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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on three missions—access,
individualization, and social problem-solving—that have
been recommended as priority agendas for higher education.
The study also describes the planning and development
of three special programs—the University Without Walls,
the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and
the Institute for Man and His Environment—which serve as
vehicles for the assumption of these missions in one
university—the University of Massachusetts.

The aim of

the study is to provide information on the viability of the
missions of access, individualization and social problem¬
solving within existing public universities and to con¬
tribute to the study of institutional change.
In a review of related research and theory, special
emphasis is placed on the articulation of new missions
and objectives for higher education by educational theorists
including Clark Kerr and David Riesman, and several specially
created study commissions and task forces including the
Truman Commission on Higher Education, the Newman Task
Force, and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

Also ©mphasized are "the characteristics of universities
as organizations and theories of change as articulated by
Ronald Havelock, Lon Hefferlin, Jack Lindquist, Warren
Bennis, Victor Baldridge and others.
Data for the study has been gathered from partici¬
pant observation, from University documents and from
approximately forty interviews.

Case studies provide

descriptions of the University of Massachusetts and of the
planning and implementation of the three programs—the
University Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with
Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man and
His Environment.

Each case focuses particularly on those

elements which could be considered important factors
to implementation and institutional change.
Each case is analyzed in order to assess the
feasibility of the missions of access, individualization
and social problem-solving for the University of Massa¬
chusetts and other public universities and to determine
and compare the factors important to the change process in
the University.
The study shows that all three missions have been
considered priority agendas for the University of Massa¬
chusetts and that special units were developed and ap¬
proved by the formal governance bodies in order to
commit the University to the fulfillment of these missions.
vi

The separatie program cases • however^ revealed variations
in the extent to which these missions could be considered
viable for special units and/or for University-wide
implementation.

The Bachelor’s Degree with Individual

Concentration program shows that the mission of individuali¬
zation was accepted and adopted.

The University Without

Walls program shows that although the provisions of
educational opportunity for non-traditional students and
the fulfillment of the mission of access would require
comprehensive changes, many at the University of Massa¬
chusetts were willing to make these changes.

The case of

the Institute for Man and His Environment reveals the
difficult organizational, attitudinal, and behavioral changes
that are required to adopt the mission of social problem¬
solving.
The study corroborates the importance of those
change factors which had been cited by Lon Hefferlin-resources, leadership, support, and environmental factors
of reward and approval—and shows very clearly the im¬
portance of the political dynamic suggested by Lindquist
and Baldridge.

The study does not unearth new change

factors, but suggests that timing might be a change factor
deserving more attention and study.

It shows the advantage

of creating special focus programs as a vehicle through
vii

which the University can accomplish change.

It also makes

clear that the process of change involves a whole net¬
work of factors and dynamics that cannot be easily isolated.
It shows that it is difficult for universities as organi¬
zations to adopt new missions.
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INTRODUCTION
^atement of the Problem.

Higher education has

increasingly moved toward center stage in American society—
a higher percentage of the population attends collegej
a steadily increasing percentage of public funds support
our colleges and universities; and more and more agencies
and individuals look to university professors for solu¬
tions to complex problems.

As a result, the number and

stridency of the voices seeking to determine the priorities
and direction of higher education have increased.

Many

people feel that colleges and universities are not pro¬
viding sufficiently individualized education for students,
and they are not applying their energies and resources
to the solution of society's most complex problems.
Educational theorists and policy makers over the
last two decades have defined access, individualization and
social problem-solving as "new" missions for higher
education.^
Colleges and universities have been slow to respond
to these renewed priorities.

This failure results less

from deliberate refusal or inattention and more from the

^See Chapter I for review of theorists and policy
makers defining missions for higher education.
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organizational patterns and structures necessitated by
rapid growth.

In order to educate the millions of appli¬

cants, most universities have become large, complex, and
bureaucratic organizations.

Whatever their original

purposes, established bureaucracies often begin to assume
a single objective—maintenance of the status quo.

It is

difficult for such organizations to change.
However, the centrality of higher education to
our society makes it imperative for our institutions of
higher education to be able to change their objectives,
priorities, and practices in order to assume new missions.
The manner in which this change is accomplished is the
focus of this study.
It is important to consider together missions and or¬
ganizational adaptability because each informs the other—
the type of mission affects how it can be introduced into an
organization and organizational characteristics often de¬
termine the viability of the mission.

This study will focus

on the missions of access, individualization and social
problem-solving and the implementation or change process
within an organization.
The study will consider how one university, the
University of Massachusetts, has adopted the missions of
access, individualization, and social problem-solving.
most important and visible method of adoption is the

The
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establishment of three programs—the University Without
Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration,
and the Institute for Man and His Environment.

The pri¬

mary objectives of each of these programs correspond
respectively to the missions of access, individualization
and social problem-solving.

Descriptive case studies of the

establishment of these programs as well as of the University
of Massachusetts form the core of this study.
Each case study will describe the planning and
implementation of the program as a way of describing the
change process.

In each, particular attention will be paid

to those factors which organizational change theorists
have cited as critical to the process of change:

extra-

institutional influence, resources, leadership, and or¬
ganizational environment, but other factors important to
the program's development will be treated as well.

The

purpose is to validate the work of change theorists and
to contribute new information to the study of change.
Significance of the Study.
is twofold:

The aim of the study

to provide information on the viability of

the missions of access, individualization and social
problem-solving within existing public universities and
to contribute to the study of institutional change.
It is informative to consider these two aspects together
and within the context of a particular institution.
Limitations of the Study.

The author of the study
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has been associated with the University of Massachusetts
for five years.

This can be seen as a limitation to the

study as it raises the possiblity of bias.

It can also

be viewed as an advantage in that the author has for three
years been actively involved with the programs in a role
analagous to that of "participant observer."
While the University of Massachusetts serves in a
sense as the case for the study, no attempt is made to
investigate all the ways in which the University of
Massachusetts has attempted to assume the missions of access,
individualization and social problem-solving.

Nor does this

study investigate the totality of the change process at
the University.

The study does, however, focus on three

programs which were used at the University of Massachusetts
as vehicles for change.

This limits the study in terms of

"generalizability" but provides a more in-depth look at
complex processes.
The case studies focus on the views of the faculty
members and administrators who were instrumental in the
planning and development of the programs rather than on
the perspectives of the students or others being served
by them.

No attempt is made to evaluate the programs,

and the case studies are limited to the specific focus
of change within an organization.
Methodology of the Study.

A descriptive case

study was deemed appropriate for analyzing the processes
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of assuming new missions and affecting change within an
institution and was chosen as the methodology for the study.
The University of Massachusetts is the locus of the
three programs which are taken as case studies and in a sense
serves also as a case.

The study considers the history, or¬

ganizational structures, academic program, leadership and
governance of the University of Massachusetts over the period
1950-1970•

It describes the University in order to provide

background material for the specific cases and review the
general factors which were important for the creation of pro¬
grams reflecting new missions and supportive of internal
institutional change.
The programs selected as case studies were chosen be¬
cause each takes as its primary objective one of the missions
advocated by educational policy-makers.

The Institute for Man

and His Environment attempts to solve complex environmental
problems; the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration
provides for individualized education; and the University With¬
out Walls operates chiefly as an access route for those who
have not previously enjoyed equal opportunity for higher edu¬
cation.

They have been chosen, in addition, because the his¬

tory of their development within the University of Massachu¬
setts provides three similar but distinct lenses through
which to view the process of change within an institution.

No

attempt has previously been made to study these programs with
a focus on institutional change.
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Data for the study was collected from documents in
University files.

Those documents describing the planning

and implementation of the three programs taken as case
studies and documents more generally related to the Uni¬
versity and recent change efforts were a primary source of
information.
Because these programs are of relatively recent
origin and because they have not previously been studied in
relation to the change process or as vehicles for accomplish¬
ing university missions, the study of documents was supple¬
mented by approximately forty interviews.
For each case study, interviews were conducted with
individuals who were in a position to provide information on
the particular program.

Those interviewed had been involved

with the initial preparatory stages of the program, with the
process of implementation, or with some aspect of the programs
relationship to the University.

Many of these individuals

were already known to the author, others were named in the
documents on the programs and others were suggested by program
directors or others currently associated with the programs.
Appendix I contains a list of those interviewed.
Interviews were non—scheduled to encourage
different information and perspectives but they were in
some respects standardized so that each of those inter¬
viewed would consider certain issues.

All of those

interviewed were asked open-ended questions about program goals and objectives, the process of planning and
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implementation, and the characteristics of the University
of Massachusetts in terms of possibilities for change as
compared to other universities.

Interviewees were asked

to consider the importance of specific factors in the
change process:

extra-institutional influence i resources?

leadership; and organizational environment including re¬
ward systems, approval process, and communications.
Appendix II contains a list of the questions used as a
basis for discussion during the interviews.
These questions were field tested on two individuals
who are directors of programs at the University of
Massachusetts which are similar to those under study in
orientation, size, and relationship to the University,
yet distinct in terms of objectives, personnel, and
process.

The field tests led to some revisions of wording

and considerable reduction in the number of questions.
In addition to data gathered from University
documents and interviews, the study contains a review of
the literature.

It reviews generally the work of the major

study commissions and groups who have been concerned
with overall missions and objectives for higher education
in the past two decades, and the work of organizational
theorists and researchers on the change process.

It

reviews specifically the work of commissions and in¬
fluential individual authors that related to the missions
of access, individualization and social problem-solving.
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and the work of those focusing on universities as or¬
ganizations and the process of change and academic reform
in colleges and universities.

Concepts and change factors

emerging from this review of the literature informed the
perspective of the description of the University of
Massachusetts as an organization and each of the case
studies.

An analytical section makes these connections

more precisely and attempts to draw conclusions from the
data.
Organization of the Study.
an introduction and seven chapters.

The study contains
Chapter I discusses

the missions of access, individualization, and social
problem solving as advocated by those commissions and
groups that have most informed policy concerning higher
education.

It also reviews the literature on organiza¬

tions and change theory.
Chapter II considers the University of Massachusetts.
It provides a general description of its evolution as a
university over the past two decades; an overview of the
policies and activities of the university with respect to
access, individualization and social problem-solving; an
assessment of those characteristics that make the Uni¬
versity capable

of

change; and a description of its

special unit change strategy.
Chapter III contains the case study of the Uni¬
versity Without Walls program.

It describes its re-
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lationship to the Union for Experimenting Colleges and
Universities and the National University Without Walls
program; its planning period, and its year as a pilot ex¬
perimental program with a small number of students.
It focuses on those factors that were crucial to the
implementation of the program.
Chapter IV contains the case study of the Bachelor's
Degree with Individual Concentration program.

It dis¬

cusses general issues and trends in curricular structure
and reform over the last two decades and relates the BDIC
program to them.

It describes the planning and implementa¬

tion process of the program and focuses on those factors
that have been critical to that process.
Chapter V is the case study on the Institute for
Man and His Environment.

It traces the complex evolution

of the Institute, highlighting in the process the crucial
change factors.
Chapter VI is an analytical chapter which draws
the general issues and processes described in the review
of the literature together with the data provided by the
case studies.

It analyzes the feasibility of the missions

of access, individualization and social problem-solving
for the University of Massachusetts and other public
universities.

It considers the process of change at the

University of Massachusetts by focusing on those factors
which were important to the development and implementation
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of the three programs under study.

It corroborates those

factors suggested in the literature on change theory as
important to the process of change and suggests additional
change factors.
Chapter VII concludes the study with a summary
statement! some speculations which were generated by the
investigation about the process of change, and several
recommendations for further study.

11

CHAPTER

I

MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION^ AND CHANGE
For as long as colleges and universities have been
in existence, there have been arguments about what functions
they ought to perform and about their appropriate role in
society.

Like other social institutions, colleges and

universities have changed over time; they have discarded
outmoded functions and taken on new missions and objectives.
Many people have sought to have a voice in the determina¬
tion of missions and objectives for higher education.
Social scientists, recognizing the close relationship
between organizational form and the ability to carry out
functions and respond to new objectives, began to study
colleges and especially universities as complex organiza¬
tions.

A few have focused on the change process within

organizations.

This chapter reviews the works of those

individuals and groups who have had the greatest impact
in the last twenty years on the articulation of missions
and objectives for higher education, reviews the work
of major organizational theorists who have spoken to
the issue of how universities as organizations adopt and
carry out missions and objectives, and reviews recent
research and theory on the process of change.
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Missions for Higher Education
The literature on higher education over the last
twenty years has contained an enormous number of recommended
missions and objectives for higher education.

Although the

range has been substantial, the predominant themes for the
period from the end of World War II to the early 1970's have
been access--the provision of equal educational opportunity;
individualization—more attention to individual student
needs; and social problem-solving—the application of the
resources of the university toward the solution of complex
social problems.

Each of these missions has been urged by

educational policy-makers and each has itself evolved in
meaning, emphasis, and practice over the period.

It is im¬

portant to be aware of these missions and of their evolution,
for they encompass the demands of the society on institu¬
tions of higher education.^
The sheer volume of the demands for access, in¬
dividualization, and social problem-solving has caused an
impact on higher education and society as a whole.

Yet

it is extremely difficult to trace a path or diffusion
process from individuals to policy decisions at the
national level, to policy decisions at the institutional
level,

and to institutional functioning.

There-

^Since 1970, the emphasis has shifted. The pre¬
dominant themes have become finances and power. These
themes, however, have served to add new urgency to those of
access, individualization and social problem-solving.
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fore, it is almost impossible to assert direct causal
relationships between ideas and events in so broad an
area as higher education.
One can, however, say that those individuals and
groups who would have been most likely to have an impact
on events in higher education would include commissions
established specifically to study higher education as a
whole, and those individual authors on higher education
whose books have been widely read.
to 1973 these include:

For the period 194?

The Truman Commission, The White

House Conference on Education, The Newman Task Force, The
American Council on Education’s Special Committee on
Campus Tensions, The Assembly on University Goals and
Governance, The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education,
and Christopher Jencks, David Riesman, and Clark Kerr.
Even among these groups and individuals, some have
been more influential than others because they caught
the mood of the times and voiced the majority view,
because they engaged in a political advocacy process or
because their reports were widely disseminated.

The most

influential have been the Truman Commission, the Newman
Task Force and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.
Appendix III gives an overview of these commissions
and the main thrust of their recommendations while this
section treats their observations on access, individualiza¬
tion, and social problem-solving.
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Access.

The priority of increasing educational

opportunity for individuals who have not previously
enjoyed the benefits of higher education is hardly a new
fad.

In its most general sense, the history of American

higher education is the history of the evolution from
small private colleges for the classical training of the
elite to the agreement in principle (though not yet in
practice) that there should be universal higher education.
The proportion of the population entering college
grew slowly yet steadily throughout the last two centuries.
After Word War II it seemed to leap dramatically.

In

part this was due to the economic benefits that were part
of the GI Bill but more important were the realization of
the importance of knowledge to the economy and the positive
correlation between educational attainment and income.
The Truman Commission in 194? articulated the arguments for
universal higher education*
The swift movement of events and the growing
complexity of our national life and of world
affairs make it imperative, at the earliest
possible time, to translate our democratic
ideal into a living reality; to eliminate the
barriers to equality of educational opportunity;
and to expand our colleges and universities to
assure that the only factors which limit en¬
rollment are the ability and interest of the
prospective students.2

^Higher Education for American Democracy,_The—Presi^dent's Commission on Higher EducatiorTiFrederick Zook,
ChairmarT, 6 Vols. (New York* Harper, 194?) 2*1.
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The Commission felt that at least fifty per cent
of high school graduates should receive higher education.
The period of the fifties and sixties was a period
of tremendous expansion for higher education.

By the late

sixties the Truman Commission's fifty per cent goal had
been realized and replaced by a goal of universal access.
In Priorities for Action.^ the Carnegie Commission
provided a list of tables which charted the attitudes on
certain issues

of twelve different commissions and task

forces (starting with the Truman Commission).

To the

statement — "The United States should have a system of
universal access to higher education"—four gave strong
positive endorsement and six gave moderate endorsement.

4

The Truman Commission recommended that government
and the private sector remove the barriers of race,
religion, economic status, and residence that were in¬
hibiting access.
In many of its reports the Carnegie Commission gave
strong emphasis to the notion of equal educational oppor-

^Priorities for Actioni Final Report of the
Carnegie Commission on Higher Educatioi^Clark Kerr,
Chairman (New Yorki
McGraw Hill,1973)•
^The four giving strong endorsement included*
The Truman Commission, The Committee on Education Beyond
the High School, 1956, The White House Conference 1971.
and the Carnegie Commission.
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tunity.

In one of its first, A Chance to Learn, it sets

short and long range goals

t

By the year 2000, ethnic origin, geographic
location, age, and quality of prior schooling
should no longer stand in the way of access to
higher education and success within it.5
The commission reemphasized the theme in their final report.
Priorities for Action, and they recommended a variety of
steps through which this goal could be achieved including
the provision of additional places in existing institutions,
new institutions, the financing of student costs, and
adjustments of existing institutions to students from a
wider variety of backgrounds.
The theme of access, however, is a complicated one
for it speaks to the larger issue of the role of higher
education in society and to questions of equality of
opportunity and equality of outcome.
Christopher Jencks and David Riesman spoke to the
role of higher education in an economically stratified yet
democratic societyi
One of the central functions of higher education
--along with providing jobs for scholars--is to
control access to the upper-middle social strata.
Since demand for upper-middle class jobs and
living standards far exceeds the supplyi colleges
must (in Erving Coffman's terminology) cool out
large numbers of youngsters whose ambitions exceed
their ability.
Not only that--these individuals

^A Chance to Learnt An Action Agenda for Equal
Opportunity in Higher Education, Report of the Carnegie
Commission on Higher EducationT Clark Kerr, Chairman
(New York I
McCraw Hill, 1970)» P*
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must be eliminated in such a way as to preserve
at least the appearance of fairness to all social
strata • . . the distribution system must be in
keeping with traditional American mythology,
which portrays America as a land of opportunity
with unlimited room at the top . . , ,o
Jencks and Riesman do not feel that universal
higher education will result in an egalitarian classless
society, and they feel that what is important for America
is not more mobility, but more equality.
The Carnegie Commission did not advocate an
egalitarian classless society and pointed only to the
positive correspondence between education and income for
those who had achieved higher education.

The Carnegie

Commission called for universal access, but it made it
quite clear that it was not recommending universal
attendance.

In Quality and Equality'^ and Priorities for

Action the Commission saw the mission of higher education
to provide equality of opportimity, not equality of
results.

Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic
Revolution (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Double¬
day and Company, I968), pp. 99-100.
'^Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal
Responsibility for Higher Education, Rieport of the
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Clark Kerr,
Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, I968).
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The Carnegie Commission has been criticized
for its failure to examine thoroughly the role of higher
education in society, especially in areas of access,
equality, and the economic order.

Norman Bimbaum felt

that with its five year study and five million dollars,
the Carnegie Commission should not have avoided the
difficult issue of meritocracy vs. egalitarianism in the
American social order.

He felt thatt

If the Commission were serious about the idea of
an educational revolution, its work would have
been remarkably different. Beginning with a
rational critique of our institutions, particularly
our economic ones, it would have sought to devise
new ones consonant both with our productive powers
and our egalitarian and democratic ideas.°
Finally, it is a very complex argument.

There

have been obvious economic gains for individuals and
groups because of the provision of

greater educational

opportunity yet there are obvious limits to

what

an

equalized educational system can achieve in an unequal
and stratified social order.
There is no doubt, however, that during the sixties,
attention was drawn especially to the subject of access
for minority group members who remained significantly

Q

Norman Birnbaum, "The Politics of the Future:
5 (November 1973)* P* 29*
The Carnegie Commission," Change.
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under-represented in colleges and universities.

More

equalized educational attainment, it was assumed during
the Kennedy and Johnson years, would lead to a more
democratic and tolerant society.

Many blacks who received

degrees during that period in fact moved to high level
positions in government, business, and industry and
there was no question that the society as a whole became
more democratic.

By the late sixties, however, it

became clear that many wanted equality of opportunity for
the few but not for the many.
Other groups who were being discriminated against
were receiving attention as well.
education access for women

Many suggested equal

as a means of achieving

greater equality between the sexes.

Others recommended

the provision of education for those persons beyond the
traditional college age. as a means of providing a second
chance to those who had not taken advantage of higher
education in earlier years and/or for whom retraining
or further education was desired.
While access had been the goal, it had not been
fully realized.

In 1971 the Newman Task Force found

that:
Minorities are still underrepresented. Women
are openly discriminated against. Arbitrary
restrictions and a lack of imaginative pro¬
grams limit the opportunities for those of
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beyond the normal college age or those for
whom attendance at a conventional campus
is impractical,9
Access will continue to be an important mission for higher
education throughout the seventies, and increasing emphasis
should continue to be put on the provision of educational
opportunity for particular groups.

In fact the dynamic

has changed considerably in the last few years.

Instead

of the Jenck's notion of "cooling out" the masses we
have the Sunday Times "hard-sell."

Where once the

provision of educational opportunity was a moral issue
it has now become an economic one.

Colleges and imiversities

are actively recruiting students to fill up empty places,
and this economic factor should insure that the mission of
access will remain a predominant theme for higher edu¬
cation.
Individualization.

Those who have called for greater

access have been aware that the obligation "is to provide
more than just the chance to walk' through the college
gate—that there must also be access to a useful and per¬
sonally significant educational experience."^®

This

thrust toward greater individualization of education con¬
stitutes a major theme of the period.

^Report on Higher Education, Report of Task Force
on Higher Education, oy Frank Newman, Chairman (Washington,
D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1971)«

10

Ibid., p. 3*
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Individualization has meant many things to many
people and is a "new" mission only in the context of the
times and circumstances.
colleges for centuries.

Students have been central to
American higher education during

the twentieth century, however, increasingly replaced
student interests with those of faculty.

The "new" mission,

therefore, signifies an emphasis on the students and a con¬
cern for their educational and developmental needs as indi¬
viduals.

It also means providing students with the freedom

and responsibility of making their own educational choices.
It has led to a call over the last twenty years for academic
reform and has had two major foci—one concerned with the
inadequacy of the curriculum for current and more tra¬
ditional students, and the other concerned with the edu¬
cational development of non-traditional students.
Oddly enough, individualization has become a
predominant theme because of the successful provision
of access.

Colleges and universities have expanded so

rapidly in response to demand that many of the large ones
resemble factories and treat students as units to be
processed.
The current situation on college and university
campuses was eloquently described by Jencks and Riesman.

^^Machine and computer analogies are made re¬
peatedly in the literature on higher education from the
1960's,
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They hold that a central feature of college life is the
confrontation between the old and the young.

This con¬

frontation has been exacerbated as faculty become more
and more academic and retreat from any concern with
students—especially undergraduates—even to the extent
of handing the teaching function over to graduate students.
On the other hand, the specialization of knowledge, the
narrow vision of disciplines and departments, and the
aloofness of the faculty, have made the students feel that
they have nothing to contribute in an academic sense so
they retreat into a host of subcultures which in fact
define their entire collegiate experience.
As colleges and universities differ considerably
in orientation and style, students also are quite diverse
from institution to institution and on a particular campus.
They tend to define and group themselves as collegiate
(fraternity-sorority-athletic), academic

(serious), vo¬

cational (clear career focus), or non-conformists (po¬
litical and more recently deviant life-style activists).
These affiliations dominate the collegiate experience for
students and define the educational component much more
pervasively than do curricular or departmental units created
by the university for that purpose.
Clark Kerr is somewhat more optimistc than
Jencks and Riesman about the possibilities for students
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within large imiversities.

He defines the multiversity

as a city which provides a plethora of options.
The multiversity is a confusing place for the
student.
He has problems of establishing his
identity and sense of security within it.
But
It offers him a vast range of choices, enough
literally to stagger the mind.
In this range
of choices he encounters the opportunities and
the dilemmas of freedom.
The casualty rate is
high.
The walking wounded are many.
'Lernfreiheit'—the freedom of the student to pick
and choose, to stay or to move on—is triumphant. ^
Many students and faculty do not agree with Kerr's
concept of free choice for the student.

They feel that

in a society which continues to use educational credentials
as a sorting device students do not in fact have the option
of non-attendance.

Furthermore, they claim that while

universities have appropriated the role of credentialer
in society, the university curriculum is appropriate
only to specialized disciplinary study and research and
is therefore not helpful in preparation for most careers.
Furthermore, they feel that universities have not pro¬
vided a curriculum that is concerned with the complex
and important issues of the day because it is so frag¬
mented by specialization.

Finally, many students—who

in terms of age and maturity are more adult than previously—
feel that universities have failed to recognize them as

York:

^^Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (New
Harper, 19^3)t p» ^2.
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adult individuals and have failed to provide them the
opportunity to make decisions about their own lives and
educations.
For all of these reasons, students and many faculty
became involved during the sixties with academic reform
movements.

Many students had tested their power and

organizational skills in political activism but had been
frustrated by attempts to effect political changes.

They

turned their energies inward and demanded a more "relevant"
curriculum and more power to the individual student in
determining his or her academic program.
Concurrent with and in part resulting from the
student movement, many educators were becoming concerned
with the issue of reform on campus.

Several were becoming
I

alarmed at the pervasive institutional trend termed by
Jencks and Riesman "the academic revolution," and they
tried to think of ways to reintroduce a community of
scholars.

The prevailing patterns that academic reforms

have taken over the past decade include*
A.

Attempts to reintroduce the "community of

scholars" through cluster or residential colleges.
B.

Greater course options for students within

core and major requirements.
C.
more closely
goals.

New courses, majors and departments that are
aligned with student interests and/or career
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D.

More opportunities for experiential learning

and field experiences.
E.

Greater variety in means for crediting learning

experiences including credit for prior learning.
F.

Movements toward external degree programs and

open universities often initiated on the state level.
Recommendations for these and other reforms have
pervaded the commission reports over the last twenty years.
It was the Truman Commission that first voiced concern
over the increased specialization and emphasized that
education should contribute to the general quality of life.
The Commission recommended a unified concept of general
education.

The American Council on Education's Special

Committee on Campus Tensionsand the President's Com¬
mission on Campus Unrest,while focusing primarily on
governance issues and ways to include students in

decision¬

making, also recommended curricular reforms to give students
more power over their own education.

The Assembly on

University Goals and Governance called for experimentation

^^Campus Tensions: Analysis and Recommendations«
Special Committee on Campus Tensions, The American Council
on Education, Sol Linowitz, Chairman (Washington, D.C.:
American Council on Education, 1970)*
^^Campus Unrestt Report of the President's
^
Commission on Campus Unrest, William W. Scranton, Chair¬
man (Washington, D.C.t
Government Printing Office,
1970).
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and flexibility.^^

Much of the report of the White House

Conference on Youth was concerned with education and it
stated that higher education should become more humane
and more oriented to the self-development of the individual
student.Martin Meyerson felt in I97O1
Perhaps the most important task is to deal with
the students* demands for relevance in their
education.
One of the great tasks for the 1970's
is to try to integrate the liberal learning and
the professional learning so that the scholar, the
student, and society each benefit .... These
are the tasks:
transforming professional edu¬
cation for undergraduates and graduates alike by
making it more humane and intellectual; adding
to the intrinsically valuable academic studies
that devotion to social purpose which is so
typically a part of the spirit of service of the
professions ... .17
The Newman Task Force was perhaps the most outspoken
in its criticism of existing institutional practices.

The

^^First Reportt The Assembly on University Goals
and Governance, Martin Meyerson, Chairman (Cambridge,
Mass.: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences,

1971).
^^Renort of the White House Conference on Youths
Task Force on Education, Robben W. Fleming,Chairman
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1971).
Martin Meyerson, "New Paths to New Destinies,
Saturday Review» 53 (January 10, 1970)» P»
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Newman Task Force felt that institutions of higher educa¬
tion were not responsive to society, to different kinds
of students, or to the needs of individual students.

Their

opinion of the current reform efforts was also devastating:
In the last several years, largely due to the
escalation of student protests, a great deal of
thought and energy has been given to the problem
of making colleges and universities more responsive
to the educational needs and interests of
students ....
On campuses where reforms have been implemented,
students have greater responsibility for their
educational programs, and see more of their
teachers than they did before ....
But, by
and large, this movement toward reform was begun
at selective institutions, and has been shaped
by elitist premises.
Characteristically many of
the reforms are designed to make undergraduate-, 0
education more like graduate education ....
The basic position of the Newman Task Force was
that reform was not really possible within existing in¬
stitutions and could only be achieved through the creation
of new institutions which would be more responsive and
flexible.

Their critiques of existing practices and

reform efforts were impressive and very influential, but
one would have liked more substance in their recommendations
for alternatives.
Although many have criticized the Carnegie Commission
for its failure to deal with substantive issues, several of
its reports deal with issues of academic content and re¬
form in order to provide greater individualization.
Reform on Campus:

In

Changing Students. Changing Academic

^®Newman, Renort on Higher Education, pp* 21-22.
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Programs the Commission surveyed attitudes of thousands
of students and faculty toward the curriculum and found
considerable satisfaction with current educational programs.
However, the Commission felt that there was enough evidence
of malfunctioning to warrant reform and called for efforts
in two directions.

First they called for diversity among

institutions and diversity of program within institutions.
Second, they called for provision of a number of coherent
and internally consistent options within the curriculum.
Each option would provide a broad learning experience.
"Relevance is achieved when courses and programs relate
directly to the individual interests of students and to

ig

current social problems.” ^

The Carnegie Commission's Less Time—More Options:
Education Beyond the High School, holds that most college
programs are inappropriate for many kinds of students and
it calls for a diversity of program options for diverse
studentsIt focuses perhaps too much on the structural
aspects of the curriculum such as three year degree pro¬
grams, more points of entry and exit, and greater flexi¬
bility in time and space, and too little on the content

^^Reform on Campus:
Changing Students. Changing
Academic Programs, Report of the CarnegieCommission on
Higher EducationV Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1972).

,

20^Less Time. More Potions:

Education Beyond The High
School, Report of the Carnegie Commissipn^on Higher Education, Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970J.
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of the curriculum.

Yet it has been disseminated widely,

and clearly had an impact on educational thinking,

it

provided the framework for much of the activity on

college

and university campuses over the past two years.

In New

Students and New Places Policies for the Future Growth
and Development of American Higher Education, the Commission
recommends state-wide expansion of external degree pro¬
grams and open universities.^^
Priorities for Action makes clear the Commission's
attitudes toward students.

It also summarizes the Commission's

recommendations for reform into three directions t

"toward

more options for students in their attendence patterns;
toward more diversity of programs both

among and within

individual institutions, thus expanding the range of choice
for students; and toward enrichment of programs.
Students vary greatly in their capacities and in
the intensity of their interests.
They are
generally capable—or at least as capable as
anyone else—in many situations of making de¬
cisions among alternatives that directly affect
themselves.
They will be more satisfied with
their situations if they are able, within reason¬
able limits, to structure—student by student—

New Students and New Places:
Policies for the
Future Growth and Development of American Higher Education^
Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education,
Clark Kerr, Chairman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971)•
^Apriorities of Action. Carnegie Commission on
Higher Education, Ibid., p. 46.
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alternatives that each student
believes will best fit his or her individual
wisi^0s • ^
By 1971p the notion of non-traditional study had
gained broad enough acceptance that a commission to study
and make recommendations concerning it was established
by the Educational Testing Service and the College Entrance
Examination Board.

The Commission defined "non-traditional

study" as an attitude, rather than a system; that places
emphasis on the student; that encourages diversity of
individual effort, competence, and performance; and that deemphasizes time and space.

The Commission recommended

a wider range of educational options, increased emphasis
on learning and less on degree structures, and a national
assessment capability to advise students of alternative
ways to complete a degree program.
It seems clear that as student bodies continue to
grow and become more diverse, the mission of individualiza¬
tion through academic reform will continue to be an
important issue in higher education.

^^Ibid.
24

Diversity by Design. Report of the Commission
on Non-Traditional Study, Samual B. Gould, Chairman
(San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1973)•
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Social Problem-Solving.

A third mission for higher

education is the application of knowledge and other resources
toward the solution of complex social problems,

it is a

theme that has taken a number of complex twists over the
years but generally stated it is believed that as problems
—ranging from overpopulation, resource depletion, urban
decay, environmental pollution, health care delivery
and the like—become more visible, complex and urgent,
colleges and universities must take on the responsibility
of looking for solutions.

The traditional missions for

American higher education have included public service
as well as teaching and research.

Social problem-solving

is related to public service, but it is more specific
in that it establishes definite areas for service and
implies attention to complex and difficult problems.
Problem-solving is seen as a responsibility of higher
education for several reasons:
1.

Public colleges and universities are supported

by the public through taxation.

That support has increased

dramatically over the last twenty years in line with the
tremendous increase in the number and size of higher
education institutions.

More support has led to a demand

for increased accountability.
2.

Universities produce knowledge and knowledge

is essential to problem-solving.

As Ikenberry put it:
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Knowledge is the fuel central to a scientific,
technological, and socially complex societyj it
is the nourishment society must have to function
rapid escalation of the power
of the university results from its role in the
knowledge industry as a principal producer and
distributor. From this point of view, one could
argue persuasively that the raison d'etre of the
contemporary university is not knowledge for its
own sake but knowledge for society's sake.25
Universities—especially after World War II—continued to
place high priority on the production of knowledge,
primarily through the expansion of the frontiers of the
disciplines.

They did not, however, hold in high priority

the transmission or application of that knowledge through
applied research or service activities, so social problem¬
solving has become a mission.
3»

Universities are the -only institutions that

maintain the freedom and distance from the rest of society
and its institutions which may be necessary to effectively
solve problems created by those social institutions.
Those who hold a classical view of the purposes of the
university say that the mission of the university is to
house scholars and students—it is not the mission of the
university to involve these scholars in the solution of
contemporary problems.

^•^Stanley Ikenberry and Renee Friedman, Beyond
Academic Departments, (San Franciscos Jossey BassV1972),
p. 98.

33

The classical view is that the university has
no purposes, at least none as defined in
utilitarian terms. The pursuit of truth is
synonymous with purpose and the mean's are ends
in themselves. The primary function of the
corporate body, therefore, is to provide a
setting for scholarly activity.
This view of the university predominated in Europe more
than in the United States where the establishment of
land-grant universities from the 1960*s in every state
established a stronger precedent for service to society.
The role of the university as the producer of
knowledge and the ultimate good of higher education for
society were assumed concepts by many of the commissions
created to study higher education from the late forties
to the mid-sixties.
The Truman Commission—following shortly upon
World War IT,—wanted American higher education to concern
itself with solutions to the global problems created by
the war.

A White House Conference on Education convened

by Johnson in his first years as President claimed that
education had emerged as the primary instrument for the
solution of domestic social problems—racism, poverty,
27
urban problems, environmental problems and the like.

^^Ibid.
^"^These problem-solving efforts of the Johnson
era might have borne more fruit had they not been quickly
overshadowed by the imperatives of the Viet Nam War.
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Clark Kerr's

Uses of the University faced head

on the question of the role of the university in society
and sent both positive and negative shock waves throughout
higher education.

Kerr argued that the major impacts upon

current universities were the land grant movement and
federal support of scientific research during World War IIj
that the universities had lost their community aspects and
become cities or multiversities that were characterized by
a variety of communities and a variety of purposes held
together by a corporate structure.

Many of their purposes

were determined by the federal government's funding policies.
Universities had become predominantly service institutions
for the society.

28

The Newman Task Force claimed, in 1971, that the
system of higher education had not been at all responsive
to society and that it therefore needed to be dramatically
overhauled.

The Task Force called for more public debate

on higher education, for greater clarification of in¬
stitutional priorities, for greater "real" diversity * for
the creation of explicit research universities, and for
professional training programs.

These last would have

the specific mandates to advance knowledge and provide

^^Corson provided the most apt terminology in a
Saturday Review article by claiming that higher education is
rapidly taking on the status of a "public utility
See
John Corson, "Social Change and the University," Saturday
Review 53 (January 10, 1970)* P* 7^.
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skilled manpower to attack socisa problems.
The Carnegie Commission saw attention to critical
social problems as a mission for higher education but fo¬
cused more on the related role of criticizing and evaluating
other social institutions.

It listed as fifth among the

major purposes for higher education:

"evaluating society,

for the benefit of its self-renewal, through individual
scholarship and persuasion.
Universities, because of the safeguarded tenets of
academic freedom and tenure have the opportunity to criticize
other social institutions.

This ability to criticize is as

important as the active involvement in applied research
and service activities to the solution of problems in¬
volving large social systems.

The Carnegie Commission,

while including problem-solving as a purpose did not,
however, set it as a priority.
Public service as a traditional mission for higher
education has received far less attention in the literature
than have teaching and research.

Similarly, social problem¬

solving, although generally accepted as a responsibility
for higher education by taxpayers, the federal and state
governments, and many educators, has not received primary
attention by any but the Newman Task Force.

There is no

^Apriorities for Action. Carnegie Commission on
Higher Education, Ibid., p. 26.

36

question however that accountability to the public has
become a predominant theme and mission for higher education.

Universities as Organizations and
Organizational Change
The missions for higher education, and calls for
change will remain rhetorical, however, unless they are
adopted by institutions of higher education.

This section

reviews some of the theory and literature on universities
as organizations and on organizational change*^® considers
some of the organization difficulties that prevent
institutions from assuming the missions of access,
individualization, and social problem-solving, and describes
the strategy of the creation of new organizations! units
as a way of dealing with this problem.
The formal organizational structure of universities
has consisted of discipline-based departments organized
schools and colleges and administrative support units.
traditional fimctions for public,

into
The

land-grant universities

have included teaching, research, and public service.
Governance structures have reserved for the faculty de¬
cisions concerning the curriculum, personnel, and overall

^^Only those works on organizational theory and
change theory that are directly related to this study are
reviewed in this chapter.
Appendices IV and V contain
additional reviews of works on organizational and change
theory that are pertinent as background information to
this study.
Appendix IV is a supplementary review of the
literature on organizational theory.
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policies; and administrative units are organized hierar¬
chically with decisions made at top levels.

Independent

governing boards have final legal responsibility for the
university and therefore authority for all decisions.
A recent work, the University as an Organization,
contends that:
Organizationally the xmiversity is, in fact, one
of the most complex structures in modern society;
it is also increasingly archaic.
It is complex
because its formal structure does not describe
either actual power or responsibilities; it is
archaic because the functions it must perform are
not and cannot be discharged through the formal
structure provided in its charter . The predica¬
ment of university organization has arisen in
part because of its conflicting missions?^
Parkins would contend that actual power over
universities—especially public ones—is increasingly held
outside the institution at the state level and that the
department and school structure is appropriate only to
the teaching function of the university.
Neal Gross argued that universities were ex¬
periencing "organizational lag"—changes in organizational
goals and functions had outrun the capacity of the
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organizational structures.-^

James Perkins.ed.The University as an Organization(New York: McGraw Hill, 1973)f P» 3«
^^Neal Gross, "Organizational Lag in American
Universities," Harvard Educational Review.
33 (Winter

1963).
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E.D. Duryea noted "three pervasive organizational
inadequacies" that further clarify the notions of organi¬
zational lag and archaic structures.

These inadequacies

he attributed to size and complexity^ specialization and
departmentalization, and shifting patterrs of institutional
government.They point as well to reasons why systemswide change in universities will be difficult to achieve.
The size and complexity of many universities has
resulted from huge educational bureaucracies.

Duryea

found two bureaucracies—"the academic bureaucracy with
departments, senates, and councils and the administrative,
management bureaucracies."^^

Organizational theorists have

long agreed that one of the characteristics of a bureau¬
cratic organization is an inability to change rapidly
no matter how imperative or desirable

the change.

The second organizational inadequacy Duryea found
in universities is g)ecialization and departmentalization.
He claims that departments continue to exert the principal
force in the operational definition of goals and purposes
because of their power over the curriculum and personnel
decisions.

Current practices and policies reflect their

decisions, and change efforts are inhibited because
departments have the largest vested interest in the

^^E.D. Duryea, "Evolution of University Organization,"
in The University as an Organization. Ibid.

34 Ibid., p. 36.
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maintenance of the status-quo.
The third organizational inadequacy consists of
outmoded governance structures.

One of the most dynamic

forces operating in universities today is the struggle
to gain power and control over decision-making in the
universities:

a)

Much real power—i.e., budgetary

power—is moving outside of the institution into the
hands of state governing boards and legislative committees,
b) Presidents continue to assert the power and authority
delegated to them by Boards of Trustees and frequently
exert control over all areas of the university by careful
manipulation of the internal allocation of resources,
c)

The collective faculty insists upon more involvement in

all areas of university governance because of their
hegemony over curriculum and personnel, and d)

Subgroups

within the university—professional staff, classified
staff, faculty, graduate teaching assistants, and
students increasingly demand power over decisions affecting
them.

As a result of these governance shifts it is

difficult to pinpoint the final authority for any decision,
and systems-wide change efforts are often blocked or
confused by issues of power and influence.
The relationship between organizational form and
governance is a complex one which remains ill-defined in
the literature.

Another recent work The Multicampus

University looks closely at

a

new organizational

4o

phenomenon in higher education and asks the question about
which organizational form is likely to solve the problems
of higher education in the 1970’s.^^

Multicampus

universities have developed in many states, including
Massachusetts,

as a response to needs for more state¬

wide attention and coordination of higher education,
as well as needs to limit at some point the size of single
institutional units*

The study finally does not answer

the question of organizational form but it raises important
issuesi
Indeed, our inability to understand the political
and social context of organizational form has
beclouded our understanding of the dynamics of
university governance. None of the alternative
patterns of organization is better or worse in
the abstract. They take shape and can be evalua¬
ted only in terms of the environment within which
they are set ....
The organization of higher education, therefore,
is critical "in combination” with its environment.
Organizational form affects the access and power
of the different participants in academic govern¬
ance with respect to specific decisions.
It in¬
fluences the agenda of all institutions of higher
education* the manner in which that agenda will
be handled, and the very substance of educational
plans and programs.
Organizational form affects
the goals and values that control the life of the
universities and colleges—singly and collectively--

^^Eugene Lee and Frank Bowen, The Multicamnus
University: A Study of Academic Governance (New Yorki
McGraw Hill, 1971)•
^^The University of Massachusetts was not considered
in the Lee and Bowen study, however, because of the Uni¬
versity's recent evolution to multi-campus status.
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however, have pointed to the inability to change and
those who have studied imiversities as organizations have
pointed to additional reasons why it is hard for univer¬
sities to change rapidly.

All of these provide some in¬

sight into why it would be difficult for universities as
whole systems to assume the new missions of access,
individualization, and social problem-solving.
Those who recommend universal access for higher
education find that the structures and forms of higher
education were created to deal with full-time residential
students who enter at more or less the same knowledge and
experience level.

Changing those structures and forms—

administrative as well as academic—will be a very diffi¬
cult undertaking.
Those who argue for greater individualization and
responsiveness to student needs and interests find the
discipline-based curriculum emanating from the organizational
structures of departments more a reflection of faculty
interests than student interests.

Although departments

were originally created to perform the teaching function,
the increase in knowledge and consequent specialization
have rendered them appropriate, in many cases, for teaching
only at the graduate level.

Full provision for individuali¬

zation would require a revamping of the academic program
and would probably be beyond the financial capabilities
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of universities.
Those who recommend

social problem-solving as a

mission find that while departments and schools allow for
research that pushes back the frontiers of knowledge in
the various disciplines, they rarely allow for attention
to problems that cut across disciplinary lines.

Adequate

attention to even a handful of the most pressing social
problems would require a change in the entire departmental
system.
Because of the difficulties of accomplishing
systems-wide organizational change efforts in a university,
many have advocated the creation of special units as
parallel structures or temporary systems.

They have

recommended them for two major reasons:
1.

It would be more possible to implement them

in a university environment; and
2.

Once implemented such units bring pressure for

change on existing organizational structures.

In this way

they become part of a larger organizational change
strategy.
The point is made by a number of organizational
theorists.

York:

Everett Rogers talks about models for emulation

^^Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New
The Free Press, 19^2).
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and Mathew Miles about temporary systems.Ikenberry makes
the point most directly in connection with his study on
research institutes and their relationships with the
university.

A large number of university administrators

that he interviewed felt that:
1.

Institutes enable the university to establish

new goals and respond to new constituencies more readily
than do departments.
2.

Institutes make visible the university's

commitment to a particular area of specialization in a
manner not possible in the department.
3.

Institutes are useful in assembling inter¬

disciplinary teams.
4.

Institutes generate financial support.

5«

Institutes more than departments allow for a

rapid shift of resources to meet new institutional
responsiblities.

4l

Ikenberry concluded that independent research in¬
stitutes provided the best organizational form for inter¬
disciplinary research and service activities.

^^Mathew Miles, ed., Innovations in Education
(New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964).
^^Ikenberry, Beyond Academic Departments, Ibid.,
pp. 104-105•

^5

Distinct, parallel units would make the organizational
forms and functions even more complex but, according to
many theorists, represent the most viable means for the
assumption of new missions.
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Change Theory
While study commissions and others have articulated
missions for institutions of higher education; organizational
theorists have begun to study the characteristics of colleges
and universities as complex organizations, and many theorists
have suggested new organizational units

as a means of

accomplishing change within complex institutions 5 others
have been devoting their energies to studying the process
of change.

This work on change theory serves as important

^^The author here disagrees with the conclusions of
Perkins in the University as an Organization.
Perkins
predicts that there will be changes in mission and function,
as well as in organizational form in universities over the
next twenty years.
He argues that large scale research
and many—though not all—public service activities will
shift to non-university institutions and that consequently
organizational forms will be simplified and governance
clarified.
The author feels that pressure for more public
service--particularly in the area of social problem¬
solving; for more research; and for greater access will
increase and that new missions will emerge in the years
ahead. As a direct consequence organizational structures
will become even more complex and as a consequence of
that, governance will continue to be fuzzy.
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background for this study for several reasons.
1.

It helps clarify the question of how

universities—as total systems—can adopt new missions.
2.

The preceding section described the near

impossibility of achieving system-wide change, but pointed
to the creation of separate units as one possible change
strategy.

Change theory provides further elaboration on

this strategy.
3«

Assuming that the university has adopted the

strategy of creating new units, it remains important to
ask what factors have been important to the creation of
those units.

Close scrutiny of the change factors in a

single unit might lead to a clear understanding of those
factors in larger units.
Social scientists have been scrutinizing the change
process in a variety of different social systems and they
have been using a variety of different research methodolo¬
gies related to different disciplines—predominantly
sociology, anthropology, and psychology—in their studies.
They are working toward a generalized theory of change that
would be applicable to all situations.

Much of their work

remained separate and distinct within the disciplines,
however, until Everett Rogers in 1964^^ and Ronald Havelock

^^Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, Ibid.
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in 1968 began to synthesize it.

Ronald Havelock claims

in 1968 that there is an emerging discipline in the social
sciences focusing on processes of change, innovation, and
knowledge utilization:
the quantity and even the quality of available
literature indicates that the basic conceptual
and empirical ingredients of this new discipline
are now present.
Havelock surveyed over 4,000 literature titles.
The rudimentary state of the "discipline," however,
precludes simple analysis and easy generalizations.

It

remains necessary to trace change theory through many re¬
search strands each of which contributes insights to the
process.

Appendix V reviews some general attitudes toward

change, and some recent change theory, while this section
treats

more specifically those works which have dealt with

the change process in colleges and universities and which
were directly relevant to this study.
The most important researchers on change in colleges
and universities are J.B. Lon Hefferlin and Jack Lindquist.
Four additional authors—Joseph Fashing, Steven Deutsch,

^^Ronald J. Havelock, Planning for Innovation
Through Dissemination and UtillFation of Knowledg^(Ann
ArborV Michigan^
Center for Research and Utlization
of Scientific Knowledge, University of Michigan, 1968), p. 16.
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Victor Baldridge, and Warren Bennis wrote case histories
of change or reform efforts in colleges and universities
which contributed to the theory of change and to this
study.
—*

One of the most important works for

this study was Dynamics of Academic Reform by J. B. Lon
Hefferlin.

Hefferlin's book, published in I969, reports

on a four year major study—the study of Institutional
Vitality—conducted by the Institute of Higher Education,
Teachers College,

Columbia University.

In simple terms the purpose has been to uncover
the forces within institutions which tend to
preserve and nourish a readiness to change as
they face new social conditions, new types of
students, and new developments in teaching
methods and materials,45
To carry out the study Lon Hefferlin and others surveyed
existing information on organization change in general
and academic change in particular, made a series of
sixteen case studies of the evolution of particular
practices at a number of institutions,

developed a question¬

naire called the Institutional Functioning Inventory, and
tested their ideas about academic reform on a randomly
selected stratified sample of 110 American colleges and
universities.

^^J.B. Lon Hefferlin, Dynamics of Academic Reform
(San Francisco I
Jossey-Bass, 19^9), p. x-xi7
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Lon Hefferlin,

like most authors considering change

in higher education, felt that most changes in higher
education are attributable to forces external to the
university.

Changes are made within the institution in

order to respond to the existing or perceived priorities
of those outside of the institution who control the flow
of resources to the institution.

These groups include

state legislators, the federal government, foundations
and the general public.

The redirection or reorientation

of any institution must come from without.

Data in the

Hefferlin studies supported this conclusion.
Lon Hefferlin concludes,

in addition, from his

study that three dominant sources of change in higher
education have been resources, advocacy, and openness.
As resources constitute the key external factor,
they also are the key internal factor.
In short, the first key to academic reform is
that of resources:
an existing program will
continue to exist as long as it can find support.
A new program will be tolerated if it costs no
money or it brings its own support. It will
be resisted if the new funds it requires could
be used for the expansion of existing programs.
And it will be actively opposed and accepted
only under duress if existing resources must
be divided to include it.^°

46

Ibid., p.

39*
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The second factor is advocacy:
Call it inspiration, leadership, persuasion,
or politicking{ without it change is unlikely.
All the evidence from history as well as
from the observations of men and women engaged
in academic life about the importance of in¬
dividual initiative in stimulating change is
borne out by the statistical evidence of this
study:
academic change tends to be highest at
colleges and universities where the most in¬
fluential members of the institution are seen
k_
as forces for change rather than for stability.
Leadership or advocacy needs to be exercised at three
different levels.

Some individual (often from outside

the institution) must act as initial advocate or change
agent, another individual who has influence over the
faculty must exercise opinion leadership and a third
individual occupying a position of power and control over
resources must be willing to financially support an
innovation.
In addition to the individual leadership and action,
however, there must exist a critical mass of support from
the faculty for a reform to be adopted.

The absolute

number of the critical mass is impossible to determine
as that varies with other factors—amount of financial
resources, need for innovation, position power of person(s),
exercising leadership,

47 Ibid.,

p.

etc., but it is clear that a number

l4l.

51

of individuals must be supportive.

The critical mass of

support is necessary from among the faculty and ad¬
ministrators,

and while students can contribute to the

critical mass, although critical numbers here are far
higher than for faculty,

student support alone does not

seem sufficient to bring about change.
The third factor important to reform, according
to Lon Hefferlin,

involves the openness of the system

or a conducive institutional environment.

This includes

a shifting combination of organization structure,
governance,

ethos,

communications, growth, and other

institutional characteristics.

Lon Hefferlin concluded

from the literature on organizational change that organi¬
zations generally are inherently passive, and tend toward
ritualism and self-maintenance of their members.

He

concluded from his study on academic organizations that
they were even more resistent to change than other
organizations because their purposes and support are
conservative,

they are vertically fragmented and struc¬

tured to resist change, and the norm of professionalism
breeds independence among institutional members.
Lon Hefferlin found, however,

some characteristics

that lead to change and reform.These include:

^^These characteristics are discussed in Chapter VI
"Sources of Reform,"
Lon Hefferlin, pp* 13o“190*
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1.

A market is essential:
“Market means both a demand for change and a
corresponding reward for change.

2.

New models are needed for emulation.
‘These may be extra institutional models or
internal models housed in distinct or separate
units.
^

3»

Ideas need circulation.
“Communication between institutions should not
be dependent only upon faculty growth but
should be encouraged by workshops, seminars,
and inter-institutional meetings.

4.

A number of "marginal" members are helpful.
“Marginal members of institutions are those who
are committed to it but not dependent upon it
for livelihood.

5»

For major reorganization, new members seem necessary.
“ 'The most dynamic institutions tend to be those
where the faculty is both expanding and changing
the most, where the junior faculty appear to have
more influence in affecting educational policy
than at other institutions, and where the.
proportion of tenured faculty is lowest."^9

6.

The right people must be retained.
-The atmosphere and environment must be conducive
to change and supportive so that the vital
people and advocates of new ideas stay on at the
institution.

7.

Initiative is decentralized.
-"We suspect that the major restriction to
continuous reform on many campuses is the
debilitating effects of a sense of power¬
lessness . . . ."30

8.

Patriarchy is avoided.
-"In a patriarchal institution, power is not
merely concentrated in one person or group,
but it is assigned on the basis of seniority

^^Ibid., p. 163*
•^^Ibid., p. 166.
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and is thus held interminably or indefinitely
by senior members.”51
Patriarchy is an in¬
adequate form of government in a rapidly
changing society.
9*

Collegial consensus is also avoided.
-"Collegiality is well-suited to those colleges
and universities that operate as holding
companies for their faculty members—those
institutions that exist for the purpose of
providing professors with space, equipment,
and apprentices, and where the combined in¬
terests of the faculty constitute the pur¬
poses of the whole."52
Lon Hefferlin and others would maintain that
colleges and universities are not meant to be
such holding companies and that such governance
control by the collegium has resulted in con¬
servative institutions which are not easily
adaptable to social change.
It is very diffi¬
cult to accomplish anything if everyone must
agree.

10.

The institution is avuncular.
-The term avuncular is derived from the Latin
term avunculus referring to an uncle.
The
characteristics that identify the avuncular
institution are:
a) initiative is neither
permanently centralized nor dispersed and all
connected with the institution participate at
one time or another in determining policy}
b) high status is assigned on the basis of
expertise and c) positions of status shift
according to different tasks rather than in
strict rotation.
"Expertise tempers the
authority of patriarchy and the equality of
the collegium."53

^^Ibid., p. 169»
^^Ibid., p.

175.

^^Ibid., p.

180.
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Lon Hefferlin's study was very impressive.

It

started from a broad theoretical base concerning both
higher education and the general process of change, used
imaginative research methodologies^^ and analyzed per¬
ceptively the factors for change in universities.
Jack Lindquist.

Next to Lon Hefferlin's, the most

immediately helpful and the most recent work on the process
of change in colleges and universities is that being under¬
taken by Arthur Chickering and Jack Lindquist in the
"Strategies for Change and Knowledge Utilization" Project
that is being conducted under the auspices of the Union
for Experimenting Colleges and Universities and supported
by the National Institute for Mental Health.

The project

has both research and action objectives.
The research seeks to identify structures, values,
and processes which correlate highly with utilization
of knowledge in ongoing, educational problem-solving.
The action seeks to institutionalize within Project
colleges and universities (currently eight) such
self-renewing structures, values, and processes as
well as specific academic innovations.55

combination of evolutionary case studies, "In¬
stitutional Functioning Inventory," interviews. Index of
Institutional Vitalization, etc.
^^Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities.
"Strategies for Change and Knowledge Utilization Brochure
on Project," supported by the National Institute of Mental
Health.
Arthur Chickering, Director, p. 1.
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The project was a three year project begun in
1969/70 and although the project is completed, the final
report is not.

A valuable article by Jack Lindquist,

however, contains a review of the background research for
the project, a description of the project methodologies,
and some preliminary conclusions.^^
The first step in the research component of the
project was to analyze literature regarding the adoption
of innovations, and decision-making in complex organi¬
zations, including the study of academic reform and
governance in higher education.

Lindquist's analysis

of the literature suggested seven characteristics of change
and of higher educational institutions which formed ob¬
stacles to academic innovation.

These include:

1. most

changes threaten secured positions, 2. institutions of
higher education are extremely differentiated organizations,
3, academic power is

pluralistic rather than monolithic,

4. universities display "value resistance" to innovations
which challenge meritocracy and graduate research speciali¬
zation, 5. educational outcomes and future demands on the

5^Jack Lindquist, "Political Linkage in the Academic
Innovation Process." Journal of Higher Education. XLV
No. 5 (May 197^)•
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institution are inadequately measured,

6. most college

and university members are isolated from new teaching¬
learning information* and ?. universities are invested
with organizational inertia.
Lindquist moves from a review of the barriers to
academic reform to a discussion of various conceptual
models of change process.

He reviews those which had been

abstracted by Havelock from diffusion studies in a wide
variety of disciplines, including sociology, anthropology,
psychology, and education and which were meant as general
to

theoretical models.^

Lindquist then proposes one that

will, by taking into account the barriers to change in
academic institutions, be appropriate for colleges and
universities.
Havelock's first major perspective or conceptual
model is "Research Development, and Diffusion."

It serves

as a relevant paradigm for technical and social change in¬
cluding the following features*

a. rational sequence from

^"^Ibid., pp. 324-327.
^^Lindquist's review of Havelock is taken from:^
Ronald Havelock, Planning for Innovation Through Dissemina¬
tion and Utilization of Knowledge, Ibid.
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research, to testing, to production, to distribution to
consumers, b. planning, c. division of labor, d. defined
audience, e. high investment for maximum pay-off.

Havelock

finds it a useful model for consideration of issues at
macrosystemic and policy levels, and Lindquist finds it
only minimally applicable to colleges and universities
because it assumes aspects of packaging and marketing that
university faculty are likely to mistrust.

An example

that strengthens Lindquist's point can be found in
Richard Evans' Resistance to Innovation in Higher Education
where he reported on the negative response to Instructional
Television in Selected Universities.^^

ITV could be con¬

sidered a research development and diffusion-type inno¬
vation, and it clearly failed at the university level.
The second conceptual model suggested by Havelock
and reported by Lindquist is the "Social Interaction
perspective.

This perspective has its roots in anthro¬

pology and social psychology and its major theorists
include Newcomb, Lewin, E. Rogers, Carlson, Mantard and
Ross.

It assumes a constant empirical innovation and

measures its flow through the social system by concentration
on the communications network, and on the process of

^^Richard Evans, Resistance to
Education (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 196b).
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adoption.

Major points derived from theories in this

tradition include:

a. the importance of the social

relations network, b. the importance of opinion leader¬
ship,

c. the importance of informal personal contact, and

d. the significance of the individual's group identity.
Havelock and Lindquist felt that the shortcoming

of this

perspective was that it concentrated more on the individual
than on the group or social system.
The third model is the "Problem-Solving" perspective,
It is closely associated with the human relations tradition
of planned change and represents basically a psychological
and user-oriented approach.

Its major proponents include

Benne, Libbitt, Miles and Watson.

Major points stressed

by theorists with this perspective are that knowledge
utilization must include a diagnostic phase where user
need is the primary consideration; that the role of the
outsider is primarily to serve as a catalyst, collaborator
or consultant on how to plan change; and that self¬
initiation by the user or client system creates the best
motivational climate for lasting change.

Bennis'

study

on the failure at Buffalo of major institutional reform
corroborates this point/®

The motivation for change

^°Warren Bennis, The Learning Tvorv Tower (San
Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1973)•
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at Buffalo did not come from the faculty or the students,
but from a small group of individuals and the overall
reform effort could not be sustained*

Lindquist points,

however, to the inadequacy of this model for higher
education by claiming that most educational changes in
fact are made in response to external, rather than internal
influences.
Havelock added to these conceptual frameworks of
change his own model—the "Linkage Model."

The key concept

is the aspect of linkage between user and external know¬
ledge resources.

The task of intervenors, or linking

agents, is to bring the knowledge-disseminating, and the
knowledge-consuming subsystems into effective and continuing
interaction.
Figure 1 depicts the four diffusion perspectives
synthesized by Havelock.
Lindquist adapted Havelock's "Linkage Model" to
a college and university environment by creating a new
model, the "Political Linkage Model."

Figure 2 depicts this

model.
Lindquist's model adds to Havelock's the formal
governance or decision-making process in a university.

The model looks at ways teaching-learning innovations enter
an institution.

Most often students and faculty within

the institution become aware of research and practices
(Continued on Page 62)

Figure 1
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Figure 2
SOURCES OF NEW ACADEMIC INFORMATION

Academic-Innovation
SOURCE:
Jack Lindquist, "The
XLV No. 5 (May 197^)»
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p.
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at other institutions.

It looks at ways these ideas

connect with needs, wants, or demands that have been
articulated on the campus, and it studies the stages in
the political governance system through which a proposal
for any change in program policy

or procedure must pass.

Important to this political governance system are the
gatekeepers who decide which proposals enter and the
formal authorities who make the final decision.

The

next step in the process is a diffusion step within the
university so that the program or policy will be imple¬
mented.
Lindquist's model was meant as a deductive frame¬
work rather than a rigidly testable model, but it does
capture some essential steps in the process of change.
model has been further elaborated by Lindquist

The

and is

currently being tested in the "Strategies for Change"
project.

Research results from that project are not yet

available.
On the whole, Lindquist does not think colleges
and universities are organizations susceptible to
innovations.

He restates the Mohr hypothesis;

Innovation is directly related to the motivation
to innovate, inversely related to the strength of
obstacles to innovation, and directly related to
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"the availability of resources for overcoming
such obstacles.
Lindquist said that such resources as internal
research on teaching and learning, regular in-service work¬
shops and training, funds for academic experimentation,
an abundance of cosmopolitan locals, structures for aca¬
demic planning, professional rewards for innovators, and
open collaborative governance are not found in many higher
educational institutions.
He concluded;
The probability of academic innovation is not
high under current conditions.
Dabbling in
educational R & D, linkage to diffusion
channels, self-study, and collaborative problem¬
solving may not help much, for the problem is
beyond mere tinkering.
Lindquist did suggest systematic attention to re¬
search and development of academic innovations, attention
to diffusion channels, collaborative problem-solving,
professional development, and intervention into ongoing
institutional functions.

He also suggested a number of

strategies for change;

6l]^wrence Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation
in Organizations," American Political Science Review,
63 (March 1969)» pp. III-I26.
^^Lindquist,

"Political Linkage," p. 343*
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1.

hold workshops and retreats

2.

conduct faculty seminars on teaching and
learning

3»

sponsor new faculty orientation or in-service
training

4.

provide student orientation to learning options
and problem-solving

5»

hire new personnel and recruit new kinds of
students

6.

introduce an alternative learning experience

7.

restructure governance

8.

build into the institution an Educational
Development Office and/or Research and Planning
Committee

9»

conduct a major self-study

10.

bring in experts

11.

visit other campuses

12.

utilize social gatherings

13•

utilize administrative perogatives

14.

develop a change agent team

15.

join a consortium^^

Case Histories of Innovation at the College and
University Level.

The case history most closely related

in focus to this study was a study completed by Fashing and

^^Jack Lindquist, "Strategies for Changing Campus
Programs,” supplement to remarks made at Commissioner's
First Annual Conference on Non-traditional Study, Glens
Falls, New York, November 2, 1973*
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Academics in Retreat.

It is a study of the process

of educational innovation in six colleges and universities
with reference to specific developments such as studentinitiated experimental colleges, other experimental units,
and ethnic studies programs.

According to the authors:

"Our central focus is on the sources of educational inno¬
vations, and particularly, their impact on the governance
of the institutions in which they are undertaken.The
timing of the study, the thinly veiled political perspective
of the authors, and their concern with student activism and
power reveal something of a bias to their study of the
process of change in an institution, but the authors made
two points well worth considering.
They felt that the inhibitors to university reform
were the lack of consensus about what changes are de¬
sirable or required, the nature of the university organi¬
zation with its hierarchies and divisions along narrow
disciplinary lines, university governance structures with
decisions reserved for the top administration and govern¬
ing boards, and its multiplicity of official interest groups
within the university.
Reviewing materials on innovation processes and
innovative programs in a number of colleges and universities.

^^Joseph Fashing, and Steven Deutsch, Academics in
Retreat: The Politics of Educational Innovation (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1971)i P» 5*
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Fashing and Deutsch found "that such programs are not only
limited in their scope, but that they are usually set apart
as a distinct unit from the 'normal' university.Such
units were in addition usually given little financial
backing and were low on the institutional priority list,
which meant that in periods of budget crises they were
likely to be eliminated or severely curtailed.

They con¬

cluded, therefore, that innovative program units, like
ethnic studies programs or experimental colleges within
institutions, were accepted by administrations and faculty
as "cooling out" mechanisms.
Such attempts move to restore equilibrium without
altering established procedures or units in any
significant way. . . .
Such moves can be in¬
terpreted as means to temporarily avoid the
central issue—reform of already existing ones
(departments).
In addition, experimental pro¬
grams often have limited life-span and have in no
sense been considered permanent additions to the
institutions
I find Fashing and Deutsch's analysis compelling
for the period of generalized unrest and institutional
response to that unrest of the late sixties but somewhat
weaker as we move into the seventies and a period of
reduced student activism.

The creation of special program

units can also represent less of an intentional device

^^Ibid., p. 22.
^^Ibid., p. 24.
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for avoiding institutional change than a vehicle for ob¬
taining it.
Bennis' case study also provided insights to this
study.

In The Learning Ivory Tower. Bennis describes in

detail three events that were meaningful and important to
him and which are related to three universal organizational
phenomena—leadership succession, resigning, and a new
administration's attempt at massive organizational reform.
His intention is to provide a more thorough and realistic
understanding of the university through describing it in its
complexity and changes, and he counts upon the reader to
generalize to other similarly complex situations.

He

attempts, in short, a new kind of social science, one that
combines action and analysis.

I found his method fascinating,

and his last two chapters—where he reflects upon the failure
of attempts to bring about radical reform at the State
Univorsity of New York at Buffalo and offers guidelines on
how to bring about changes in a university setting

par¬

ticularly helpful.
Based on his negative experience at Buffalo,
Warren Bennis offers eleven guidelines on how to bring about
clBnge in a university setting:
1.

Recruit with scrupulous honesty.^
-avoid the disparity between vision and reality

2.

Guard against the Crazies.
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3*

Build support among like-minded people, whether
or not you recruited them.
Given economic sufficiency, persons stay in
organizations and feel satisfied in them because
they are respected and feel competent. They are
much freer to identify with the adaptive process
and much better equipped to tolerate the high
level of ambiguity that accompanies change when
these needs are heeded."67

4.

Plan for how to change as well as what to change.
If' change is to be permanent it must be gradual.
The incremental-reform model depends on a rotating
nucleus of persons who continuously read the data
provided by the organization and the society
around it for clues that it is time to adapt.

5»

Don't settle for rhetorical change.

6.

Don't allow those who are opposed to change to
appropriate such basic issues as academic standards.

7*

Know the territory.

8.

Appreciate environmental factors.

9.

Avoid future shock.

10.

Allow time to consolidate gains.

11.

Remember that change is most successful when "those
who are affected are involved in the planning.
Another case study which provided insights on the

dynamics of change in universities is Power and Conflict in
the University, by Victor Baldridge.

It is particularly

important because it suggests a way for looking at the

^"^Bennis, The Leaning Ivory Tower. Jbid., pp. I38-I39.

68 Ibid., p. 140.
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dynamics and interacting forces among the factors of
change.
Baldridge conducted an extensive research study of
New York University.
search were:

The three major thrusts of his re¬

a. the study of policy formulation—"the

dynamics involved in setting long-range goals and arranging
69
basic decision structures;" ^

b. the study of conflict

processes in the University—"the type of conflict that
develops when interest groups try to influence policy
decisions;"

and c. the study of change dynamics in the

university.
Baldridge incorporates all three thrusts into the
notion of governance but found existing theories of
decision-making and governance—the bureaucratic and
collegial theories—inadequate to deal with the process
of change in the university.

According to Baldridge:

When we look at the complex and dynamic
processes that explode on the modem campus todayi we see neither the rigidi formal aspects of
bureaucracy nor the calm, consensus-directed
elements of an academic collegium.
On the con¬
trary, if student riots cripple the campus, if
professors form unions and strike, if administra¬
tors defend their traditional positions, and if

^^Victor Baldridge, Power and Conflict in “the
University
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971)i P* 3*

’^^Ibid.
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external interest groups and irate governors
invade the academic halls, all these acts must
be seen as political. They emerge from the comsocial structure of the university
publics, drawing on the divergent concerns
and life styles of hundreds of minature subcultures.
These groups articulate their interests in many
different ways, bringing pressure on the decision¬
making process from any number of angles and using
power and force whenever it is available and
necessary.
Power and influence, once articulated,
go through a complex process until policies are
shaped, reshaped, and forged out of the competing
claims of multiple groups. All this is a dynamic
process, a process clearly indicating that the
university is best understood as a 'politicized'
institution--above all else the Political
University.71
Baldridge selected policy decisions as being the
most important decisions and the key to studying organizational
conflict and change, and developed a new theory of decision¬
making which he called a political model.

His model

suggests that the organizational analyst should focus
on the nature of the organization's social structure, on
interest articulation dynamics, the legislative process,
and on the execution of policy.
Summary.

The research studies of Lon Hefferlin

and Jack Lindquist and the case studies of Fashing and
Deutsch, Bennis, and Baldridge all are concerned with the
process of change in colleges and universities, and they
all show the complexity of that process.

71 Ibid., p. 19-20.

All would have

71

agreed with Lon Hefferlin's observation concerning the
change process:
We have unearthed no academic philosopher's stone;
no one device, no one mechanism, no one technique
that seems alone adequate to bring about academic
change.
Instead a whole network of factors
(attitudes, procedures, mechanisms, pressures)
appear to be involved.
Colleges and universities,
like other organizations, are systemic by nature.
To alter their operations significantly requires
effort on several fronts at several levels and
by several means.72
The following chapters will consider this network
of factors for one institution, the University of Massachusetts,
by describing its attempts to take on the important missions
of access, individualization, and social problem-solving.

"^^Lon Hefferlin, Ibid., p. 1^0.

72

CHAPTER

II

THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
The University of Massachusetts is a large, public,
land grant.institution.

This chapter contains:

a) a brief

overview of its history; b) a more complete description of
its development since it achieved university status in 1947;
c) an overview of the policies and activities of the
University with respect to the missions of access, indi¬
vidualization, and social problem-solving; d) an assessment
of those characteristics that make the University of
Massachusetts amenable

to change; and e) a description

of its special unit change strategy.
Brief History of the University
Massachusetts Agricultural College.

The University

of Massachusetts is fundamentally a land grant institution,
but it could have been other things.

According to its

historian Harold Whiting Cary:
... it was clear that this was not to be the
University which Massachusetts' Governor
John A. Andrew had dreamed of in 1863» a state
university of schools partly private and partly
public gathered around Harvard College as their
nucleus. And it was not the University in Boston
which the leaders of the labor organizations had
strongly urged in the 1930*s*
This University
was to develop where Levi Stockbridge and
William S. Clark had cleared land of swamps

73

and bramblas "to crsab© in I867 "the Massachuseb'ts
Agricultural College.
The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 which promised
federal financial assistance in agricultural education
spurred on many years of effort within the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts to develop a school for the education
of farmers.

Finally, Massachusetts legislators determined

not to attach the state's land grant monies to an existing
private institution, but to create an entirely new public
2
institution.
The institution was incorporated as
Massachusetts Agricultural College in April I863 and it
opened its doors to a handful of students in 186?•
The first announcements from "Mass Aggie"
emphasized that the new college was designed primarily
for those who could not afford to attend the private
colleges,^ and its main purpose was to provide
education for farming."

"an

4

^H.W. Cary, The University of Massachusetts; A
History of One Hundred Years (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1962), p. 2.
^This meant, in fact, dividing up federal land
grant monies so that a portion would go to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology for education in technology.
\o this day, U. Mass, continues to be a place for
those who cannot afford to attend the private colleges of
the Commonwealth.
In studies of entering freshmen con¬
ducted by the American College Testing Service each year,
a significantly large percentage {^7% for 1968) cite low
tuition as a major reason for attending the University.
4

Cary, p.

o
3o,
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Between 186? and 1931. the college grew slowly
to an enrollment of 1200, but its basic curriculum was
centered in agriculture.

Not all of those who wanted low

cost public education, however, wanted agricultural
education, so students, faculty and alumni pressed for
designation as a State College rather than an agricultural
college.

A State College would enable a broader curriculum

and a liberal degree, and would be a step in the direction
toward a university.
Massachusetts State College.
State College came in 1931*

Designation as a

Changes were slow during this

period but the State College gradually formed

a

division

of agriculture and horticulture, a division of biological
sciences, a division of physical sciences and mathematics,
a division of humanities, and a division of social sciences.
Within divisions, departments were slowly being established.
University of Massachusetts.

Enrollment grew

slowly from 1931 'to 1945. l^ut World War II was to have a
significant impact on the college.
Not only was there a backlog of young people
whose opportunity for education had been post¬
poned, but a new pressure of numbers was about
to develop as a result of the increase in population
and the desire of a larger percentage of the people
for college training.
A new emphasis upon edu¬
cation for professional needs, resulting in part
from the rapid advances in technology, led to the
demand for programs in engineering, business
administration, and teacher training.-^

^Ibid., p. 173*
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Many in the Commonwealth argued for the creation
of a State University in Boston that would be distinct
from the Massachusetts State College in Amherst, but in¬
fluential alumni as well as faculty and students were
pushing instead for a change of status for the institution
in Amherst.

They were able to engage enough political

support so that on May 8, 19^7f the Massachusetts State
College became the University of Massachusetts
The University of Massachusetts
From 1950 to 1970
Organization.

The broadening of scope to become a

university required new organization, new buildings,
expansion of curriculum, and increase of staff.

These

changes took place during the decade of the fifties.

All

activities related to agriculture—education provided by
the Stockbridge School, research, and extension activity—
were unified in a School of Agriculture.
In 1953 the college was responsible for the
agricultural education of some 700 students
and stood sixteenth among fifty land-grant
colleges.in the total enrollment in agri¬
culture . ^
The college of Arts and Sciences—merging several divisions
was created in 1955.

A- large number of specialized

departments were established within this college during
the period.

The department of Home Economics was trans-

^Ibid., p. 179*
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formed into School status in 1947*

More important were

the achievement of School status by the divisions of
Engineering (1947)» Business Administration (1950),
Nursing (1954)t Education (1956)» and Physical Education
(1959).
In comparison with other state universities, the
University of Massachusetts was slow in its development
of professional schools.

Its Schools of Engineering and

Business Administration were created quite latej a very
small Medical School in Worcester did not appear until the
sixties, and only discussions about the possibilities of
a Law School were in evidence by 1970.
In i960, then, the University of Massachusetts
was not a large institution, but the basic organization at
Amherst was established.
Its College of Arts and Sciences was
surrounded by six other colleges and schools
offering vocational curricula (Agriculture,
Engineering, Business Administration, Educa¬
tion, Nursing, Physical Education). A student
body of 6500, and a resident faculty of 580
members seemed large by standards which Amherst
people had had in the past.7
The decade of the sixties was going to be an era
of more dramatic changes for the University of Massachusetts.
Its enrollment nearly quadrupled.

By the Fall of 19711

University enrollment exceeded 25#000 students and faculty
numbered more than I600.

"^Ibid., p. 198.

77

Organizational changes were radical as well#

The

University became a multi-campus system with an urban
campus in Boston, a Medical School in Worcester, and a
systems office for its president in downtown Boston.
It became part of a more formalized structure for public
higher education in the Commonwealth with the passage
of the Willis-Harrington Act in I965.®
Its budget and facilities grew spectacularly.
With growth at Amherst and new campuses more than seventy
new buildings were built.

The budget quadrupled so that

the fiscal operating budget of 1971 exceeded 110 million.
Library holdings quadrupled.
An important achievement was legislation granting
fiscal autonomy to the University in 1962.

This allowed

the University to set its own salary schedules and thus
compete successfully for faculty.

Marked improvements in

the quality of the faculty were a result.
Its academic program expanded and improved in
quality upon the foundation built in the 1950's»

Table 1

lists university departments by college or school and the
degree programs offered as of June 1972.

®The Willis-Harrington Plan set up and defined
a state-wide university system, a State College system,
and a community college system, a coordinating Board of
Higher Education, and an Advisory Council on Education.
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TABLE 1
DEPARTMENTS AND DEGREE PROGRAMS
A - Associate (Stockbridge)
B - Bachelor D - Doctorate
M - Master
S “ Master, more than 42 required credits
D S M B A
D
MBA
D
MB
D
D
D

MB
MBA
MBA
B A
S
BA
D
MB
D
MBA
D S M B
D S M B
SMB
M B
D
MB
D S M B
D*
M B
D*
M B
D*
M B
D
MB
D
M
M B
D*
M B
M B

College of Agriculture
Agricultural and Food Economics
Entomology
Environmental Science
Food and Agricultural Engineering
Food Science and Technology
Forestry and Wildlife Management
Hotel, Restaurant, and Travel Administration
Landscape Architecture
Plant Pathology
Plant and Soil Science
College of Arts and Sciences
Faculty of Humanities and Fine Arts
Afro-American
Studies
Art
Classics
Comparative Literature
English
French and Italian
Germanic Languages and Literature
Hispanic Languages and Literature
History
Linguistics
Music
Philosophy
Slavic Languages and Literature

D
D
D
D
D S

MB
MB
MB
MB
M B

Faculty of Social and Behavior Sciences
Anthropology
Asian Studies
Economics
Political Sciences
Psychology
Sociology
Speech

D
D
D
D*
D*

MB
MB
M B
M B
M B

Faculty of Natural Science and Mathematics
Biochemistry
Botany
Chemistry
Geology and Geography

D S M B
D
MB
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
A - Associate (Stockbridge)
B - Bachelor D - Doctorate
M - Master
S - Master, more than 42 required credits

D.
D
D*

M
M
M
M

B
B
B
B

Mathematics and Statistics
Microbiology
Physics and Astronomy
Zoology

D

MB
M B
B
B
B

School of Business Administration
Accounting
General Business and Finance
Management
Marketing

D

MB

School of Education

D
D
D
D
D

MB
MB
MB
MB
MB

D

MB

School of Engineering
Chemical Engineering
Civil Engineering
Electrical Engineering
Industrial Engineering and Operations
Research
Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering

D

MB
B
B

D

MB
B

School of Home Economics
Home Economics Education
Human Development
Management and Family Economics
Nutrition and Food
Textiles, Clothing, and Environmental Arts

M B

School of Nursing

MB

School of Physical Education
Exercise Science
Physical Education for Men
Physical Education for Women
Recreation

D
D

B
B
B
D

D

M
M
M
M

Graduate School
Computer Science
Marine Science
Polymer Science
Water Resources
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
A - Associate (Stookbridge)
B - Bachelor D - Doctorate
M - Master
S - Master, more than 42 required credits

Provost
Air Science
Military Science
Bachelors Degree with Individual Concentration
Continuing Education
Honors Program
Institute for Man and His Environment
Labor Relations and Research
Public Health
Residential Colleges

B
B
B

M B

*

Five College cooperative PHD offered.
SOURCE:
Patricia Bourke, Richard Story, and
Richard Wagner, “I97I-I972 UM/A Data Sheets" (Amherst:
Office of Institutional Studies, 1972).

The number of graduate programs had doubled since I960;
new research programs had been established in computer
science, polymer science, and marine science; and new
service centers were created in labor relations, water
resources, and governmental services.

A graduate Dean had

been established and a new facility for graduate research
begun.

A Division of Continuing Education had been

established in 1970 to provide credit and non-credit
educational programs throughout the state.
One of the most important changes at the University
of Massachusetts involved the School of Education.

In
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1968 a new Dean was hired and given the mandate to revamp
the education program.
geance.

He did this almost with a ven¬

Within the space of two years the School of

Education had a new and quadrupled faculty* a thousand
graduate students, innumerable activities and outreach
programs throughout the state and nation, and an entirely
new curriculum that was strikingly different from the
rest of the University.

The objective of the School of

Education was to act as an agent of change for elementary,
secondary, and higher education.

It clearly affected the

rest of the University.
Leadership.

The leadership of the University of

Massachusetts during the period from 1950 to 1970 was quite
strong, but underwent significant changes which in turn
affected the basic orientation of the University.
Ralph Van Meter, President of the University
from 1947 to 1954, had begun the transformation from a
college to a university.

Jean Mather, President from

1954 to i960 had devoted most of his attention to building
the physical plant to accommodate the influx of students
and faculty.

He was committed to growth.

The obvious need for developing greater oppor¬
tunities in public higher education for the
tidal wave of youngsters now coming up through
the elementary and secondary schools of
Massachusetts is a real challenge. The very
preponderance of private colleges and liniversities in the state, all committed to a program
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of limited enrollment, makes the challenge
here the greatest, I believe, in the
country.9
Mather also worked for the achievement of fiscal autonomy
for the campus although this was not fully achieved until
1962, during the presidency of John Lederle (I960-I970).
Lederle, too, was concerned with providing
educational opportunity to citizens of the Commonwealth.
We are pledged to the democratic principle
of the right of every individual, regard¬
less of race, religion, or economic back¬
ground, to that amount and kind of education
of which he is capable and for which he has the
desire and will.^^
He was concerned, perhaps, with building a great, public,
research-oriented university on the model of Michigan
and Berkeley.

Under Lederle and his Provost, Oswald Tippo,

hundreds of new faculty members were brought to the Uni¬
versity.

They recruited primarily young men trained at

Harvard, Yale, Michigan, or Berkeley and committed to
graduate education and research.

During this period,

the University of Massachusetts took a leading place among
state universities.

^Jean Mather,
Cary, Ibid., p. I89.

"Inaugural Address," quoted in

^^John Lederle, Report of the President for i960,
quoted in Cary, Ibid., p. 197•^
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Spectacular growth on the Amherst campus was
augmented by the establishment of a branch campus in
Boston and plans for a Medical School in Worcester.

In

1969* plans for system-wide reorganization were announced,
and Robert Wood in succeeding Lederle in 1970 became the
President of the University of Massachusetts system.
His office was moved to Boston.
Robert Wood de-emphasized graduate education
and research and concerned himself more with the role
of the University within the Commonwealth.
But I am inclined toward research that will
actually solve problems and toward education
that really helps the student concerned ....
But the real challenge comes in bringing the
University and the real world together in new
ways ....
The knowledge and skills that
exist in this University are among the state's
great natural resources.
The Commonwealth has
a right to that knowledge and those skills.
They represent opportunities to bring about not
only incremental improvements but institutional
change ....
I am persuaded that the real
hope for change lies in an 'institutional'
approach.
The University as an institution
that represents both knowledge and change can
work with other institutions that need know¬
ledge and are receptive to change.
This
process—properly undertaken—can feed back to
and strengthen the University's own educational
and research capacities.
This re-orientation toward social problem-solving
and public service would prove difficult for the faculty
hired by Tippo and Lederle in the 1960'^ but unquestionably

2

^^Robert Wood, "Inaugural Address," The Alumnus
(February/March 1971)* 3”8.
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the interests of the leadership of the University of
Massachusetts from 1950 to I970 combined to make the
University of Massachusetts responsive to the pressures
for providing access,

individualization, and social

problem-solving.
Administration.

As a result of growth and the

move to a multi-campus system, the administrative organi¬
zation of the University was in flux during the period
from 1950 to 1970.

The president had a small systems

®^^ice staff in Boston.

Each of the three campuses was

headed by a chancellor.

At the Amherst campus (by far

the largest campus in the system), the chancellor had
reporting to him a Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs
and Provost and Vice-Chancellors for Student Affairs and
Administrative Services.

Deans of the Schools and Colleges

reported to the Provost.

During this period, the number

of top level administrative positions and the turnover
in these positions was considerable.
Robert Wood's arrival, his move of the president's
office from the Amherst campus, and his stated intentions
of re-orienting the University toward public service and
away from graduate education, and the

"Michigan/Berkeley

Model" led to an inevitable power struggle with the thenchancellor, Oswald Tippo.

Tippo would resign in 1971,

but the dynamics of power and conflict was significant
during 1970 and 1971*
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Goye_mance»

The basic governance structures at

the University of Massachusetts were similar to those at
other universities.

The Board of Trustees made all final

decisions on the recommendation of the president.

The

president in turn sought the advice in academic areas
of a representative faculty senate, and in student life
areas, of a representative student senate.

An academic

Matters Council considered proposals for new course,
major programs, and other academic programs, and forwarded
these to the faculty senate.
During the late sixties,

student dissatisfaction

and considerable faculty sentiment that the administration
was making too many policy decisions without consulting
the faculty led to a reexamination of governance by
several committees.

A variety of proposals for reorganiza¬

tion were made and widely debated on the campus.

Students

suggested an all-university senate and rumblings about
faculty unionization and collective bargaining were heard.
What emerged by the early seventies was a system of multiple
governance units—faculty senate,

student senate and

administration--with final decisions allowed to that unit
which had been granted responsibility in the particular
area.
The Evolution of Mission and Objective from 1950 to

1970.

It is difficult to define the missions and objectives

of the University of Massachusetts from 1950 to 1970 for it
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was clearly a ’'multiversity" in both the positive and
negative definitions of the term coined by Clark Kerr.
There were many goals, a large number of sub-groups
among students, faculty, and administrators, whose in¬
terests sometimes corresponded and sometimes clashed,
and an array of activities ranging from undergraduate
education to large scale research and service efforts.
The dynamic forces and the pace of change at the University
of Massachusetts were considerable and the University's
sense of its mission evolved in response to these forces.
One way of describing the missions of the University
of Massachusetts and their evolution

is to look at state¬

ments from major plsinning documents during the period.

In

1962, the Long Range Academic Planning Committee of the
Faculty Senate issued its report and supported a multiple
role for the University of Massachusetts as a land grant
institution of higher learning supported by the Common¬
wealth.
As such, the University carries a strong mandate
for rendering appropriate educational services on
behalf of the people, the Commonwealth and the
common good.
But as our institution of higher
learning, it also carries a primary obligation to
other universities to uphold intellectual stan¬
dards and ideals.

12
1962 Report of the Long Range Academic Planning
Committee, by Maxwell Goldberg, Chairr^n (Amherst?
University of Massachusetts, 1962)1 p» 6.
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Under multiple roles Uie committee called for
teaching, research, extension, equality of opportunity,
and excellence, but it clearly stressed excellence as
defined by a student body dravm from the top twenty per
cent of their high school graduating class, a faculty
holding doctorates from elite institutions, and a large
number of graduate programs.
A September 1970 report of a different Faculty
Senate Long Range Planning Committee reverses this posture
to some extent and stresses the notion of equality of
opportunity.
... a public university in a democratic
society cannot pursue an educational philosophy
which, in effect, outlines a policy of ex¬
clusivity. A democracy implies diversity. A
public university must, to Y^atever extent
practicable, reflect that diversity.^3
The many recommendations in the report reflected
the changes the Committee felt were needed for the
University of Massachusetts to accomplish its mission
of diversity as a public university.
and more diverse

It called for more

students, a commitment to academic

experimentation and innovation in response to student
dissatisfactions, a commitment to public service, and a
better articulation of the role of the University in the

^^Directions for the Seventies;^ A Report of the
Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee, by Joseph
Marcus, Chairman (Amherst: University of Massachusetts,
September 1970)1 P«
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Commonwealth.

Overall, however, the report emphasized

the improvement of undergraduate education.
This report had been completed and distributed in
September 1970.

In December 1970, Robert Wood was

inaugurated as president and he used the occasion to name
a new committee—The Committee on the Future University of
Massachusetts.

In contrast to long range planning

committees, this was not solely a faculty committee,
but a committee including students, faculty, alumni,
and leading members of the professional and business
community.

It was headed by Vernon Alden, Chairman of

the Board of the Boston Company and former president of
Ohio University.

After a year, the committee issued its

report, commonly called "The Future Report," with the
following intentions:
... to outline a set of goals and directions for
the University for the coming years that will help
generate a renewed sense of public trust that the ,
University belongs to the people of the Common¬
wealth and is serving them, inspire a renewed
sense of purpose and mission within the University,
and instill in the elected leadership of the State
a renewed confidence and shared vision that the
University deserves jPull and unstinting support
in the years ahead.
The Future Committee too called for teaching, research,
service, and academic excellence.

It

stressed under-

^^Reoort of the President’s Committee on the Future
Universitv~~of Massachusetts, by Vernon Alden,Chairman
(Boston; University of Massachusetts, 1971)• P*

89

graduate education, and, most importantly, called for a new
involvement of the University in society.

"We believe

universities should be responsive rather than disengaged,
appliers as well as creators of knowledge, questioners as
well as conservers of values,The Committee called
for a series of changes on all campuses of the University
in such areas as admissions, educational programs, academic
organization, and administrative priorities.

They ordered

these recommendations around five major themes:

accessi¬

bility, diversity, undergraduate teaching, service, and
productivity.

The Committee wanted the University of

Massachusetts to be a "new model for the public university
in America—one defined by its stronger emphasis upon the
quality of the undergraduate learning experience and
service to society.
Therefore, while the mission of the University of
Massachusetts from 1950 to 1970 continued to include the
traditional functions of teaching, research and public
service, and a committment to academic excellence, the
emphasis changed considerably over the period from a stress
on graduate education and research to higher priority for
undergraduate education

^^Ibid., p. 52

^^Ibid.

and public service.
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The University of Massachusetts and
Access, Individualization, and
Social Problem-Solving
Access*

It has been pointed out that the pre¬

dominant preoccupation of the University of Massachusetts
for the period 1950 to 1970
and expansion.

' was institutional growth

The University's rationale for its ex¬

ceedingly rapid growth rate was the provision of educational
opportunity to the citizens of the Commonwealth.
Between 1950 and 1959» the overall enrollment
(graduate, undergraduate, and Stockbridge School) grew
seventy-five per cent from 3#524 students to 6, 131.
Between i960 and 1969* enrollment on the Amherst campus
grew 191 per cent, from 6,495 to 18,865.^’^

If the enroll¬

ments of the Division of Continuing Education and the
Boston and Worcester campuses are added, the figure reaches

,

.^®

24 989

^*^Diraction for the Seventies,

Ibid., Table 2, p.8.

^^Opening Fall Enrollment in Higher Education, 1970,
Report on Preliminary Survey (U.S. Dept, of H.E.W., 1970),
cited in Future Report, Ibid., p. 1-4.
It is worth noting
as well the comparative enrollment increase among institu¬
tions of higher education in the Commonwealth.
Reflecting the changes in the relative roles of the
public and private sectors in Massachusetts, there has been
a spectacular increase in the size of the public sector.
In
ten years the State system has grown from 17,190 students^
in sixteen institutions to 74,002 in twenty-nine institutions:
from 6,371 at the University to 22,851; from 8,373 at the
eleven State Colleges to 26,652; from I5I at one community
college to 17,850 at thirteen of them; and from 2,295 at the
technological institutes to 6,650.
Fourth Annual Report of
the Chancellor, Board of Higher Education (January 1971)*
cited in Future Report, Ibid., p. 15»
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Not everyone on the Amherst campus approved of
such rapid expansion, however, and a review of major
recommendations for admissions policies shows a shift in
emphasis over the period similar to the shift in priorities
among University missions.
The 1962 Long Range Planning Committee had been
very conservative and had recommended the University slow
its growth rate to approximately ten per cent a year and
concentrate on increasing the proportion of graduate
students in the overall student body.

The admissions

policies throughout the sixties have been characterized
by the Director of Admissions at the University, Robert
Doolan:
The admissions function is but a reflection of
the University's philosophy and objectives.
Like
the institution it too has been quantitative,
means-oriented and concerned with logistics over
the past quarter of a century ....
It was
an era perhaps best described ... by the phrase
'pursuit of excellence' ....
The demands for
the higher-qualified student from an increasing¬
ly larger base of selection became the basic
admission philosophy for the time.^"
The proportion of graduate students in the overall
student body did rise dramatically during the sixties.

And

^^Robert Doolan, Report on the Present and Future
Status of Undergraduate Admissions at the University, of
Massachusetts at Amherst (Amherst^University of Massachu¬
setts, January 197^)»
1» 7*
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the Admissions Office was able to recruit the higherqualified students because it used predictive formulas, and be¬
cause the applicant pool was quite large.

But the University

far exceeded the Long Range Planning Committees recommenda¬
tions concerning enrollment growth.
By the late sixties, the concept of access was
taking on new meaning.

It began to connote the provision

of educational opportunity for those groups that had
previously not been part of higher education—youth from
poor families, minority groups, persons beyond the normal
college age.

The Long Range Planning Committee of 1970

took the view "that it is not necessary to have highly
selective standards of admissions to have a quality public
university."

20

The Committee recommended a more flexible

admissions policy to provide access to those who had been
turned away by the rigid prediction formulas.

^^Directions for the Seventies, Ibid., p. ^8.
The committee view was informed by the work of Alexander
Astin, who after study of the relationship between under¬
graduate achievement and institutional excellence concluded
that there was no direct correlation between the two and
therefore that admissions standards could be lowered with¬
out negative effect on bright students, less able students,
or the quality of the institution.
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The Committee on the Future University laid even
greater stress on access:
The opportunity for higher education has not
yet been extended to all who should have it.
Ability knows no lines of income or race.
A
public university, especially, has an obliga¬
tion to all the citizens who support it, to
say nothing of its obligation to facilitate
mobility as part of the American committment
to equal opportunity.21
They looked at the trends in the economic background of
the student body and were concerned to find the percentage
of students from lower-income families decreasing.

They

recommended changes in admissions policies, more recruitment and, as a critical factor, more financial aid.

22

The Future Committee also recommended attention to
a more diverse student body in terms of age.

Having already

recommended admission of more low income persons, and
recognizing a potential conflict in the fact that the
traditional older student clientele tends to be more
affluent, the Committee in turn recommended that the
University "design or adopt programs which would tend to
have more appeal to lower-income older people,
and then recruit students

^^Future Report,

specifically

Ibid., p.

for

those

53'

.

22
"'‘^The Future Report did not recommend an open ad¬
missions policy for the University because it
that would not be physically possible or
desirable, but it did suggest that as a whole, public high

education in Massachusetts move to open admissions.
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programs,
Thus the Future Committee recommended a specific,
and immediate program response as a vehicle through which
the University could provide greater access.
Individualization.

During the fifties and early

sixties, the University had put all of its energies into
development as a major graduate university and into growth
to accommodate a very large influx of students.

Even in

curricular planning and academic programming, the emphasis
was on numbers not on individualization or responsiveness
to the developmental needs of individual students.

The

1962 Long Range Planning Committee devoted only a few
pages to discussion of the curriculum.

They called for

a number of new departments and schools and further
study of the academic program, but they did not relate
their recommendations to student needs.
By the late sixties, however, the emphasis had
shifted at the University of Massachusetts toward a concern
for the undergraduate student.

U.Mass students had joined

the nation-wide student protest movement over the war in vietNam,

and although there had been only a small number

of disruptions on campus,

^^Future Report,

faculty and administrators were

Ibid., p.

26.
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showing a new concern.

Political activism was combined

with activism focusing on academic reform.

Students

initiated a week-end conference to bring together students,
faculty I and administrators to discuss important issues
in the University.

These week-end conferences, called

SWAP conferences, became an annual event.
1970,

In April of

students organized a moratorium on classes in order

to spend time on educational reform issues.

The faculty,

too, had become active and had sponsored a series of
conferences to discuss ways to improve undergraduate
teaching, grading reforms, and other issues.

The Academic

Matters Council spent much of its time deliberating over
the undergraduate program.
The Faculty Senate Long Range Planning Committee,
which issued its Report in 1970, therefore

paid much closer

attention to curricular and other aspects affecting student
life.

It

considered that a series of academic reforms

and other changes were needed on the Amherst campus to
make it a better educational environment for students.
They investigated reform efforts at other universities
and quoted the

"Muscatine Report" recommendations as their

own I
....
Consequently, many of our concrete
recommendations are for substantial ex¬
periments, not for untested wholesale changes.
In this spirit, we have avoided wherever possible
the temptation to frame legislation for 'all*
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students and 'every* department . . . chances
are most likely to succeed if they remain
optional, offered along with the means for their
implementation on experimental trial, then, left
to the judgment of those for whose benefit they
are intended

,^

The Committee recommended supplementing the normal pattern
of divisional and major requirements by a number of optional
programs for undergraduate students.
By 1970, optional programs outside departments
included the following:

Orchard Hill Residential College.

Southwest Residential College, Project 10, Program for the
Collegiate Education of Black Students (CCEBS), an Honors
Program, and International Programs in Bologna, Freiburg,
Oxford, Madrid, Pau, and Colraine,

Within Schools and Colleges,

increased options were being made available as well.

In the

Spring of 1968, the College of Arts and Sciences conducted
an extensive review of its educational program.

It con¬

ducted a study of student attitudes toward undergraduate
course requirements and found that students endorsed course
work in the major and electives as important sources of
education, but did not like required distributional or

^^Education at Berkeley: the Muscatine Report,
(Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968X p.
as quoted in Direction for the Seventies, Ibid., p. 66.
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core

courses.

"A large majority of students evidenced

a desire to change the existing curriculum with regard
to seven out of eight of the core requirements."^^

Several

changes were made during the late sixties which eased these
requirements by allowing more options for students within
the designated core areas of humanities and fine arts,
social and behavioral sciences, mathematics and natural
sciences, and rhetoric.
The Report of the Committee on the Future University
also emphasized the notion of optional programs to provide
choices for students.
The University should seek to intensify its
undergraduate focus, offering a diversity of pro¬
grams, places and times to learn suitable to a di¬
verse student body and a complex society ....
A greater diversity of carefully designed
options . . . including more options for inde¬
pendent study, broadened majors, (and) new
problem oriented approaches to learning ....
They felt that:
. . . the undergraduate curriculum should avoid
impersonality, meet real career needs and pressing
societal needs, make the most effective use of
educational resources and students' time, relate
classroom work more directly to the world beyond
the campus, educate better citizens, and promote
physical accessibility.^^

^Ted Jakubowski; and H. Roy Kaplan, Seniors^ View
the Core Curriculum; A Survey Report (Amherst:
Office of
Institutional Studies, University of Massachusetts, October
1968), p. 1.
Future Report, Ibid., p. 42.
27 Ibid., p. 56.
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Greater individualization and responsiveness to
student needs was encouraged in the academic area
through the provision of more programmitic

options and

through granting students the ability to choose among those
options.
Social Problem-Solving.

It has been pointed out

that when Robert Wood assumed the presidency of the University
of Massachusetts in 1970, he emphasized the need for more
public service which would be geared to the solution of
social problems.

James Pease who studied the public

service role and activities of the University felt that
this was a significant departure.

He claims that there

had not been a coherent, positive policy statement on
public service from the administration or Board of
Trustees until President Wood's inaugural address and that
"public service responsibilities have been recognized
and carried out largely by the efforts of individuals with¬
in the University.
The Long Range Planning Committee which reported
in 1970 had devoted only five pages to the question of
public service and in those had emphasized Continuing

^^James Pease, Public Service and the Public
University: EnvironmentalProblem-Solving and Research
(Amherst, University of Massachusetts, January 1971)•
29 Ibid., p. 58#
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Education rather than the application of the University's
resources to the solution of specific problems.

It had

recommended a review of campus outreach activities "to
insure that public service activities are sufficient to
and compatible with the University's mission as a public
university"

30

but had suggested that the University should

not be turned into a service station.
While Pease had found ambivalence and confusion
within the University over the appropriate University role
in public service, he found the same confusion outside.
He administered questionnaires and interviewed
many throughout the state and in the University and con¬
cluded that while action agencies and planning commissions
in Massachusetts thought the University should be involved
in problem-solving research, the Office of Administration
and Finance was skeptical about the University's ability to
deliver and therefore reluctant to support such activities
through state appropriations.

The Future Report, issued

a year after the Long Range Planning Committee Report
and after the arrival of Robert Wood, placed much more
emphasis on social problem-solving.

The report can be seen

as an attempt to convince the legislature and through them,

^^nirections Tor the Seventies, Ibid., p. 1^^
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the Office of Administration and Finance of the importance
of legislative appropriations to the University for such
activities.
The Future Report defined public service as in¬
cluding three major areas;

advice and technical assistance

in problem-solving, research toward solution of public
policy problems, non-degree training programs for govern¬
ment social service personnel.

It called for an expanded

public role for the University in the Commonwealth with
emphasis on service to immediate neighbors, service to
government agencies, and service to the poor.

It felt that

the University should help the Commonwealth provide better
education and economic growth.
The list of organized public service programs at
the University of Massachusetts in the late sixties
mentioned by the Faculty Senate Long Range Planning
Committee Report, the Pease Study, and the Future Report
included;
1.

The Cooperative Extension Service - involving

University of Massachusetts from 19O8 in agriculture, land
use, planning, and rural community development.
2.

The Water Resources Research Center.

3.

The Institute of Agricultural and Industrial

Microbiology which was transformed into the Environmental
Sciences Department of College of Food and Natural Re¬
sources .
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4.

The Labor Relations and Research Center

5*

The Center for Business and Economic Research

of the School of Business Administration
6.

The Commonwealth Technical Services Division of

the School of Engineering
?•

The Center for Urban Education in the School of

Education
8.

The Division of Continuing Education
This list does not include service activities

of individual faculty members, and even the level of activity
among these groups varied considerably.

The Extension

Service was quite large, involving hundreds of people
throughout the Commonwealth for substantial amounts of
time, while the Center for Business and Economic Research
involved only a few individuals at sporadic intervals.

Both

the Long Range Planning Committee and Future Committee
recommended greater coordination among service activities.
This list is not impressive, moreover, when
compared to other universities,

for others were developing

research institutes in addition to centers throughout
the fifties and sixties.
development.

Stanley Ikenberry studied this

He defined institutes and centers as

a new organizational form in universities, (that)
were formally identified by specific names or
titles and (that) were established on a permanent
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basis' as separate entities for carrying on
continuing research programs.31
Ikenberry studied the characteristics of institutes
and centers in fifty-one land grant universities and found
that "in some institutions, institutes and centers are
almost as numerous as departments, with an average of some
eighteen institutes and centers each in this particular group
of universities."

32

Ikenberry attributed their appearance

to the inability of discipline-based departments to focus
on tasks and problem-solving and considered them a sig¬
nificant organizational alternative.
At the University of Massachusetts, however, Oswald
Tippo and others had been opposed to institutes during the
sixties and had only allowed the creation of centers which
remained closely affiliated with existing Schools and
Departments.

Thus the University's commitment

to social

problem-solving as seen in policy statements and organized
activities was less impressive than its committments to
access and individualization.

Much of what it did accomplish

however, it did through the vehicle of special units or
centers.

31 Stanley Ikenberry, A Profile of Proliferatip_g
Center for the Study
Institutes (University Park, Pa.:
of Higher Education, the Pennsylvania State University
Report No. 6, November 1970)i P« 3*
^^Ibid., p. 16.
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Characteristics That Make the
University of Massachusetts
Amenable to Change
Organizational Characteristics,

It can be con¬

cluded from the shifting priorities for missions and
objectives over the period from 1950 to 1970, and from
the response to the missions of access, individualization,
and social problem-solving, that the University of
Massachusetts had a positive orientation toward change.
Organizational characteristics that seemed most important
to this change orientation include:
A.

Spectacular growth in enrollment, facilities,

and faculty.
B.

Adequate resources provided by the State to

support this growth.
C.

Fiscal autonomy so that the University could

internally allocate resources for redirection in response
to its own priorities and missions.
D.

A major organizational shift from a single

campus to a multi-campus system.

The resulting unstable

organizational environment proved conducive to change.
E.

A shifting governance structure.

F.

A critical mass of faculty who were interested

in academic reform and public service.
G.

Many students who applied pressure for change

and who were willing to work with faculty and administrators.
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H.

Strong yet changing leadership throughout

the decade.
I.

A number of institutional self studies,

committees on long range planning, and frequent open
discussions on missions and the role of the university in
society.
J.

An overall climate for change.

Students,

faculty, and administrators felt that it was worth working
for change because change was possible.
It would, however, be a mistake to oversimplify.
Although campus leaders were prepared to place emphasis and
"prioritize," they were not ready to become one-dimensional,
so the University of Massachusetts remained a complex in¬
stitution with many missions and objectives.

Also, the shifts

in orientation from graduate to undergraduate education; and
from pure research to applied research, public service, and
social problem-solving were shifts more obvious in the
rhetoric than in the organizational structure, the alloca¬
tion of resources, or the activity levels.
Special Units as Vehicles for Change.

The vehicle

for change most often advocated and used at the University
of Massachusetts was the creation of new programs or
centers.

Special programs were advocated and created

as a means to be responsive to a new student clientele.

^^See Chapter VI for assessments of these con¬
ditions in relation to the literature on change.
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Departmental and extra-departmental educational program
op'tions were created in an attempt to be more responsive
to student needs, and special extension research and service
centers were begun to more directly relate the University's
resources to social problems.
The University Without Walls Program allowed the
University of Massachusetts to pay special attention to
the mission of access.

This program not only made the

University efforts more visible, it created pressures
for change throughout the system—in admissions, student
support services,

curricular requirements, and other areas.

Thus in ways far beyond what its actual student enrollment
would imply, U.W.W. helped the University of Massachusetts
be more responsive to the mission of achieving access.
The Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration
Program served

as a vehicle through which the University

of Massachusetts assumed the mission of individualization.
The BDIC program not only made the University’s efforts
at providing for individualization more visible,

in itself

became an important vehicle in the University for gauging
student interests.

Spinoffs from BDIC became new major

programs of study, and for the first time these programs
were determined by students rather than faculty.
addition,

In

since students could design their own majors

as alternatives to departmental majors, departments
began to revitalize their own offerings to keep students
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interested, thus making the University as a whole more
responsive to the mission of individualization.
Although there was less enthusiasm for the mission
of social problem-solving at the University of Massachusetts,
and throughout the sixties the University had avoided the
creation of separate research institutes,

it did approve

the Institute for Man and His Environment as a vehicle
for focusing the resources of the University on environ¬
mental related problems.
University's efforts

The Institute did make the

(and lack of them) visible in this

area and pointed clearly to the difficulties of responding
to the mission of social problem-solving.
Summary.

The quarter century following World

War II was an extraordinary period of growth and development
for the newly designated University of Massachusetts.

The

University was aware of the missions of access, individuali¬
zation and social problem-solving and intended to be
institutionally responsive to them.

The primary vehicle

for this change effort was the creation of special program
units, the University Without Walls, The Bachelor's Degree
With Individual Concentration, and the Institute for Man
and His Environment.

These programs in turn enabled more

institution-wide responsiveness to the missions.
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CHAPTER

III

THE UNIVERSITY WITHOUT WALLS
The University Without Walls is a programmatic
vehicle for fulfilling the mission of the provision of
access and equal educational opportunity.

It was planned

and implemented at the University of Massachusetts between
1970 and 1972.

This chapter starts with information on

the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, the
National University Without Walls program and the School
of Education, as necessary background for the campus
University Without Walls unit; describes the planning pro¬
cess from its beginning in the School of Education, through
the pilot year of the program; describes the evolution of
the major objectives and concepts of the program; and con¬
cludes with an overview of the major change factors in the
program.

Chapter VI analyzes these factors in greater

detail and compares them to those operating in other
programs.
The goals of the University Without Walls program
are *
A.

to provide access to the University of
Massachusetts for people who would not otherwise
have access, and have few other options for formal

education;
B.
to offer a competency-based B.A. degree from
the University, one that would certify a competent
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scholar-to-be or practitioneri
. C.
to help these students learn how to make the
University work for them (i.e., to make it a more
humane, student-centered place);
D.
to help these students develop into life¬
long learners.^
The University Without Walls Program was committed
to providing access to a different student clientele, and
it was committed to the creation of different academic
programs that would be appropriate for its students.

The

process of defining these commitments and their realiza¬
tion in the organizational format of a program provides
a lense through which to view the process of change in a
university.

Background to University
Without Walls
The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities.
The University Without Walls program considered in this
study was a program developed on the Amherst campus of the
University of Massachusetts.

It was also one of thirty units

in the country which were sponsored by the Union for Ex¬
perimenting Colleges and Universities.

The history of the

Union and the development of the National UWW concept is
important to the development of the University of
Massachusetts' unit because it established the context

^"University Without Walls," University of Massa¬
chusetts Proposal, Draft (March 7i 1972).
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and parameters for that unit.

It is important as well to

the consideration of the broader issue of organizational
response to new missions for higher education because the
Union and UWW saw -themselves

as vehicles to help existing

colleges and universities change.
The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities
is an association of colleges and universities whose twenty
institutional members include

small liberal arts colleges,

large public universities, community colleges, predominantly
black colleges* and special interest colleges such as the
Collegio Jacinto Trevino.

The presidents of these in¬

stitutions formed the association to encourage research,
experimentation, and innovation in higher education.

2

They recognized the difficulty of changing organizational
structures (their own institutions included) and sought
to encourage change through collaborative efforts.

To¬

gether they planned a new entity—the University Without
Walls.
The University Without Walls.

The University

Without Walls was to be an alternative structural form

^The presidents of the affiliated institutions were
the institutional representatives to the Union and attended
all Union meetings with one exception—the University of
Massachusetts.
At U.Mass., the School of Education was -the
affiliate member and the Representative was a then Associate
Dean—Robert Woodbury.
Both of these anomalies will be im¬
portant to the development of the University Without Walls
unit at U.Mass.

110

with a distinct philosophy and organization, but it was to
be organizationally affiliated with many diverse in¬
stitutions.^
Robert Woodbury, currently the Associate Provost
for Special Programs at the University of Massachusetts,
was involved from the beginning with the planning for the
National University Without Walls.

He described its ob¬

jectives as follows:
The University Without Walls wanted to provide
access to a college education, but they wanted
to see if that college experience could be built
without depending upon the capital expenditures
of a campus setting or upon campus residency.
They wanted to see if it was possible for a peo¬
ple to go through the college experience no
matter where they lived. The second theme was

3
^Other educators, also recognizing the difficulties
of achieving swift organizational change, were recommend¬
ing and establishing other types of alternative university
structures during these years. External degree programs,
open universities and other units were being talked
about in nearly every state and a few were actually
established.
The unique asset of the University Without
Walls program in comparison to these units is the fact
of continued affiliation with more traditional institutions.
This makes possible a reallocation of manpower and
facilities to new purposes and theoretically does not re¬
quire major new expenditures.
Other alternative structures
were starting from zero as new institutions. Many of
these have faltered while UWW has flourished.

Ill

that UWW would be a program that provided a freer
structure for students to build their own edu¬
cation. This freer structure might be of interest
to current students as well as non-traditional
students.^
While the planning for the University Without
Walls involved presidents, faculty and students from
member institutions of the Union, and many community
representatives, it was spearheaded and orchestrated by
one man, Sam Baskin.

Baskin was a faculty member of

Antioch College and the president of the Union.

Without

his vision, persistence to the point of single-mindedness,
and strong leadership, the difficulties of coordinating
the many and diverse groups and institutions and of ob¬
taining sufficient financial support could never have been
overcome.
Baskin was able to obtain the financial backing
of the Office of Education and the Ford Foundation.

O.E.

and Fbrd together gave $800,000 as seed money for the
implementation of the idea, and smaller grants were re¬
ceived for the development of a plan for assessment and
research, for overseas expansion of the idea, and for other
special purposes.

^Interview with Robert Woodbury, Associate Provost,
March 30» 197^•
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This level of support was important as it enabled
the Union to cover the costs of coordination and also
provide grants of approximately forty thousand to those
colleges and universities which agreed to plan a UWW unit
which would remain affiliated with their institution.

In

a sense it gave the Union the wherewithal! to buy themselves
in.^

The University of Massachusetts was one of the twenty

colleges and universities which received a planning grant.^
It was expected that each participating institution
would plan a University Without Walls program that took
advantage of the resources and responded to institutional
needs and priorities, yet would remain distinct in structure,

^It was also well known that the planning grants
from the Union would not cover the full cost of planning
efforts at participating institutions, contributions of
time from a large number of faculty and administrators were
an expected institutional commitment to the University
Without Walls.
^The other institutions participating in the
University Without Walls as of 1970*"71 were the University
of Minnesota, Antioch College, New College at Sarasota,
Shaw University, the University of South Carolina, Roger
Williams College, Bard College, Chicago State University,
Goddard College, Howard University, Friends World College,
Northeastern Illinois University, Stephens College,
Loretto Heights College, Skidmore College, Morgan State
College, New York University, Staten Island Community
College, and Westminster College. These institutions
have very different philosophies, goals and student
bodies, but they shared a commitment to the UWW idea.
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organization, and curriculum from the institution.

The

Union did not want to impose a single structure or edu¬
cational mode and encouraged diversity among the units.
It

did however want all units to be in accord with the

basic UWW philosophy

and organizational concepts.

These

were articulated in eight characteristics and disseminated
widely on the campuses receiving planning grants.

They

are
1.

A UWW student body which includes students

from the widest possible age group and reflects the ethnic,
racial, and economic diversity of the United States.

Older

students and those from minority or highly disadvantaged
population groups—while excluded from many more traditional
structures of higher education—are encouraged to par¬
ticipate in the University Without Walls.
2.

Involvement of students, faculty members,

and administrators in the design, implementation and
governance of each UWW unit on the assumption that not
only will the process be educational but the product will
be a more viable alternative for those it is meant to
serve.
3.

Development of special seminars and other

procedures to prepare students to learn on their own and
overcome the dependence and apathy that is often the result
of traditional American schooling at all levels.

Provision,
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through seminars and other activities

for continued con¬

tact among students and faculty members in order to allow
for the kind of purposeful interaction which is important
to the learning process.

The development of special

to prepare faculty members for the new
instructional procedures.
4.

The elimination of a fixed curriculum or

uniform time schedule for completion of a degree to allow
for greater individualization in the University Without
Walls.

Flexibility not only in the amount of time required

for each student to complete his own program, but among
study programs to allow for individual differences, learning
styles, interests, and outside responsibilities and
activities.

5.

'
Use of a broad array of resources for teaching

and learning inside and outside the regular university:
internships, apprenticeships, and field experiences; inde¬
pendent study and individual group projects; field seminars
and use of adjunct faculty; travel in this country and
abroad; and programmed material, casette and other
technologically aided materials.

The development of a

National Inventory of Learning Resources and inventories
at each UWW unit to indicate possible resources for learning,
and as a guide to program planning.
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6.

Use of an adjunct faculty of government

officials, business executives, persons from community
agencies,

scientists, artists, and others as a regular

part of the UWW's instructional staff in teaching, super¬
vising and advising roles in order to broaden the under¬
graduate experience and expand the definition of "educator"
to include those with knowledge and experience in a wide
variety of fields.

Special seminars in the field conducted

by adjunct faculty are an additional feature of the
University Without Walls.

7.

Opportunities for students to use the resources

of other UWW units thus significantly increasing the
available resources per student and initiating a process
of institutional cooperation.

8.

Concern for both cognitive and affective

learning and the development of new assessment procedures
more appropriate to different students with different
learning styles and goals that do more than record time

7

spent in class, number of courses and grades.'

These eight characteristics formed the basic
philosophy and objectives of the University Without Walls

’^"University Without Walls," Summary Statement of a
proposal for an experimental degree program in undergraduate
education issued by the Union for Experimenting Colleges
and Universities (distributed to units in draft mimeo
form in January 1971f in final form in June 1971)*
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experiment and established guidelines concerning organi¬
zational structure, function, and clientele for each unit.
The University of Massachusetts UWW unit was planned within
these guidelines.
The School of Education.

The University of

Massachusetts* UWW unit was also affiliated during its
early planning phase with the School of Education.
The School of Education through its Associate Dean
for Special Projects was a member of the Union for
Experimenting Colleges and Universities and had participated
in the planning of the University Without Walls experiment.
Woodbury had helped prepare the massive and complicated
grant proposals for the Office of Education and the Ford
Foundation, and had argued successfully that the University
of Massachusetts—as one of the few large public universities
in the Union—should receive the seed grant and plan a
UWW unit.
Most of those actively engaged in the planning of
the University Without Walls unit were faculty and graduate
students in the School of Education.

While the Union and

central UWW office established parameters and guidelines and
encouraged collaboration among UWW planning units, the
style and tone of the University of Massachusetts effort
was more a reflection of the School of Education.

The

Dean of the School of Education was committed to innovation

117

at all levels of education.

Students and faculty had been

attracted to the School of Education because of this commit¬
ment, and most saw themselves as change agents

committed

to having the program serve as vehicle for reform within
the University, and more generally, in higher education.
Because of their interests in higher education they were
perhaps more conscious as well of the factors that would
influence the development and implementation of such a

0
program within the University.
The School of Education had been engaged for two
years in attempts to restructure governance.

At a time

when students were still excluded from most decision-making
bodies in higher education, the School of Education had
not only used students extensively in its own planning
effort, but its new constitution included them in all
committees and councils of the School including personnel
committees.^

This emphasis on collaboration and partici-

would not want to overstress this point.
It
may simply be that because of the author's own interest
in higher education, there was during intepiews a compati¬
bility of language and concepts that made it appear that
the fLuW and Itudents associated with UWW were more a^re
of change factors than were those faculty associated with
other programs.
^Many would argue that despite the trappings of
oarticipation and collaborative decision-making all authority
SfpowS irthe School of Education remained
the hands
of the Dean.
That may or may not be true, but what is o
importance to the development of the University Without Walls
program is the fact that the rhetoric and structures of
participation were present at the School of Education.
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pation was to influence the UWW planning effort.
The graduate students in the School of Education
were for the most part older students who represented
ethnic, racial and economic diversity.

This was the kind

of student body that was to be sought by the University
Without Walls at the undergraduate level.

The School of

Education thus not only created an atmosphere

which would

support the concept of diversity for UWW, it also provided
a different group of planners for the program.
The School of Education was engaged in a variety
of attempts to provide greater flexibility in the structure
and content of curriculum in order to enhance the learning
opportunities for students.

Systems of flexible scheduling,

achievement monitoring, off-campus experiences, a modularized

^^The differences in UWW units that resulted from
the twenty distinct planning efforts resulted no doubt from
a whole complex of factors.
One of the most important
however, was the difference in planning groups. There
is no doubt that the involvement of a large number of
graduate students—which was not possible in most other
colleges, engaged in planning—was a distinct advantage
for the University of Massachusetts unit.
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curriculum and career opportunities programs^^ were being
designed and implemented for other school systems or for
undergraduate education majors in the School of Education.
The influence of such programs and educational ideas is
difficult to measure but it is clear that the University
Without Walls program was being planned and developed in
an environment that was fertile with educational reform
ideas.
One School of Education program that did have a
direct influence was the Contemporary University Program,
because many of the faculty and students associated with
CU,later were affiliated with UWW.

Contemporary University

was a program funded by the Ford Foundation and directed

^^The lack of a direct influence on UWW of the
School of Education Career Opportunities Program is sur¬
prising considering the similarity of goals and clienteles.
The Career Opportunities Program provided an educational
career ladder to 200 para-professional leaders in New York
City, and it was in its first year of operation under the
sponsorship of the School of Education and its Urban
Education Center, while UWW was being planned.
While it
was specifically designed for education majors who wanted
teacher certification, nevertheless it did preceed UWW
as a program committed to older, predominantly minority
students who required a different educational format and
content.
The failure of the UWW planners to learn and
build from experiences of COP and their reference instead
to the Contemporary University Program, seems to this author
to be unfortunate.
It was probably the result of divisions
within the School of Education into political interest
groups——higher education vs. urban education.
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by Tom Clark which gave approximately a hundred under¬
graduate

education majors total freedom to design their

own educational program,

it also gave students direct

grants with which they could buy whatever they thought
they needed.

CU students were xmaccustomed to such un¬

structured education and most did not use their time
or money well.

Many of them bou^t a bus and spent six

months travelling around the country.

The Contemporary

University program was not re-funded by Ford, but the
reactions to it had been diverse and in a sense formed the
preconceptions about the University Without Walls.

Woodbury

and other Deans in the School of Education felt that CU
had been a fiasco and were determined that UWW not turn
out similarly.

Many students were convinced that it had

not gone far enough in its attempts at reforming higher
education and giving students freedom, and wanted UWW to
start from where

CU left off.

These differences would

be important to the UWW planning effort.
The School of Education would also become a negative
factor when UWW sought approval as a University-wide
program, because many faculty members in other departments
and Schools of the University were suspicious of the
"radical" ideas of the School of Education and were prone
to disapprove any program that was in any way associated
with it.
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As one Academic Matters Council member and Whitmore
Administrator put it,

"UWW was disconcertingly close to

the School of Education in terms of where it was and who
was involved in it."

Later in its development UWW would

have to work hard to disaffiliate itself from the School
of Education.
For the most part, however, the School of Education
provided a conducive environment in which to plan an
innovative educational program like UWW, and it influenced
in a positive way the UWW planning group.
The Planning Process for the
University Without Walls
The Planning Grant.

The University of Massachusetts'

School of Education received a $40,000 planning grant from
the Union for Experimental Colleges and Universities in
the late Fall of 1970.

The grant itself was an important

factor in the planning process.

Although the contractual

agreements between the Union for Experimenting Colleges
and Universities and the University of Massachusetts
placed the University only under obligation to engage in
a planning process for a UWW unit, and did not require it
to establish one, nevertheless the fact of having received
funds for UWW exerted a powerful pressure in favor of such

^^Interview with David Bischoff, Associate Provost,
March 20, 197^*
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a unit.

As Toro Clark put it,

cororoiiinent

"the grant implied a vague

to carry through which produced a strange

accountability which turned into a lever.This affected
those who were involved in the planning of UWW as well
as those in a position to approve it.
a

It gave the planners

deadline against which to work and a sense that they

were creating something that would be implemented, both of
which were positive influences.
ness to compromise.

It also led to a willing¬

According to Ed Harris

"There were

some people that would have preferred to design the perfect
program and if U.Mass. didn't accept it then that was it,
but most were willing to compromise «"

l4

in order to get

something going.
Tom Clark Named Director for UWW.

The Dean of the

School of Education asked Tom Clark to head up the
planning effort.

Clark was the Director of the Higher

Education Program in the School of Education, and his field
of special interest was non-traditional higher education.
He had been very much involved in the planning and forma¬
tion of the "New" School of Education.

He had been in¬

volved, too, in a series of innovative and experimental

^^Interview with Tom Clark, Director, March 31»

^.

197

^^Interview with Ed Harris, April 12, 1974.
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programs in the University including Residential Colleges,
the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration Program,
and the Contemporary University Program.

He was a good

teacher and had a large following of graduate and under¬
graduate students who were interested in educational reform.
Tom Clark said when interviewed, that there was a
natural link between the interests of students and faculty in
the higher educational program, and the University Without
Walls experiment, and he saw the planning grant as a way to
support graduate students.

Clark started by spending time

reading the Union grant proposals in the studying Office of
Education and Ford, the UWW summary statement, and talking
with Bob Woodbury.

He went with Woodbury to meet Sam

Baskin and others connected with the Union.

He decided to

build the initial planning efforts around a course he was
teaching on non-traditional higher education.
The Collaborative Planning Process and A Strategy
for Planning.

The UWW summary statement had called for

involvement of students, faculty and administrators in the
planning of units, and the School of Education had developed
a "tradition” of student participation in decision-making;
so Clark had strong precedents for a collaborative planning
model.

The philosophy of the process that Clark initiated

was described as follows:
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The need was to provide for a group of planners
who could share both responsiblity and authority,
and to provide a climate for various interested
people to participate in trying to achieve our
intended goals—in content, philosophy, and
process for a University Without Walls. Students,
Faculty, community and resource people were in¬
volved in this process as an attempt to design
an environment conducive to creativity, change,
efficiency, and diversity

, , ,

Clark's class was the first step of the collaborative
planning effort and it ensured the participation of a large
number of students.

The second step involved open dis¬

cussion meetings on the University Without Walls that were
held at the School of Education Marathon in February 1971•
Marathons were semi-annual events in which the School of
Education attempted to open itself up to the community
through five days of workshops, seminars, fairs, films and
other "happenings."

The marathon sessions on UWW were

attended by a large number of community people who were
not students but who were interested in education and con¬
cerned about the fact that universities were not providing
adequate access.

Many of those who attended the marathon

sessions were interested enough in the potential of a
University Without Walls program to join Tom Clark's class
and participate in the Wednesday night Town Meetings.
^^"University of Massachusetts, University Without
Walls Discussion Paper No. 2," (May 26, 1971)•
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The Town Meetings were the third piece of the initial
planning effort.

They provided a continuing open-forum for

discussion on the University Without Walls.

The first

meeting was held in February and they continued weekly
throughout the Spring.

Initially they were well attended and

lively, but they grew smaller as the end of the school year
approached.
The involvement of faculty members was also sought
for the planning effort, and several bag lunches were
arranged during which faculty from throughout the University
were invited to discuss the program.

Although these lunches

were not initiated until somewhat later in the Spring, they
could be considered an important fourth step in the
collaborative planning process.
All of these pieces were one part of an overall
strategy for planning that Tom Clark said "had been clearly
thought out in advance, carried out as planned, and proved
effective in getting the program off the ground.They
were calculated efforts to involve in the planning process
'•aL3_3. groups who would be potentially interested in the
„17
outcome or who would affect the outcome."

^^Interview with Tom Clark, March 31. 197^‘

^"^Ibid.
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The Steering Committee, Task Groups, and Staff»
After the first month of rather free-wheeling marathon
sessions, town meetings, and classes, it was agreed that
more structure was needed for the planning effort in order
to get down to the "nuts and bolts" issues of program
development.

Two people—Ed Harris and Gail Kauffman—

were brought on as staff members, and a Steering Committee
and Task Groups were created.

The Steering Committee

was described as
a non-anxiety/paranoia-generating group that
could function expeditiously yet, insofar as
possible, involve the entire MW community
in immediate decision-making.^®
Task Groups were formed to pursue particular areas such
as admissions, independent learning skills, evaluation,
faculty involvement, program funding, management and
learning resources.
The functions of the Steering Committee were to
assure that the task groups did not duplicate efforts,
issue a weekly

bulletin,

"Supersheet," "make recommendations

to community," and coordinate preparation of the UWW pro¬
posal to be made to the University.While the task

I8"uww Supersheet," Newsletter issued approximately
weekly from March, 1971 to May, 1971* No. 1.
^^From Propsoal to Town Meeting, made by Manage¬
ment Task Group.
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groups were quite active in the beginning, they lost
momentum as the spring wore on, and most of their functions
were taken over by the Steering Committee,

Quickly the

Steering Committee began to focus on those things that most
needed attention for a program to be implemented by the
Fall including advising, evaluation, faculty recruitment,
admission, and management.
Tom Clark, Ed Harris and Gail Kauffman were active
throughout the Spring.

They put together the discussion

papers; met with faculty members, administrators, and
potential students; and put together a brochure on the
program.

They served on the Steering Committee, spread

themselves out among the task groups, and attended Town
Meetings.

They also kept in touch with the Union for

Experimenting Colleges and Universities and other UWW
planning units by attending a number of meetings organized
by the Union.

Some felt that there was surprisingly little

cross-fertilization of ideas among UWW planning units
although others felt that other units and the Union had
strongly influenced the development of the University of
Massachusetts unit.

?o

The Steering Committee and full-

^^The story of the first meeting for planning UWW units
in the Northeast illustrates the distinctiveness of the Uni¬
versity of Massachusetts unit. The meeting was held at Roger
Williams College.
In attendance were one representative
from each planning institution—invariably a faculty member/
administrator, all white males and all suited and tied.
In attendance was a busload of bearded, scruffy students
from the University of Massachusetts.
The U.Mass students
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time staff members carried out the second part of the
implementation strategy.

Tom Clark recruited a small number

of faculty members to serve as the first group of faculty
sponsors.

These included respected faculty from diverse

areas including Psychology, English, Botany, Anthropology,
and Education.

Tom and staff members also met with key

administrators to get help and approval for different
aspects of the program.

Charlotte Rahaim, Assistant Dean

of Admissions and Head of Transfer Affair^ agreed to handle
all admissions procedures and in effect gave a number of
admissions positions to the program.

All of those in¬

terviewed felt that Carlotte Rahaim's help was absolutely
crucial to the program.

David Bischoff, Associate Provost,

was also critical as the Academic Administrator who was
the gatekeeper to the approval process.

Bischoff was not

overly enthusiastic about the efficiencies of the planning
group.
repeatedly challenged the assumptions of the "educators”
around the table. As Bob Woodbury, who attended the meeting
put it:
"There was a real cultural gulf between institutional
types . . . and students who wanted a very different pro¬
gram." U.Mass remained out of favor for at least a year
after that, but by the end of the 1971-72 academic year, it
was considered one of the most successful units by the
Union.
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The planning group had the cart ahead of the horse.
They had gone way down the road in terms of planning
—talking about students, etc.—when they came to see
me but they really had no idea of what they were
doing.21
According to all of those interviewed, however, Bischoff
was crucially helpful in getting the program started.
The Pilot Program.

Because it was so late into the

spring when Clark and others began meeting with him, and be¬
cause it was clear that everyone wanted to have a program
up and running by the fall of 1971* Bischoff took the step
that may have been the most decisive one for the program.
He gave administrative approval to a small pilot
program for the 1971-72 academic year by convincing the
Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration Program
and the School of Education, to serve as academic covers
for thirty students.

He insisted that UWW go before the

Academic Matters Countil and the Faculty Senate during that
22
year, but he gave them the chance to begin the program.
21

with David Bischoff, March 20, 197^*

^^The organizational flexibility to allow trial ex¬
perimental programs was an important feature that separated
the University of Massachusetts from most other
of its type.
It was also a feature recommended by the Car¬
negie Commission, the Newman Commission, and others as o®"
SenUal ^ the ability of colleges and
to respond to different purposes and priorities.
It is im
nortant to note that the Associate Provost had not appro^he^acldLic perogatives of the

lllTtel

Tor students participating in UWW.
^PP^°;;tuher
name of the Provost and Chancellor, although neither
Gluckstem nor Tippo were involved at P^is time.
pp
did not promise University support
Woodbury
period, either.
Bischoff
aware at the time that Woodbury
Sould be coming as Associate Provost in the fall and ex
pected him to deal with these details.
was
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Clark and others have called the pilot program part
of the planning strategy and design, others attributed
it to the supportive decisions of administrators, but all
agree that it was a critical, positive factor for the
program.

UWW was given the opportunity to bring in real

students and work with them to learn what educational
vehicles were appropriate, they were given time to recruit
faculty members as sponsors and to build a support base
among faculty, they were able to work out appropriate process
and procedures with offices representing student support
services of financial aid, counselling, records, admissions,
registration and others.

In a program that required as many

changes as did UWW, having real data to learn from and time
was very helpful.

As Gail Kauffman put it:

The fact of the pilot year was crucial to the
program.
It gave us a chance to really get
it started and to prove that it could work to
ourselves and to the faculty.
Assessments of the Planning Process and Leadership.
There were very mixed views about the effectiveness of the
collaborative planning process.

Bob Woodbury felt that "as

an educational experience it was probably extraordinary, as
a planning process it was questionable."

Dave Bischoff

felt that it had been enormously inefficient and counter¬
productive.

Tom Clark said that there was "no question

jji-fcerview with Gail Kauffman, March 28, 197^*
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that the process was not efficient” but felt that it had
been important nonetheless.

Ed Harris felt the same way.

"A large number of people does provide more feedback and
criticism and a healthier process.

It can lead to better

decisions which create a more responsive program."
Ironically, several people associated with the planning
felt that it had not been as collaborative as was claimed.
Mark Cleron felt that "UWW went through the motions of
involving lots of people in planning, but the structure
that emerged was pretty conventional and not effective."
Jean

Carritt did not think there had been a planning

strategy but that "what was done was entirely random with
decisions made by a few individuals—-there was sort of a
power elite within UWW planners.

While information seemed

to flow up the communications network from task groups to
Steering Committee, and Town Meeting to Whitmore Administra„24
tion Building,
it did not seem to flow back down again.
A review of the documents tends to support the
view that there was not a great deal accomplished in terms
of program planning through collaborative efforts.

All

critical decisions in terms of clientele, organization

^^Quotations and opinions
views with Bob Woodbury, David Bischoff, Tom Cl
Harris, Mark Cleron and Jean Carritt.
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and structures seem to have been made by five peoplei
David Bischoff, Bob Woodbury, Tom Clark, Ed Harris, and
Gail Kauffman (two of these were not actively involved in
the planning).

Despite the lack of accomplishment, however,

it was probably important to have a process that was open
to those who cared to participate and who would be effected
by decisions.

This view is held by most change theorists

and was expressed, perhaps most directly for this study,
by Warren Bennis when he showed that the radical reform
programs failed at Buffalo because they represented the
ideas of a handful of newcomers and could not be forced
onto unwilling faculty and students. ^
The person in the leadership position throughout
this process was Tom Clark.

It was his job to try to

orchestrate a collaborative planning mode and at the same
time get a dramatic educational departure off the ground
in six months.

There is no question that that was an

enormously difficult job.

Tom Clark saw himself as

"mediator within the (planning) group but spokesman for
the group to others."

All of those interviewed felt that

^^See Chapter I for review of Bennis' The Learning
Ivory Tower.
^^Interview with Tom Clark, March 31» 197^*
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leadership had been a critical factor in the development
of UWW but there was some disagreement about the effective¬
ness of Clark's leadership.

Planning group members,

faculty, and administrators generally agreed that he had
good ideas, but did not follow through so that others—
staff members, Woodbury, Bischoff—had to pick up after
him.

Students and staff members generally saw him as

successful in recruiting faculty, and working with ad¬
ministrators saw him as generally ineffective at that,
but felt that he was managing well the planning process
that he had begun.

It is difficult to assess Clark's

leadership separately from the process itself.
case of the planning effort

As in the

where there were inefficiencies

which were outweighed by other considerations, Clark's
leadership may have often appeared haphazard or non¬
existent, but the program was planned and implemented in
a surprisingly short period of time.
Summary of Process.

During the Spring of 1971

through an elaborate collaborative effort including open
meetings, a course in non-traditional higher education,
steering committee, task groups, faculty lunches, and
countless meetings involving a large number of people,
the UWW unit for the University of Massachusetts had
been planned.

The Steering Committee had prepared dis¬

cussion papers to define the program; an admission task

13^

group had defined the clientele, obtained permission to
admit thirty students, and recruited those students;
enough faculty had been successfully recruited by Tom Clark
to serve as sponsors; the needed resources for staffing
costs had been saved from the initial planning grant from
the Union; and the Associate Provost had authorized a small
pilot planning program under the rubric of BDIC for the
year I97I-72.

Clearly, a great deal had been accomplished.
Major Objectives and Issues

Throughout the planning semester and the pilot year,
the major objectives of the UWW program were in the process
of definition, evolution and modification.

The most impor¬

tant had to do with clientele and academic program.
Clientele and Access.

The UWW summary statement

had called for a student body characterized by ethnic,
racial, economic and age diversity, but this had been one
of eight potential emphases and the central UWW office had
left it to individual planning units to determine priorities.
From the beginning, it was assumed that UWW would
be a special focus program which could decide on a target
student clientele.

Bob Woodbury in a memo to the planning

group on January 22, 1971 § niade it clear where his prefer¬
ences lay for that clientele.
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Participation in the University Without
Walls gives us the opportunity to respond to
some very real needs in Massachusetts and to
experiment with some new ideas which could
have far-reaching consequences in higher edu¬
cation.
I would suggest that the UWW component on
this campus focus on those people in the state
of Massachusetts who for reasons of economics,
physical handicap, prison terms, home responsi¬
bilities, discrimination or past or present
circumstances are unable to contemplate full¬
time residency at a college or university such as
U.Mass. Generally speaking these students would
be older than average college age.
The admissions task group, however, recommended
something different.

The task group met several times

during February, and on March 3rd recommended to the Steering
Committee and the Town Meeting that the first admissions
group to the program be all current University of Massa¬
chusetts undergraduates.

The decision resulted from the

fact that task force members were for the most part
j_v0i*sity students who wanted a more flexible degree pro¬
gram and therefore wanted UWW to be something they could
enroll in.

As Ed Harris put it,

"UWW became a focal

^"^Bob Woodbury, "Memorandum on University Without
Walls." January 22. 1971. The Woodbury
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is the only explicit
reference to service to the Commonwealth during the
first year, although service will become an important
UWW theme later on.
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point for a lot of bright, alienated, disaffected, younger,
educational reform oriented students."

?R

Core UWW staff and faculty had differing opinions
concerning the clientele for the program.

Ed Harris, and

Gail Kauffman agreed with the Woodbury position.
Kauffman said,

As Gail

"Ed and I didn't feel necessarily compelled

to provide an educational alternative to U.Mass. kids,
but Tom (Clark) in many respects did, because he had been
talking about the University's failure to provide alterna¬
tives."^^

Bob Woodbury felt that "Tom Clark agreed with

the objective of non-traditional students, but had allowed
himself to get caught in the process which inevitably
skewed the results in favor of the predominantly on-campus
planning group.Tom Clark did not mention this diffi¬
culty.

He said that "the title addresses itself to the

access question—that is creating for people who could
not engage in a residential learning experience the option
to, in fact, pursue an experience in post-secondary
31
education at U.Mass."^
There is no question, however, that the question of

,

^^Interview with Ed Harris, April 12

^*

197

,

^*

^^Interview with Gail Kauffman, March 28

197

^^Interview with Robert Woodbury.

,

3^Interview with Tom Clark, March 31

'*-

197
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who the program would serve dominated discussion throughout
the Spring and was as Shapiro put it "a source of potential
confrontation."

32

Shapiro also agreed with the Woodbury,

Harris, Kauffman position that the program should be for
students who were non-access because of age, or job
responsibilities.
A compromise was finally reached.
admission slots
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Of the thirty

for the pilot year, fifteen were to go

to on-campus students and fifteen to "non-access" students.
Even with the compromise, the precise definition of nonaccess was difficult to achieve.

During the planning

period, the distinction was simplistically drawn between
insiders—usually young, resident, U.Mass.

students who

wanted a more flexible and self-initiated academic program—
and outsiders—those who did not live in Amherst and/or
had jobs and could not attend during the day.

During the

^^Interview with Seymour Shapiro, April 30» 197^*
^%o one knows exactly where the number thirty came
from. Apparently Bischoff, Woodbury and Rahaim determined
that a certain number of admission slots be set aside and
that UWW would be allowed to determine the criteria and
handle the process.
This was a perogative not enjoyed by
other University special programs.
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pilot year in discussing admissions for the following year,
the distinction was drawn between physical non-access—those
who had jobs, lived far away,

etc.—and psychological

non-access—those who could not accomodate themselves to
traditional academic modes even though they might have the
flexibility to live in Amherst and attend as a full-time
regular undergraduate.
The experience of the pilot yeai; added interesting
data to the discussions on clientele.

Many of the edu¬

cational reform activists who had been so much in evidence
during the planning semester and who had secured fifteen
admissions positions, lost interest in the program and
either failed to enroll or complete any work.

The "non-

traditional," non-access students were more highly motivated
and used the program to greater advantage.

By the end of

the pilot year, it was agreed that only non-access students
(as variously defined) would be eligible for the UWW
program.
Academic Program.

The second major issue during

the planning and pilot semesters had to do with program—
what kind of educational alternative would the University
Without Walls offer ?
The UWW summary statement

had mentioned the

elimination of a fixed curriculum, greater flexibility of
time and place for learning, greater individualization.
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use of a broad array of resources and a broad definition
of faculty to include people with experience in a variety
of fields.

Most of the U.Mass. planning groups were students

interested in educational reform*and Tom Clark encouraged
them to think creatively in designing the program.

Several

alternatives were suggested and discussed during the planning
semester.
Several planners recommended that UWW should become
an experimental learning community with the emphasis on
community.

They wanted UWW to sever itself from the

University so it could allow greater freedom and would not
have to compromise its values.

It would offer its own

degree with the backing of the Union for Experimenting
Colleges and Universities,^^ and have its own financial
base as a result of income and cost sharing.
Others, however, felt that the major reform task
had to be within the University, and that one of the major
goals of the program had to be to change the system.

They

felt, moreover, that the credential from the University of
Massachusetts meant something to non-traditional students

^^Some other UWW units around the country went this
route and offered a Union Degree rather than the degree
the sponsoring institutions.
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whereas that from UWW alone might not.

This group

recommended an experimental educational program in which the
program elements would be individualized to the educational
needs and life style of the students, and the degree would
be based on competency.

They were less concerned with

community and more concerned with such issues as finding
faculty members who could engage in more sophisticated
advising as part of the instructional process and defining
assessment and evaluation procedures.

Tom Clark, Ed Harris,

Gail Kauffman and Bob Woodbury all supported this position.
Other groups felt that the program should remain
affiliated with the University, but that it should have
a single academic focus and draw into it only those who
were interested in that focus.
recommended

The theme orientation

was "Ecology and Social Action."

The purpose

would have been to respond to the need for relevance, and
allow an "educational institution to begin serving society
in a real way."
All of these possible educational emphases were
discussed at length during the planning period, and by
April, they had still not been resolved.

Town Meetings and

Steering Committee meetings were cancelled through much

^■^James Higgenbottom, "Memorandum to the Steering
Committee," Undated (Spring 1971)*

of April, however, because of the student strike, moratoria,
spring marathons, and other activities.

By the time things

got back together again, the core staff had already decided
to remain affiliated with the University and opt for
individualized programs.

What was left of the planning

group (several students and others had more or less dropped
out by this time, which made the choice of program emphasis
somewhat easier), began to work on the nuts and bolts
issues of admissions, brochures, etc.
Although the permission for the pilot year and
the admissions slots gave UWW the opportunity to recruit
some non-traditional students, they had very little
programmatic flexibility.

They had to follow the pro¬

cedures of the BDIC program,and students for the most
part had to enroll in regular courses.

The UWW staff worked

at finding good faculty sponsors so that students would
have something more than an accumulation of courses, and
Shapiro felt that this was one of the critical positive
aspects of the program.
The pilot year did, however, provide the staff
the opportunity to learn from students what programmatic
aspects were important.

In their proposal to the Faculty

Senate in the spring of 1972, UWW sought:

^^See Chapter IV concerning BDIC.

142

A.

Transferability of a significant amount of

academic credit from other institutions with no time
restrictions;
B.

latitude in the use of UWW course numbers to

cover experiences not usually recognized in departments;
C.

the ability to satisfy the "spirit" of a

requirement through an examination or equivalent experience
instead of specific courses fulfilling core requirements;
D.

permission to waive core requirements for

students if the program felt the courses were superfluous
to a student program;
E.

ability to accredit prior learning resulting

from experience as well as that received through course
work;
F.

use of adjunct faculty and others as "instructional

personnel."
With the exception of core requirements, most of these
academic provisions were approved by the Faculty Senate, and
the program was able to offer flexible and individualized
academic programs to non-traditional students. In this
respect, too, it was a unique program at the University
and among UWW units across the country.
The individualized academic programs did make the
program expensive to operate however, so it is hard to ima¬
gine UWW as other than an alternative for a relatively
small niimber of students.

37

^"^The same will be true for BDIC.

See Chapter IV.
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Major Change Factors
The University Without Walls sought and received
Faculty Senate approval (with a two year mandate) for its
experimental program in the Spring of 1972.

Both the

Spring semester of 1971 in which planning was undertaken
within the School of Education and the academic year 1971/72,
in which a small University-wide pilot program was operated,
could therefore be considered the planning and developmental
period for the program.
The planning effort was influenced by the Union
for Experimenting Colleges and Universities and the central
UWW Office which provided the initial philosophy, organi¬
zational concepts, guidelines and funding for the UWW unit
at the University of Massachusetts.
in terms of participants,

It was also influenced

ideas, tone and style by the

School of Education which was involved in a vast array
of educational reform attempts during that period.
The initial planning semester for the program
under the leadership of Tom Clark, was guided by the
philosophy of collaborative decision-making and a strategy
for program inplementation that involved a selected
approach to those University offices and personnel who
would become involved with or in some way approve the
program.

ThosBfactors which most influenced getting the

program off the ground that semester were

the planning
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grant, a large group of committed and enthusiastic workers,
a sense of timing, and a commitment to have a program
implemented by the fall.

The major accomplishment was

the definition of a distinct student clientele.
The pilot year itself became a crucial element
in the strategy to obtain full-fledged University approval
and support.

During that year, the major aspects of a

unique educational program were defined for a now wholly
non-traditional student body.

Those who helped to define

the program included non-traditional students, staff, and
faculty from throughout the campus.

Only after this process

was UWW ready to articulate to the Academic Matters Council
and the Faculty Senate what the program should be.

The

major factors in getting the program approved and implemented
on a wider scale this year were resources, the negative im¬
pact of the program's close affiliation with the School of
Education, and support from a number of key individuals
among faculty and administrators.

The major accomplishement

was the definition of a distinct educational program.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE BACHELOR'S DEGREE WITH INDIVIDUAL
CONCENTRATION PROGRAM

The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration
Program is the response of the University of Massachusetts
to the mission of individualization as defined in Chapter I,
because it allows students to pursue their own academic,
intellectual, and professional interests by designing their
own major programs of study.

This chapter describes the

history of BDIC from 1968 to 1971•

It traces the slow

evolution of the idea from its source at a student-organized
conference through myriad committees, conflicts, and com¬
promises, to its realization as an experimental pilot
program.

It relates this development on the University of

Massachusetts campus to national student trends and the
academic reform movement.

The chapter also looks at the

implemented form of the idea—the BDIC program, from two
perspectives, that of the faculty supervisory committee of
the program, and that of a student participant.

Finally,

it

describes the process through which the program gained
permanent approval and the factors important to that process.
Chapter IV will analyze and compare these change factors.
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The Evolution of An Idea
Emergence on the Amherst Campus*

The BDIC program

was not a transplanted program from another college or
university.

It was a program which emerged as a response

to the interests and needs of students on the Amherst
campus.
The original idea for the program had come from the

1968 SWAP conference.

The SWAP conference was a new

"tradition" at the University—a weekend organized hy
students, when students, faculty members, and administrators
came together to talk about issues of education
educational environment.

and the

The discussions at the 1968

conference had focused on the students' feelings that the
lindergraduate curriculum was too rigid and irrelevant.
Someone

(no one remembers who) suggested the idea of an

individualized major program of study in which the student
would be allowed to make the critical decisions.

A group

of students and faculty got excited about the idea and agreed
to keep working together on it after the conference.
This group became the first planning committee
for what was to become the BDIC program.

It consisted

of three faculty and five student members^ with Bernard

^The first planning committee members were:
Bernard Fleischman, Arthur Kinney, Joyce Berkman,
Howard
a™. Hedy Kaplan. Celia Mandel. Susan Tracey, and
Robert Ross.
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Fleischman, a faculty member, taking the leadership
position.

The committee met several times that spring

and issued a one-page "report."

The "report” was in fact

a statement of need rather than a recommended program or
policy change, so no action was taken at that time.

The

report focused on the shared student and faculty feeling
that the needs of many students were not being satisfied
by current departmental offerings.
National Trends Among Students.

Although the idea

of a student-designed major was not transplanted from
outside the University of Massachusetts, there is no doubt
that both students and faculty were being affected by a
national mood which influenced in many ways the discussions
at the SWAP conference
group.

and

the

first BDIC planning

Many college students and faculty members were

exerting pressure for change.

The student pressure was

less clearly articulated but more powerful.

The years

1967 and 1968 had been busy on college and university
campuses throughout the country with many students engaging
in political activism centered around the war in Viet Nam,
and the Presidential election of 1968.

While it is true

that the highly publicized activity at Berkeley was not
typical of other universities, students generally began
to recognize the enormous power they had vis a vis social
institutions when they chose to exercise it.

Concurrent
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with their political activism, many students became in¬
volved with academic reform movements.

Students began to

criticize colleges and universities for antiquated rules
and regulations, dehumanizing procedures, and irrelevant
curricula.

They felt that the organization of the

curriculum with prescribed distribution and major re¬
quirements and courses offered only in disciplinary areas,
was not responsive to their own needs.

They were interested

in more broadly-defined issues and social problems and in
examining their own role in relation to these issues.
Such interests were not represented in the course offerings.
As one student interviewed put it:
Many people define education as courses, people
don't define education (in terms of) individual
students and they don't assume the responsibility
for helping students define their own program as
a coherent whole.^
A few students formed free universities which operated
outside the structure of the University, but offered
courses of broad interdisciplinary nature.

Most, how¬

ever, began to work within the system for curricular change.
University of Massachusetts Students.

While students

at the University of Massachusetts were more apathetic than
those at Berkeley or Wisconsin in a political sense, they

^Interview with Janet Sheppard.
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were active and vocal concerning campus educational matters.
The Student Senate Academic Affairs Committee became in¬
volved in a number of academic policy decisions and began
to work closely with the Faculty Senate Academic Matters
Committee.

The Student Academic Affairs Committee issued

a report in 19^9 which was to influence the planning group
of the BDIC program.
The overriding theme of the report was individuali¬
zation.

"Our central principle has been that of facili¬

tating, as best we could, the process of individualized
education."^

The authors of the report wanted "to color

every academic endeavor with a new regard for the personality
.4
and sovereignty of the individual student."
One of their major recommendations was for the
creation at the University of Massachusetts of the equivalent
of Berkeley's Board of Educational Development.

The Board

would consist of a committee of faculty and students and
be responsible for the encouragement of experimental courses
and programs.

Although the report did not call explicitly

for a program such as BDIC it did call for interdisciplinary,

3Friimation for T.iving!
A Program
Renort of the Academic Affairs Committee of the Student
Senate. Lch^d Story. Chairman (Amherst.
University of
Massachusetts,
'Ibid.

1968), p. 6.
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multidepartmental programs and greater choices for indi¬
vidual students.^
Students had strongly supported the creation of
Orchard Hill and Southwest as Residential Colleges, and many
had been instrumental in the creation of Project 10, an
experimental living-learning community in Pierpont Dormi¬
tory.
National Trends in Curricular Reform.

While students

on the Amherst campus were responding to national trends
by’ becoming involved in efforts at curricular change and
focusing on individual student needs, many University of
Massachusetts faculty members were similarly joining a
national academic reform movement.

This was not exactly

a "new" movement; there had always been debate over the
curriculum among teachers, and the history of American
higher education reveals a pattern of gradual—very gradual—
curricular change in response to the needs of society.
The

"Academic Revolution," however, with its acceleration

of the production of knowledge, its ever greater disciplinary
specialization, and the increasing student outcry against
those specializing trends seensto have quickened the pace

^The report was to be quoted in the BDIC formal
proposal to the Academic Matters Committee.
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and altered the tone of the curricular debates of the late
sixties.

Paul Goodman's diatribes were in vogue among

students and faculty during this period.^
The demands for change were strident

but without

a great deal of substance and the actual changes were few
in Colleges and universities during the 1960's.

Paul Dressel

investigated curricular practices in higher education over a
ten year period, 1957-196?# in order to give a then current
curricular profile and to show curricular trends."^

His

profile provides an interesting benchmark against which to
view the idea for the BDIC program.

Dressel's sample

included over 300 institutions of various sizes, affiliations
and clienteles, and he found remarkable similarity in
curricular mode among institutions of size or type.

All of

them had three elements—a series of general or divisional
requirements designed to provide the

"breadth" experience

and composing an average of forty per cent of the total
undergraduate education? a major field of study occupying

^Paul Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education and The
Community of Scholars.
"^Paul Dressel and Frances DeLisle. Undergraduate
Curriculum Trends
(Washington, D.C.: American Council
on Education, 19^9)•
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approximately thirty per cent of the curriculum and
associated almost invariably with departments; and elec¬
tives or courses chosen by the students and comprising
approximately thirty per cent of the curriculum.
Dressel's study also contained a chapter,

"Pro¬

visions for Individualization," which focused on curricular
features "which provide for individualizing and a personal
o

integration of learning."

By individualizing, Dressel

meant "permitting students to select

(curriculum) on the

basis of personal interests or goals, rather than because
of faculty determined principles."^

Table 2 lists those

curricular features or instructional methods which
promoted individualization and shows their occurrence in
322

institutions in 1957 and I967.
It is interesting to note that in 1967 there was

no provision in any of the sample institutions for a
student-designed major program of study such as the BDIC
program.
Dressel finds that "despite all the talk about
innovation, undergraduate curricular requirements as a
whole have changed remarkably little in ten years.

®Ibid., p.
^Ibid.
10

Ibid., p.

75*

..10
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TABLE 2
TYPES OF DEVELOPMENTS FOR INDIVIDUALIZING
AND INTEGRATING LEARNING EXPERIENCES

INSTRUCTIONAL
METHODS

(1967)
CURRENT PRACTICES
N
I0

(1957)
TEN YEARS AGO
N
%

Advanced placement

274

85.1

117

36.3

Honors programs

212

65.8

103

32.0

Independent study

188

58.4

90

28.0

Seminars

165

51.2

80

24.8

Study abroad

151

46.9

36

11.2

Comprehensive
examinations

129

40.1

107

33.2

Tutorials

72

22.4

25

7.8

Senior thesis or
project

48

14.9

26

8.1

Field Work experience

42

13.0

21

6.5

Residence hall programs

34

10.6

5

1.5

Interim terms^

20

6.2

2

.6

Work study or coopera¬
tive programs

18

5.6

11

3.4

Community service

13

4.0

7

2.2

7

2.2

2

.6

Off-campus or non¬
resident terms

^Periods of shorter duration variously related to
longer terms, and usually used for special programs.
SOURCE':
Paul Dressel, Undergraduate Curriculum
Trends, Ibid., p. 39*
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He postulates some change theory to account for-this.
. . .faculty interests, publicity, institutional
prestige, opportunism, and expediency in responding
to pressures or to availability of financial re¬
sources are more potent determiners of specific
change than is deliberation based on educational
goals, social needs, and the abilities and aspira¬
tions of students.il
Dressel thinks that faculty and professional associations
have exerted a pressure for stasis in the curriculum that
exceeded the pressure for change coming from students
and/or outsiders.

He concludes, however,

. . . that there are signs, both in the trends
and in the comprehensive patterns, that the
student may become—as indeed he should—the
focal consideration in curricular planning.12
The University of Massachusetts and Academic Reform—
Continued Evolution of an Idea.

Nearly all the instructional

methods listed by Dressel as contributing to the individuali¬
zation of curriculum were in evidence at the University of
Massachusetts by the spring of 1968.^^

Yet the students

and many faculty felt that these curricular features
were not enough.

They usually served only a small number

^^Ibid., p. 2.
^^Ibid., p. 77.
^^The exceptions were interim terms, work study or
cooperative programs and off-campus or non-resident terms.
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of students and they did not provide an alternative to
the basic departmental requirements.
The goal of the BDIC program, according to one of
its planners was "to provide a mechanism for students who
were being turned off by college and for whom departmental
requirements didn't meet their needs."

l4

Designing appropriate mechanism, however, especially
given the lack of models in other colleges and universities,
was a difficult task.

The group that had been excited by

the SWAP conference and had met throughout the
semester, lost momentum over the summer.

1968

spring

Many of the

students graduated or became interested in other things,
and the faculty had other commitments

as well.

The group

that reconvened in the fall was smaller and met less often.
One reason for the slow pace may have been that there was
no sense of a deadline and no

urgency to have a specific

^
15
program in operation by a certain time.
One of the students who had been active, left the
planning group out of frustration with its slowness.

^^Interview with Antlnony Borton.
^^This is in sharp contrast to the University
out walls program in which the sense of timing and deadlines
provided a constant and positive dynamic.
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Mark Cheren, a graduate student in the School of Education
had also had some conceptual disagreements with the planning
group.

The faculty members all agreed that the fundamental

core of a program that was an alternative to an academic
major had to be a close student~faculty relationship.
Cheren had argued more for a group orientation in which
students would help each other learn to use the freedom to
make educational decisions.

In Cheren's view, the faculty

occupied a less central place.
Cheren began to work for a student-designed
program within the School of Education.

At that time,

the School of Education was engaged in a massive effort
to redesign its entire academic program for undergraduate
and graduate students.

Many of the radical ideas for

educational change were beginning to seep out of the School
of Education and infiltrate the campus.
The BDIC planning group was kept somewhat informed
of ideas at the School of Education by Tom Clark, a faculty
member in the School who occasionally participated in BDIC
planning meetings.

The pace of the planning group, however,

continued to be slow and no documents or reports were
produced for many months.
In the spring of 1969, the BDIC planning group was
in a sense beaten to the punch.

The School of Education

brought its entire “package" before the Academic Matters
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Council for discussion and submission to the Faculty
Senate.

The package contained an entirely new academic

program for the School of Education.

One of the items in

the package was a proposal for a student-centered Bachelor
of Education degree.

It had been prepared by Mark Cheren

and a small number of other graduate students, but it had
the support of Dean Dwight Allen.
The Academic Matters Council had not been confronted
before by such a curricular package, and did not quite know
how to proceed.

The Coimcil did, however, single

out the

student-centered Bachelor of Education proposal for discussion
and invited Dean Dwight Allen and Associate Dean Carl Seidman
to appear before Academic Matters on its behalf.

The Aca¬

demic Matters Council members were quick to agree that the
idea had merit, but they suggested that the degree should
be university-wide, and not limited to the School of
Education.

The Deans of the School of Education recog¬

nized the need for a university-wide option, but felt
that their proposal ought to be approved as well.
Academic Matters Council did not approve it.

The

Instead they

created an ad hoc subcommittee to draw up a proposal for
an all-university, student-centered degree.
The motivation of the Academic Matters Council in
this unprecedented action is subject to various interpretations.

Academic Matters Council members describe
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it as an example of that group's initiative in achieving
academic reform.Others described it as a backlash
against the School of Education—taking its best ideas
but not allowing the School of Education to implement
them.

17

The issue was further complicated by the fact

that the chairman of the Academic Matters Council—Richard
Ulin—is a professor in the School of Education.

The

author did not have the opportunity of interviewing
Dr. Ulin, but others have suggested that his move to
appoint a subcommittee was in fact an effort to save a
good idea—a student-centered degree program—from almost
certain defeat in the Faculty Senate.

18

point made in interviews by Leigh Short,
Anthony Sorton, and David Bischoff; all Council members.
^"^A point made in interviews with Tom Clark and
Bob Woodbury.
^^This point was made by David Bischoff, Arthur
Kinney, Leigh Short and Anthony Borton.
In fact, however,
the rest of the School of Education package was eventually
approved by the Faculty Senate so it's likely that this
particular segment would have been approved as well.
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Further Conflicts and Compromises as the Idea Moves
Toward Institutional Reform.
an ad hoc subcommittee.

In any event, Dr. Ulin created

Ulin had been aware of the faculty-

student group which had been meeting since the SWAP
conference to discuss alternatives to departmental require¬
ments, so he intentionally chose Arthur Kinney, a faculty
member from this group, to chair the subcommittee.

Under

Arthur Kinney's chairmanship, the two groups became one.

19

The new committee met several times during the
spring of 1969 and continued into the fall without losing
a great deal of momentum.

In December 19691 "the group

submitted a five-page proposal to the Academic Matters
Council.

The proposal reiterated the goal of having

students design their own major programs and spelled out
in some detail the mechanisms for them to do this.

It

called for a bachelor's degree to be awarded to seniors

^^The members of the Academic Matters ad hoc

commixxee,
visory com
members:
Education.
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who have completed no fewer than four academic
terms at the University which demonstrate,
courses each term, an
academic program of 'designed coherence.'20
It was assumed (but not required) that programs of coherence
would cut across departmental lines, but the ad hoc committee
felt that the student working with the faculty advisor was
the responsible party for defining that coherence.

They

felt that the
yo-lidity of the 'designed coherence' of each
individual program will be determined by the
student's own faculty advisor in consultation
with the student and finally by the director
of the program.21
According to the proposal, any undergraduate in
the freshman or sophomore year who had a 2.0 average and
was willing to define a program, work with a faculty
sponsor; and prepare reports and evaluations at the end of
each term, could be admitted to the program.
Thus, the mechanism proposed by the ad hoc committee
was a new program.

As one faculty member said in praise

of the planning committee's efforts.

on

'Troposal for a New Bachelor's Degree with In¬
dividual Concentration,” proposal submitted to the Academic
Matters Council by the Ad Hoc Committee, Arthur Kinney,
Chairman (Undated), p. 1.

21 Ibid.

I6l

. • . there had been the idea of providing some
flexibility for students, but before that (BDIC)
it had had a negative caste to it—you released
an individual student from requirements . . .
BDIC turned the psychology around—from being
something you wanted to get out of into something
to get into. The program was a positive thing
for students.22
The ad hoc committee proposal was less clear about
the organization of the program and its relationship to the
University.

It called for the College of Arts and Sciences

to offer the option of BDIC to students.

It called as

well for a Director of the program, but the reporting lines
were unclear.

It was to be the Director’s responsibility

to recruit faculty advisors, to recruit students and
oversee programs, to establish interdepartmental and
interdisciplinary courses.

In its closing paragraph the

committee asserted that "(BDIC is not conceived as an honors
degree and there should be no overlapping of responsibility
here).
When the report was submitted to the Academic
Matters Council in December, however, it was the potential
overlap—or threat—to the Honors Program that was the item
of most intense debate and conflict.

The Director of the

22with Dave Bischoff.
^^Proposal for a"New Bachelor’s Degree with Indi¬
vidual Concetration," Ibid., pp. 4, 5.
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Honors Program—Everett Emerson—was a member of Academic
Matters and he was opposed to the program as a separate
entity*

He felt that a student—centered degree program

should be one of the available options within the Honors
Program*

Arthur Kinney, on the other hand, was strenuously

opposed to this.

He felt that the students for whom BDIC

had been designed were not those who would identify them¬
selves as Honors students*

The students he had in mind—

stemming from his experience as a faculty resident in
Southwest Residential College—were those who were bright
and capable, but who had been tumed-off by the university
experience, and therefore had mediocre to poor academic
records.

He was seeking a vehicle to reinvigorate and

"turn-on" these students to education*
In addition to the substantive differences over
program orientation that existed between Everett Emerson
and Arthur Kinney, there emerged as well questions of
leadership and power*

Emerson as Director of Honors—

then the only free-standing nondepartmental degree
program—did not want another, and Arthur Kinney who had
for a year and a half been developing the idea for BDIC
and had conceived of a separate organizational unit headed
by a director, was not interested in merely a sub-unit
of another program*
to document*

These differences, however, are hard
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The Academic Matters Council had other questions
about the proposal as well.

It asked for a university¬

wide program, because it felt that this proposal was too
affiliated with the College of Arts and Sciences.

In

response to this objection, the ad hoc committee revised
its proposal to call for a free-standing program called the
Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration.

It would

have a director responsible to the Provost's Office.

The

revised proposal encouraged the participation of other Schools
in addition to the College of Arts and Sciences.
The revised proposal was discussed again at a
February meeting of the Academic Matters Council.

Council

members--principally Everett Emerson--were still not satis¬
fied with the program.

The issue of the cost of such a

program was raised.
In an action quite separate from the BDIC proposal,
the Academic Matters Council had decided that it should
investigate the cost implications to the University of any
new policy or program before it recommended action to the
Faculty Senate.

Accordingly, it established occasional

ad hoc committees for this purpose.

Several members of

the Council objected strongly to the budget review committees,
because they felt that the Council should concern itself
with academic and not budgetary issues.

Because of this

difference of opinion, the ad hoc budget review mechanism

164

was only occasionally used.

When it was called up in the

BDIC case, therefore, it could have been for either of
two reasons:

a) to seriously consider the cost implica¬

tions because the proposal called for a director on released
time, and secretarial support, or b) to side-step the KinneyEmerson split by creating in effect another committee to
revise the Kinney proposal.
Although the documentary evidence is unclear,
the second notion seems the most plausible because the
new subcommittee chaired by Professor Leigh Short not
only considered budgetary implications, but proposed a
number of important revisions to the program.

24

The review committee accepted the basic idea and
objectives of the program, but changed many of the specifics.
Most importantly, they saw the program as an experimental
or pilot program and therefore recommended a limited number
of students and a pilot period of two years.

They saw

the pilot notion as a strategy for gaining Faculty Senate
approval, but also as an opportunity for testing the
validity of the core idea and for experimentation with

^^The members of this committee included: Leigh
Short, Chairman, Tony Borton, Everett Emerson, Hugh Mi¬
ser, John Zahradnik, and John Kendall.
It is interesting
to note the elimination of student participation.
Of this
group, none was a student.
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the mechanics of the program.
In order to strengthen the notion of a university¬
wide program, the subcommittee replaced the director with
a four-person supervisor's committee.

The committee would

include a student and the chairmanship would rotate among
the members.

It was understood but not stipulated that

the committee membership would represent various pro¬
fessional Schools as well as the College of Arts and
Sciences.

26

This supervisory committee structure rather

^^This
in fact extended the planning period of
the program two years, but gave more clear focus to the
efforts because the pilot program would have active students.
^^Perhaps the reason it was not stipulated was
that it was clear by then who the first supervisory committee
would be (assuming Academic Matters Council and Faculty
Senate approval.) The supervisory committee would include
Leigh Short, the chairman of the budget review sub¬
committee and professor of Engineering,* Tony Borton,
professor in the then college of Agriculture and member of
both the ad hoc committee and the
budget review commitee
created by the Academic Matters Council; and Arthur Kinney,
professor of English, Chairman of the ad hoc committee
and one who had been involved with the program from the
initial SWAP conference.
It is also interesting to note
that the notion of a student committee member althoiAgh
part of the proposal was never acted upon.
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creatively solved the leadership conflict between Everett
Emerson and Arthur Kinney while appealing to the university¬
wide nature of the program.
The committee changed too, the notion of the student
clientele.

While supporting the idea that BDIC would not

be an Honors College it made it clear that the program
was for students ready to undertake the major rather than
for entering freshmen.

It minimized the departure from

existing university requirements stressing that students
entering the program would have completed distribution
requirements and that BDIC in fact offered only an alterna¬
tive way of meeting core requirement F—intensive or
specialized work constituting a major.

The committee

also put the responsibility of finding a Faculty Sponsor
onto the student rather than the Director of Faculty
Committee and articulated a very stringent set of procedures
for students to follow during the pilot phase:
1.

With guidance from the chairman, a student
who wishes to be a candidate for a degree in
the program first seeks to locate a member of
the faculty who is willing to serve as his
sponsor.
If the student is successful, he pre¬
pares with his sponsor's help a unified program
of studies for at least two semesters and a
rationale for the four semesters of his program.

2.

The student then presents his proposal to the
Committee and stands prepared to defend his
proposal.

3.

With the aid of appropriate consultants who may
serve as ad hoc members, the Committee reviews
the proposal and decides whether the student may
be authorized to undertake the program. When it

16?

is approved, the student becomes responsible
for preparing periodic written self-evaluations
with his sponsor and for planning with him the
remainder of his academic program, subject to
the approval of the Committee chairman.
4.

The student who successfully completes the major
will be awarded his degree by the University of
Massachusetts upon the initial recommendation of
the Committee.2/
One of the more important strategies of this

Committee's proposal to Academic Matters was to include
sample programs of study.
programs.

Table 3 lists these sample

These, more than anything else perhaps suggested

what the program would be like.

It is interesting to

note that the core idea of the Bachelor's Degree with
Individual Concentration program is a combination of
courses.

This core idea will continue to evolve during

the pilot phase of the program.

The subcommittee's

proposal was accepted by the Academic Matters Council on
March 5,

1970.

It had previously been presented to and
/

approved by the Student Senate Academic Affairs Committee.'

Proposal to Establish a Program for A Bachelor's
Degree With Individual Concentration,” proposal submitted to
the Academic Matters Council, March 5t 1970, Leigh Short,
Chairman, p. 1.
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-^Arthur Kinney had felt that it had been important
,

to get formal student backing and support for the program so
had gone to the Student Senate first for approval and re¬
turned to Academic Matters with their backing and support.
Others including students felt that that had ^een some¬
thing of a phony process—a last minute appearance befor
^hrftSLntf rather than actual student participation.
In
either case it was symbolically quite important.
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It was forwarded to the Faculty Senate and approved at their
April 2nd meeting.

It was approved at a May meeting of the

Board of Trustees.

°?P®t«ith Individual Concentration
During ps Pilot Phase: Perspectives from
a Student Participant and from
the Supervisory Committee
By the Fall of I970, then, the BDIC supervisory
committee had been

program had been given

formed,

a two year experimental mandate, and it was finally
ready to admit its first students.

The objective of the

program was to provide for individualization by allowing
students to develop their own major program of study.
The first part of this section depicts what that meant
for an individual student.

BDIC was also a programmatic

or organizational vehicle for meeting this objective and
the two year mandate afforded the supervisory committee
the opportunity to experiment with that vehicle.

The

supervisory committee during this period was concerned not
only with individual student programs, but with a variety
of programmatic issues relating to the implementation of

29
^The supervisory committee members were, as had
been predicted, Anthony Borton, Leigh Short, and Arthur
Kinney.
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the program.

The second part of this section deals with

those issues from the perspective of the supervisory
committee.
Janet Sheppard—A BDIC Student.

Janet Sheppard

was one of the first ten students in the BDIC program.
She applied and was accepted during the fall of I970 and
her program beg.an with the spring semester of I971.
Janet had come to the University of Massachusetts
as a freshman with a clear idea of what she wanted for
herself.

She wanted to be a lawyer and she wanted the

University of Massachusetts to help her learn what she
needed to get into law school, what she needed to practice
effectively, and how to keep the study of and practice of
law in a broader perspective.

She quickly learned that

there was no particular Department, School or program at
the University of Massachusetts to directly help her with
her objective.

According to Janet, "the majors would not

have prepared (me) for anything but that academic
discipline--would not have helped me in terms of skills
for law school.Janet's motivation was strong, however
and she began to pursue her objectives on her own.

^^Interview with Janet Sheppard. While this state
ment is clearly inaccurate, what is important to the point
are Janet's perceptions about the University and her
motivations for joining BDIC.
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One feels that "you have to really fight for an education
at U.Mass,

(but) you can get what you want."^^

She

joined the Honors Program because she had become convinced
that good teaching was more important than content of
courses, and the Honors courses were offered by many of
the best professors in the University.

Honors also allowed

her to get out of University core requirements, which she
considered useless.

She joined Project 10 "because

it seemed different from all other places in the University,
and because it too had good faculty associated with it.
By the beginning of her sophomore year, she still
had to choose a major and she heard in Project 10 about
a new program which allowed students to structure their own
majors.
According to Janet, "it was strange to think about.
I was going to design my own education.
wanted to do that."-^^

I

wasn't sure I

She decided, however, to investigate

the program and went to see someone in the office to ex¬
plain about wanting to go to law school and the skills
she felt she needed to learn at U.Mass in order to get there.
Tony Barton talked with her and said that what she wanted

^^Interview with Janet Sheppard.

^^Ibid.

^^Ibid.
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to do was important and that she should find a facultysponsor and apply to the program.

Janet felt that his

encouragement during that meeting was crucial.

She went

to a faculty member—Richard Harzler, a lawyer affiliated
with the School of Business Administration—informed him
of the new program and invited him to be her sponsor.
After checking out the program, he agreed.
They worked together to prepare the program of
Study and Rationale required of applicants to the program.
Janet's program statement had emphasized her professional
goals:
My professional goal is to be a lawyer.
In
order to have a useful background, I . . . .
want
to study law specifically, but I would
also like to study the things that influence
the law.
I think politics, culture, history and
social grouping influence the law, and in turn
are affected by the law.3^
The courses listed for her first year of the program in¬
cluded American government. Political Novel, Criminology,
the Individual and Society, the Law and Judicial Behavior.
Janet and Professor Harzler went together to be
interviewed.

Janet found the process strange.

The inter¬

view seemed to focus more on the specific combination of
courses than on her rationale and objectives, and most

3^Janet Sheppard, "The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration," Program statement, undated but
contained in her academic folder.
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questions were directed to Professor Harzler rather than
to her.

She was nervous about locking herself into the

program for two years and wanted to be assured that her
program could remain flexible.
The supervisory committee said she could change her
program if she felt she needed to and accepted her into the
program.
BDIC did allow Janet to change her program.

Her

report at the end of her first term stated that "I have
added the goal of acquainting myself with the aspect of
the law which deals specifically with women.More
fundamentally, it allowed her

to do something more than

just combine University courses.

In the Summer of 1971,

a new program had been started at U.Mass called the Univer¬
sity Year for Action in which students spent a full year
in community anti-poverty work.

Janet convinced Professor

Hartzler that a year spent working with the Community and
Regional Legal Assistant Program in Holyoke would give her
practical legal experience and insights into the sociology
of law.

Together Janet and Professor Hartzler convinced

^^Sheppard, "Program of the Bachelor's Degree
With Individual Concentration, End of Term Report,'" May
28, 1971.
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The BDIC program to allow Janet to participate in the
Action program as part of her BDIC major.

They put to¬

gether a reading list designed to help Janet understand
and clarify her day-to-day experiences.
At the end of one semester in the program, Janet
felt that it had "sharpened my insights into the social
problems related to the law and given me a better per¬
spective from which to plan my career.She also felt
that she had gotten a much clearer perspective on a law
office, on lawyers, as professionals, and on ways in which
their attitudes shaped the profession.

Because she was

concerned with ways of articulating what she had learned
and in some way bringing it back to the university, Janet
taught a University course during her second semester in
the Action program and her third in BDIC.

She appreciated

Professor Hartzler's and BDIC's willingness to let her
teach what she had learned in order to learn from that
process.

During her second semester with Action, Janet

also co-authored a pamphlet on Landlord-Tenant Rights and
Duties, which he felt was a valuable learning experience.
Hartzler in his memo to BDIC evaluating Janet's
experience in the Action program says:

^^Sheppard,

"End of Term Report, Fall 1971»" P* 3*
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In summary, her educational experiences
in the Action program brought her to the point
where she is now—a respected teacher. This
respect comes from the lawyers with whom she
worked, their clients, the personnel of the
courts, her student peers and even a few pro¬
fessors; and law school is still to come ....
I am becoming more convinced than ever
that at least some students don't need as much
traditional formal education as we presently
have structured into our system.
T think BDIC
and Action are good things ... .37
Janet felt that the most important things about her
BDIC program had been her experiences in Action, her
teaching, her reading, and her close relationship with
Professor Hartzler.

She felt that she had learned a great

deal from keeping in close contact with him over two years
and she felt that the most important thing that BDIC had
done was facilitate that relationship.
Janet finished her final semester in the BDIC
program by taking and teaching additional University
courses and she was accepted into law school.
Arthur Kinney, when asked what had made BDIC
a successful program, had said:
I want to say that the most important thing—
in a kind of naive and adolescent way, was the

^"^Richard Hartzler, memo to the Committee on
Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration concerning
Janet Sheppard, found in Sheppard's academic folder, p. 2.
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wisdom of the student programs, that is, the
purposes they came up with, the combinations,
etc. (Students) were what made the program
successfully.38
I think that Janet Sheppard's experience proves Arthur
Kinney's point.

Janet's program attests as well to the

fact that BDIC fulfilled its main objective—that of pro¬
viding individualized education.
The Su-pervisory Committee and the BDIC Program.
When the BDIC program was approved by the Board of Trustees
in May of 1970, the supervisory committee began spending
time together immediately.

They were an impressive group

and nearly all of those interviewed concerning BDIC felt
that the most important factor to the quick acceptance
university-wide of the BDIC program was the "academic
respectability" of the first supervisory committee.

Arthur

Kinney was seen as the program's leader from the beginning
of the planning period and all of those interviewed felt
he had been very effective.

His success was attributed to

his energy and dedication, and the fact that he was well
known and respected throughout the campus.

Arthur Kinney

typified what Lindquist and others referred to as a
"cosmopolitan local* because he had been involved in a
large number of activities on the campus that made him
well known beyond the confines of the English Department.

^^Interview with Arthur Kinney.
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He was respected by both the faculty and the students at
the University.

He had been a faculty resident in South¬

west, had participated in the SWAP conference, and had
organized a student-faculty teach-in in May 1970 about the
invasion of Cambodia in addition to well-known scholarly
activities.

His experience prior to coming to the

University of Massachusetts

had been at Yale where he

had been involved with the collegiate system.
The other faculty members on the first Supervisory
Committee were widely respected as well.

The Academic

Matters Council was an established academic campus group
and Leigh Short had been a member for some years.He
was well known within and without the School of Engineering.
Tony Borton, also a member of the Academic Matters Council,
had been at the University for many years, knew a large
number of faculty members and had been actively involved
in undergraduate curriculum development in the College
of Agriculture.
The supervisory committee accepted six students into
the program for the fall of 1970 and another thirty for
the Spring semester.

They worked hard to achieve diversity

among the students and their programs, to foster creativity.

^^In fact, when BDIC was to come up at the end of
its trial period for permanent approval, Leigh Short
was serving as chairman of the Academic Matters Council.
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and to interest students who were cap>able but had pre¬
viously been academic underachievers.^^
The preliminary report described the range and
diversity of programsi
The most popular areas in the first year of the
program are:
pre-law (5), natural science (4),
environmental science (4K urban studies (4), and
mythology and folklore (3).
Other students have
combined speech therapy and physical education
work for a career helping the profoundly re¬
tarded; work in philosophy, creative writing,
theatre, and dance for a study of aesthetics;
work in engineering, film, and music theory and
composition for composing and scoring for mass
media; work in government, history, sociology,
English, and economics, combined with employment
by the state legislature and the Democratic
Party for a study in professional politics ....
The supervisory committee at first required that
students combine existing University courses, but as the
program progressed, they found that University courses did
not always fulfill the educational needs of students in
the program.

The supervisory committee petitioned the

Academic Matters Council for special course numbers which

^^This nonmeritocratic emphasis was one of the unique
things about the BDIC program as compared to programmatic
attempts in other colleges and universities.
4liiprogram of Bachelor’s Degree with Individual
Concentration: A Preliminary Report—April 19711"
mitted by Anthony Borton, Arthur Kinney, and Leigh Short,
supervisory committee, p. 3*
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would serve as academic umbrellas under which BDIC
students and their sponsors could design directly relevant
educational experiences.
used.

These courses became widely

They also began to allow more field work and off-

campus experiences as students and their sponsors sought
to build these into their programs.
The supervisory committee asked students to ar¬
ticulate both a personal and professional goal- for their
studies, and they found that the program tended to attract
ambitious, aggressive and industrious students.

Students

often used the BDIC program as a way to undertake much
more specifically career-related studies than usually
available within Departments.

Some excerpts from student

proposals are illustrative:
The purpose of my individual concentration
will be to prepare myself in the field of
East Asia Journalism, centering around Japan.
I have proposed a program to acquire many
of the skills essential to the positions of
the Software Design Specialist and Management
in that field (Computer Science).
My pro¬
posed study consists of at least seventeen
interrelated courses covering Mathematics,
Software Systems, Hardware and Cybernetics.
This program is designed to provide a founda¬
tion for graduate study and research in both
mythology per se
manifestations of
myth in literature.

^^Ibid., Appendix IV:

Selected Case Studies
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Just as the first students were important to the
implementation of BDIC, as a program, so too were the
faculty sponsors.

The Supervisory Committee paid close

attention to its initial group of faculty sponsors.

They

made it very clear that they were accepting or rejecting
students to the program according to their judgments about
the faculty sponsors and the quality of the faculty-student
relationship as well as on the coherence and viability
of the student program.

In their proposal for permanent

status they defined their criteria for student acceptance
as follows:
Approval and acceptance is dependent on the
Committee's evaluation of:
(1) the need for an
individualized major in consultation with the
sponsor and on occasion other faculty, (2) the
faculty-sponsor's ability to advise the student
effectively, (3) "the student-sponsor relationship,
(4) the academic merit of the proposal, and \^)
the interrelationship jnd coherence of the pro¬
posed course of study. ^
During their first year they attracted faculty
sponsors from twenty-six departments and colleges.

The

sponsors were well respected as a group, by other faculty
and administrators in the University.

The BDIC supervisory

committee did not interfere with faculty judgments and

^^MpT-onosal to Award permanent Status to the

ry1h2
visory committee, p»

su^fr^”’
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expected the faculty member to take responsibility with
the student for the student's program.

They felt thati

The ultimate success of the BDIC program is
dependent on the individual faculty-sponsor
who is the key to a successful independent
major. The sponsor counsels and advises the
student, makes academic decisions concerning
the major (pass-fail courses, pre-requisites,
etc.), certifies the student as a candidate
for graduation and in the final analysis, pro¬
vides the academic credibility to the BDIC
major.^^
The Supervisory Committee also worked hard at
establishing harmonious relationships with University
Departments.

They made it clear that they did not intend

to challenge or undermine existing Departments or majors
and that the program was only for those few students who
wanted an academic program that was not otherwise available
through existing departmental major offerings.
As BDIC moved into its second year of the pilot
program, another major objective began to be articulated
for the program—that of academic experimentation.

45

^^Ibid.
^^Arthur Kinney, when interviewed stated that this^
objective had been present from the beginning of the planning
period, but there is no documentary support for this posi¬
tion.
The documents and most of those interviewed testify
that the sole purpose of the program in the beginning was to
respond to the pressure for individualization of the
curriculum by allowing students to design
•
program of study.
I would agree with Kinney that invidualized majors do, in fact, constitute an academic reform, but
would agree with the others that the program was not ini¬
tially viewed as a vehicle for continual curricular experimentation.
That the program in fact turned out to be such
a vehicle could only be attributed to serendipity.
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The BDIC supervisory committee began to allow
groups that were planning new academic programs to use the
rubric of BDIC as a vehicle for their program development
and experimentation.

For example, the fact that BDIC

allowed UWW students to enroll under its major was crucial
to the development of the University Without Walls program
for it gave UWW a year of working with real students, and
faculty members while it designed its program.

In addition,

BDIC became a vehicle for ^u.ging student academic in¬
terests and this information was useful to the university
for curricular planning.

Students joined the BDIC program

in order to design a major program of study that was not
available to them in any other way at the University.

As

the BDIC enrollment grew, student programs began to cluster
in certain areas such as urban studies, environmental
studies, or legal studies.

As one faculty member put it:
46
"Students, in a sense, voted with their feet.
The

supervisory committee watched student program patterns
closely and suggested new majors for the University.
The concept was best stated by Arthur Kinney:
+hp best sense of the word, BDIC is really
i se5^ioe
for the University in general
U J^sfespefially for the Academic Matters
ty\

46j^terview with Robert Woodbury.
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Committee itselfj a program which tests certain
possiblities which are raised as academic matters
on our campus.
In addition to encouraging experimentation and new
major programs, BDIC began to have an impact on Departmental
curricula.

Departments began to revamp their course

offerings and to allow greater flexibility to students in
fulfilling major requirements.

The Biology, Zoology, and

the College of Agriculture were three examples cited often
during interviews.
The Success of an Idea—BDIC Moves
For Permanent Approval
From its inception as a pilot program in 1970,
the BDIC program had grown rapidly, so that by the spring
of 1972, it had 134 students.

As its two-year experimental

mandate was to expire in May, the BDIC supervisory committee
decided that the program had proved successful in providing
individualized majors and that permanent status for the
program should be sought from the Board of Trustees.
While the process for planning and gaining approval
as a pilot program had taken two years the process for
gaining permanent approval seemed quite simple.

The

supervisory presented a tried proposal to the Academic

^"^Arthur Kinney, letter to Ernest Buck, Chairman
of the Academic Matters Committee, March 1973*
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Matters Council.

The Council voted unanimous approval

and supported the proposal in the Faculty Senate.

The

Senate also voted its approval and supported the program
before the Board of Trustees.

The Board of Trustees voted

its approval and BDIC became a permanent academic option
for students.
The critical supporting factors in the first
planning stages of BDIC had been leadership in the involve¬
ment and support of a few well-respected faculty members
and a genuine concern
for finding
needs.

on the part of students and faculty

an academic mechanism for meeting students

The important factors in the process of gaining

permanent approval were somewhat different.

Due to the

successful experience with an experimental pilot program,
BDIC had achieved a critical mass of support from students,
and faculty.

The students had for the most part come up

with serious and exciting alternative programs and the
faculty responded to the students.

The large number of

faculty members who supported the program before the
Faculty Senate were according to one supervisory committee
member "strange bedfellows." BDIC appealed to both extremes-liberals for its reform potential and conservative^
academic s because of the flexibility it gave students to
follow their own particular line."

48 Interview with Tony Borton.

The effective leader-
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ship of the well-respected supervisory committee was
still a critical factor, but the University environment
was more conducive to academic reform in 1972 than it had
been in I969 and 1970.
An important element in the planning and imple¬
mentation of BDIC from I968 to 1972 was the fact that it
did not appear to be a program of radical change.

Allowing

students to make all the decisions concerning a major pro¬
gram of study was a fundamental departure from prevailing
attitudes about the relative roles, responsibilities, and
competencies of faculty and students, but within the context
of BDIC this departure was not immediately apparent.

A

BDIC program for a few students did not appear to alter in
any way the basic missions or functions of the University;
this was the most important reason for its swift and wide¬
spread acceptance, but as an approved program, it did
allow for the assumption of the mission of individualization.
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CHAPTER

V

INSTITUTE FOR MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT
The Institute for Man and His Environment was
formally approved by the Board of Trustees of the University
of Massachusetts on April 26, 1971*

I'ts establishment as a

distinct research unit attests to the intention of the
University of Massachusetts to assume the mission of social
problem-solving.

The story of its development over a two

year period, however, shows how difficult it is to alter the
basic missions of the University, and on another level, how
difficult it is even to create a new unit within the Uni¬
versity where an altered mission could be apparent.

Its

history also reveals some of the complex aspects of the change
process and suggests a number of factors that were important
to its creation as well as many that prevented its realiza¬
tion in the grandiose terms envisioned.

This chapter traces

the development of the Institute from the fall of i960 to
the spring of 1970*
Objectives of the Institute
The concept of the Institute grew out of a wide¬
spread feeling among many members of
faculty
that a great state university had a responsibility
to employ its resources to help cope with the
worsening problems of the environment.
^Bernard Berger, "A Chronological Account
^e
Development to Date If the University of Massachusetts Institue^for Man and His Environment, Amherst, 16 March
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In the late sixties and early seventies environ¬
mental problems such as pollution, overpopulation, and
resource depletion were the center of a great deal of
attention and public concern.

It was felt that the

University ought to take an institutional role about the
issues of knowledge and its application to environmental
problems.
There was a growing feeling on the part of the
activists among the students and faculty that
the University should get involved in social
problems, that they should get themselves in¬
truded into the social process and become an
agent of social change in a much more active
way. 2
The concept of an institute was shared by many at
the University; the entity of an institute, its structural
and operational form, evolved over the two year period and
was much harder to achieve.

A recent brochure describes

the goals of the Institute:
The Institute for Man and His Environment has
been established ... to meet the challenge of
the many complex problems arising from the inter¬
action of people with the social and physical
environment.
Its main task, which no other
single segment of the University is equipped to
perform, is to bring together the diverse
ents
of the faculty and students to bear on problems of
common interest. The Institute is designed to
act, therefore, as a focal point for the

^Interview with Carl Swanson, Associate Director,
Institute for Man and His Environment, 2k January 197'*--
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recognition and delineation of areas of
environmental concern which call for a
multidisciplinary approach, and as a stimulus
to the development of appropriate strategies
for dealing with these concerns.3
The documents pertaining to the Institute were
quite eloquent about its goals.

Those who were inter¬

viewed were less eloquent, but they revealed the fact
that there were many perceived goals and objectives for
the institute; these were not prioritized, and some of
them were in fact contradictory.
Of the thirteen people interviewed, all agreed with
the generalized goal of meeting the challenge of complex
environmental problems.

They agreed that these problems

stemmed from the interaction of man with the environment,
and that the solutions had to involve both man and tech¬
nology—the social sciences, the hard sciences and even
the humanities.
Most agreed, as well, that the problems faced
were of a kind that required some sort of multidisciplinary
activity, and that no existing unit could mount such an
effort.

Therefore, they agreed that an institute should

be created as connecting tissue between departments and
schools and between teaching, research, and service in the
environmental area.

3Tnstitute for Man and His Environment. Informational Brochure, 1972.
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The objective of many to have an educational
program that was closely tied in and that was available
to undergraduate as well as graduate students at all
levels of sophistication was a shared objective but one that
was

unique to this institute.

One more cynical faculty

member felt that the reason for the educational program
was somewhat different:

"We were Johnny-come-lately•s

so we had to do something different."
Another goal for the institute was that the
institute should serve as a resource for state govern¬
ment.

Agencies of the state government concerned with

environmental problems ought to be able to call upon the
institute for help.

This goal was articulated by most

of those interviewee^ although some claimed that the focus
originated at a national level and only slowly shifted
toward the state level.

As one faculty member put it:

We are a large state university.
We have a
unique responsibility—an obligation to respond.
My feeling is that the state agencies were
originally skeptical that the University could
look on such problems in a realistic fashion
and some state agencies still are skeptical.^
Many felt that the "real" motivation for the
Institute had less to do with the environment and more to

^Interview with Otto Stein, Head, Department of
Botany, 1 February 197^*
^Interview with Bernard Berger, Director, Water
Resources Research Center, 31 January 197^*
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do with money.

As the Associate Director put it«

. . . it was both in response to a very obvious
social need « . . and it was also in response
to the fact that there was money available through
MND and NSF . . . there was in the air^the feel¬
ing that we had better get on the ball.
A number of Federal agencies and large foundations were
at that time making large grants to universities for work
in the environmental area, and the University of Massachusetts
wanted to be on the receiving end.

The structural forms,

the timing, and much of the energy and motivation seem
7
to have been related to "grantsmanship."'
Those who saw monetary objectives as a goal for
the Institute also saw political and personal ones.
one administrator said, "the

As

Zeitgeist was in the

environmental area so the University needed a labelled

g

entity in the environmental business."

New presidents,

new top administrators, and new deans all wanted to improve

^Interview with Carl Swanson, 24 January 1974.
"^The fact that over the years its major proposals
have not been funded and few resources have come to it
has been a severe blow to the inflated aspirations of
those who saw it solving hosts of problems.
^Interview with Richard Louttit, Head, Department
of Psychology, 1 February 1974.
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their power base through control over a visible and
successful entity.
These last conflicting motivations—not the generally
accepted notion that the University ought to be working
towards the solution of difficult environmental problems—
led to the two year squabble over the forms and functions
of the Institute.
Planning Process for Institute
Initial Stages—Faculty Meeting and External
Influences.

Concern over what the University was doing

in the environmental area first was expressed in an
organized fashion in the Fall of 1969*

A group of

faculty—mostly from engineering and business—had been
meeting on Monday evenings to talk about what the Uni¬
versity could do about major social problems.

At the same

time the Dean of the Graduate School, his research
associate dean and others were trying to think of ways
to involve the University in areas that would respond
to needs but would also produce funds.

The catalytic

agent between these groups was Bernard Berger who had
spent the I968/1969 academic year as the water specialist
on the Presidential Science Advisory staff in Washington,
and who returned to campus convinced that the University
should be doing something in the environmental area and
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that there were funds available for such activity.

Berger

had been in a position in Washington to know what legisla¬
tion and appropriations were likely in the environmental
areas so he was granted substantial credibility on campus.
Berger met several times with the Graduate Deani and they
planned a series of large group meetings where interested
Q

faculty and students could discuss the issue.^

The first meeting which was held on September 23*

1969f was well attended.

Close to one hundred people were

there, including a smattering of "vocal” students and
faculty from a wide variety of University departments.
The agenda for the meeting was to discuss problems and
what the University ought to do about them.

There was a

general consensus that something ought to be done about
the environment by the University as an institution but
considerable disagreement about what and how.

As one

participant put it "the humanists were talking about ethics
and culture* and the engineers about waste treatment.

^All of those interviewed attested to the initial
leadership roles of M. Appley and B. Berger although there
were differences of opinion as to who was really the prime
mover.
Clearly B. Berger as the Chairman of meetings and
the Steering Committee was the most visible, but that was
perceived by most as a justifiable strategy on the part of
the Graduate Dean to put a faculty member in the visible
position.
^^Interview with Robert Gluckstern, Vice Chancellor
for Academic Affairs and Provost, 22 March 197^•

194

A second meeting was held on October 16, I969 and
an outside guest was invited.

John Steinhart had been

a colleague of Bernard Berger's in Washington, was
associated with the Office of Science and Technology, and
had recently completed a report to the President's Environ¬
mental Quality Council.Steinhart's visit was remembered
by almost all of those interviewed, his report was dis¬
tributed on the campus and widely read, and he was quoted
in all the major Institute documents.

He was, therefore,

the most important outside influence on the development
of the Institute, and his input came at a crucial, early
stage in the Institute's development.

It is important,

therefore, to review the major elements of Steinhart's
Report.
The Steinhart study set out to determine the
appropriate institutional arrangements for environmental
problem-solving.

It started from some assumptions about

the role of the university in society and claimed that
"the ongoing discussion of problems" was the third major
function of the university (along with education and re¬
search).

Thus Steinhart made the transition from public

^^John S. Steinhart and Stacie Cherniack, ^
Universities and Environmental Qualityj_Commitment
^
to Problem-Focused Education, A Report to the President's
Environmental Quality Coyicil» Office of Science and
Technology, September 19&9*
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service to social problem-solving as a mission for the
university.

According to Steinhart:

. . . society has a right to expect, as a part
of the educational process, discussion of the
prominent issues, problems and opportunities
of the day, and training of professionals who
can deal with these problems on a professional
level.
(Universities should also play) a
prominent role in the long range public dis¬
cussion of alternative futures.12
Steinhart studied a variety of institutional
arrangements developed in universities to focus on en¬
vironmental problem-solving, but concluded that most
had failed because they had been unsuccessful at providing
a viable alternative to the departmental structure.
Although federal money had encouraged the proliferation
of institutes and centers, many of these according to
Steinhart had become paper institutes to channel research
out to departments.

13

Of these few institutes that Steinhart found to

12 Ibid., p. 8.
^^The basis of the Steinhart study was a sup/ey
"Environmental Science Centers at Institutions of Higher
Education" which had been prepared for the subcoimittee
on Science Research and Development, U.S. House of Repre¬
sentatives, 91st Congress by The Environmental Policy
Division of the Legislative Reference Service. The survey
found a great number of institutes and centers and trie
but failed to determine the most successful organization 1
forms to deal with environmental problems;
No
answer exists to the mis-match of historical institutional
organization and emerging social problems.
The
,
Division survey recommended the involvement of more socia
scientists and more operational relationships
^ ‘
ment agencies.
Steinhart had selected twenty institutes
from this survey for further study.
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be successful, Steinhart delineated two factors that he
deemed crucial to their success:
1. They had substantial or complete control of the
faculty reward structure and
2. They had the freedom to be innovative in
introducing course material, educational programs.
work study programs, and curriculum requirements
for degrees.
(Emphasis in original
Steinhart felt that control over the reward
system—including hiring and subsequent promotion and
rewards—was important as the only way to establish a
viable alternative to the departmental structure and enable
faculty to focus on problems rather than disciplines.
Steinhart felt, as well, that one of the most valuable
results of a program concerned with environmental quality
was the education and training of students with a problem
orientation.

The appropriate educational program in this

area, however, required new multidisciplinary and problemfocused courses, so Steinhart felt that the environmental
unit/institute needed the power to create them.

He also

felt that they needed the ability to sponsor experiencebased programs and confer degrees so that students could
be freed up to pursue work in the environmental area.
In addition to the crucial factors of control over faculty
rewards and the educational program, Steinhart also found that
the

most successful institutes enjoyed the direct interest

14 Steinhart, p.lO.
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and support of one or more senior administrators.
The Steinhart study concluded that the current
federal funding policies were inappropriate and recommended
that the federal government provide broad programmatic
support (including developmental support) for environ¬
mental quality centers.
The findings and recommendations of this report
were the substance of Steinhart's speech to the faculty
meeting on October l6, I969.
were intense and conflicting.

The reactions to the speech
Mort Appley and others who

wanted an environmental problem-focused unit that was
large, visible and liberally supported from Washington
heard in the Steinhart speech the future federal policies
and patterns, and wanted to move at once for the creation of
an institute along the Steinhart model.

Those who had

been primarily concerned with how existing faculty members
from various departments and schools might come together

^^In an appendix to the Steinhart report, D.E.
Cunningham discussed the advantages and deficiencies of
several federal funding patterns.
Cunningham
a universitv response to the complex problems of society
luTtTeZnlloiA expressed through ^i-ncial interactions
hptween government and universities.
The details
v,* o
conditions, and patterns which these financial relationships
assume is of abiding significance in the future structure
InHuncUons of thf university.” Cunningham discussed
the several different funding
^^^/^^^reolace
recommended program funding to the university
^
individual research grants to faculty members,
recommendation was reiterated by Steinha
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to focus on environmental problems were very concerned
with the notion of a separate unit with its own faculty,
research projects, and educational programs.
Formation of Steering Committee.

The meeting

with Steinhart and the reactions convinced the Graduate
Dean that large group forums were not the most pro¬
ductive for pursuing complex questions, so with the
agreement of a large number of faculty he appointed a
Steering Committee and named Bernard Berger as its
Chairman.

The charge to the Steering Committee was to

recommend shape and substance and to suggest a strategy
for launching a program.
The Steering Committee wanted to focus on the
three major elements of education, research, and service
or outreach, and established sub-committees in each of
these areas.

The Steering Committee itself continued

to focus on issues of goals and structure.

These four

groups met often during the period November 19^9 "to
April 19701 discussed a large number of questions, and
put together a report recommending structure and function
for an Institute.

The Steering Committee drew its

membership from different departments and schools in the
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University.The motivations of those on the Steering
Committee and

subcommittees were quite diverse.

Most

of those interviewed felt that the primary motivation was
one of "watch-dog-ism."

Individuals joined the committees

not out of desire to work for an Institute, but to be
sure that their department or school did not miss any¬
thing.

They represented units on the campus who had a

stake in the outcome of the deliberations either because
they wanted control of the Institute themselves (Engineering,
G.raduate School) or because they would stand to lose power
if an Institute were created (Agriculture).

Therefore,

’their positions on an issue regarding structure or function
reflects their feelings about impact on their own unit

^^The members of the Steering Committee were:
Bernard Berger, Chairman, Director of Water Resources
Research Center; Samuel Seeley, Secretary, Associate
Dean, Graduate School; Kenneth Picha, Dean, School of
Engineering; Lester Van Atta, Associate Dean, School of
Engineering; John A. Naegle, Department of Environmental
Sciences; Otto Stein, Head, Department of Botany; Irving
Howards, Government Department; Robert McGarrah, Center
for Business and Economic Research, School of Business
Administration; Ervin Zube, Department of landscape
Architecture; John Roberts, Department of Zoology;
William Darrity, Dean, Department of Public Healtn;
Ellis dim. Department of Human Development.
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rather than on the Institute itself.As one person
interviewed put it:

"some strong people got involved

who wanted to run with the ball and everybody was
juggling and pushing here and there."

1R

This political

maneuvering was to be one of the major factors in the
development of the Institute.

Other motivations for in¬

volvement with Institute planning committees were more
personal.

Many second-rate faculty members tended to

^The College of Agriculture especially viewed
the Institute with some consternation, because they felt
that they had been doing for some years in their Depart¬
ment of Environmental Sciences and in their Experiment
Stations, the very things that the Institute was calling
for. There was some legitimacy to this view, for the
service mission of the University had evolved primarily from
the Land Grant movement in the I860's, and the establishment
of Agricultural Experiment Stations in the late l890's
and early 1900's.
With the exception of the Dean of the School
of Engineering, all those interviewed pointed to the
fact that Engineering wanted to gain control of the
Institute.
Most people tended at first to define en¬
vironmental problems as engineering technology problems,
the School of Engineering had a division of Environ¬
mental Engineering and they were deeply involved in
grantsmanship.
^^Interview with Otto Stein, 1 February 1974.
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attach themselves to the new enterprise as a vehicle
to gain recognition they had failed to achieve in their
home department.

The majority of those seeking routes

to legitimacy included faculty from Agriculture and
Business,
The Steering Committee had a great deal of diffi¬
culty

focusing goals for the new Institute as well as

deciding on its function.

Generally

its

objectives

for the Institute were similar to those mentioned during
interviews; the Institute should serve as a vehicle through
which the University responds to society, it should obtain
financial support for projects, serve as resource to state
agencies, and engage in multidisciplinary research,
education and service projects that focused on environmental
problems.
There were differences of opinion as to the im¬
portance of such goals as compared with the other missions
of the University, and therefore

differing opinions as

to the appropriate size and activity level.

Many argued

that the traditionally emphasized missions of teaching
and disciplined-based research ought to continue to be of
highest priority in the University because the university
is the only and/or best societal institution for carrying
out those missions.

While a multidisciplinary, problem

focused unit might be desirable—especially if it had

202

educational and training aspects—social problem-solving
was performed by other agencies in the society and should
remain a low-level University priority.

Others argued

that the educational and research missions were anachron¬
istic in contemporary societies and could be revitalized
only through an emphasis on social problem-solving.

They

argued for a central place for an Institute for Man and
His Environment.
Lack of a coherent University policy on public
service hampered the deliberations of the Steering
Committee•
The education subcommittee reviewed current
environmentally-focused curricular offerings and recom¬
mended a number of new courses and seminars.

The research

subcommittee grappled with the problem of theoretical vs,
applied research, disciplinary vs. multidisciplinary
activity, and how to decide which research activities
would fall under the purview of the Institute and which
would not.

They recommended research efforts which were

multidisciplinary, problem-focused, and which brought
together willing faculty members.

The service-outreach

committee focused on questions of what activity for whom,
and articulated the notion of service to the state.
They recognized the fundamental importance of outside
funding to support the activities of the Institute.
The Steering Committee had a number of alternative
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organizational formats to choose from during this stage
of the planning process.

They could opt for the Steinhart

model—a separate research unit with its own faculty,
staff and educational program, they could argue for a new
department or school or they could dispense with a new
structural entity

and recommend a series of committees

or task forces.
The deliberations

of the Steering Committee

were somewhat aided by a second visitor to the campus.
Dr. John Buckley, ecologist on the staff of Dr. Lee DuBridge
then the President's Science Advisor, spoke to a third
large group meeting on December 2, 19^9

described

the efforts of Executive agencies in developing programs
in the environmental area.
The Steering Committee pulled together reports
from the subcommittees and incorporated them into one
draft report proposing an Institute for Man and His Environ¬
ment.

It recommended an independent Institute but one with

only a small staff for coordination purposes.

All projects

and activities would be carried out by faculty and graduate
students working with or for diverse state agencies.

The

Institute would report through the Graduate Dean.
the time of the Steering Committee deliberations
reportinrUnr?Srou^h ?he’^GraSuate°Dean.°b5rit'SL not a
cri?icaf issSe at thit time.
It later became one.
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Although the Steering Committee recognized that
its recommendations left unresolved some of the reward
system problems for those faculty who might want to partici¬
pate in Institute projects, it was felt that the Institute
would have to deal with these problems as they arose on a
one-to-one basis.
The Steering Committee's report was meant as an
on-campus discussion paper and as a proposal for funding
to the National Science Foundation.

It was distributed to

University faculty on March 27» 1970 f sind discussed at a
fourth large faculty meeting on April 9‘th.

Following that

meeting, and with the general concurrance of the faculty
attending the meeting, it was submitted to the National
Science Foundation.

It sought a development grant from

the National Science Foundation for the creation of an
Institute. 20
^

a.-4.

4.

^^The struggle for control over the Institute was
revealed once again in deliberations over who was to be
principle investigator of the proposal.
Both Bernard
Berger and Lester Van Atta, Research Associate Dean of
Engineering were likely candidates but the Associate
Provost and the Graduate Dean were both concerned that
that would result in the School of Engineering taking
control of the Institute.
In the end, the Graduate Dean
himself signed on as principle investigator.
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Recruitment of Director.

With the Steering

Committee's draft report In hand, the Graduate Dean re¬
quested three faculty positions for the Fall of I970.
He wanted a Director and two Associate Directors for the
Institute.

The Provost and Associate Provost found such

a request impossible, given the fact that the Institute
did not then exist as a formal unit,^^ but authorized
one appointment.

The Steering Committee was transformed

into an informal search group, and M. Appley took the
initiative in late spring to recruit a Director for the
Institute.
There was immediate controversy over where to
recruit.

Some, including Appley and the Provost, felt

that selection of an on-campus person would run the risk
of a department or school assuming control over the
Institute; others argued that if the primary task were
to bring together and coordinate the faculty on various
environmentally-related problems, a person who was known
and respected on the campus would be best.

21

Nevertheless,

The Steering Committee Report had not gone
to the Faculty Senate and Board of Trustees for approval.
Although many felt that approval was important, they
wanted the Report to go immediately to N.S.F. as a
grant proposal and did not want to wait for formal
approval.
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an off-campus search began but was incomplete that spring
and continued into the fall.
not been overly successful.

The recruitment process had
The favorite candidate,

Carl Swanson, refused the Directorship while agreeing
to the Associate Directorship.

Two other names had been

put forward, and the Provost chose Dayton Carritt,
he was a scientist with an established reputation.

Every-

agreed that it had been an unfortunate choice.
Nevertheless, Dr. Carritt was offered a position and he
came in January as Director of the Institute.
Continued Planning of the Institute Under Carritt
Directorship.

Dayton Carritt's mandate was clear.

He was

to implement the proposal that had been completed the
previous April by the Steering Committee by moving
a) for Faculty Senate approval for the Institute, b) to
bring faculty together and get them started on activities,
and c) to push forward in the pursuit of grant funds.
Dr. Carritt agreed that his mandate to implement
the proposal had been clear but felt that the proposal
was so vague and general that it could not be done.
According to Carritt, the Steering Committee had avoided
the really difficult implementation problems concerning
resources, reward systems, and priorities for activities.
In addition, Carritt felt that he had been mislead con¬
cerning the actual status of the Institute.

He thought

the Institute had been clearly established and had
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campus-wide support, even though he was told that as a
trivial matter it had to go through an approval process.
Again, according to Carritt, he found himself, upon
arrival as Director, in a position of trying to create
an Institute from nothing and against the opposition of
the Deans of the two most powerful professional Schools,
the top campus administration, and the constituted aca¬
demic bodies on the campus.
Whether the opposition was there when he arrived.
whether it was generated by his actions during his first
months, or whether it was generated by other forces such
as opposition and antipathy for the Graduate Dean is a
fascinating question to which, unfortunately, there are
no clear answers.
Carritt, upon his arrival, began a series of
meetings with department heads. Deans, the Provost and
Associate Provost, and the President.

He began to lay

out his notion of an Institute for Man and His Environment.
The Institute was to be, according to Carritt, a large,
liberally supported unit.

Following the Steinhart model.

^^There is unfortunately, no documentary evidence
UJ.

UIICOC

nice U J.

-^-

_

1,

4.^

Louttit, Picha, Gluckstem—were able to speak to the
substance of those meetings from personal recollection.
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it would have control over all grant funds and research
projects concerned with environment-related problems,
and it would have its own educational program.
Carritt's conception was clearly different from
that envisioned the year before by the Steering Committee
and its subcommittees on education, research, and outreach.
The difference could be explained in several ways;
1.

It could reflect Carritt’s sincere attempt

to put specifics on the generalities of the Steering
Committee's report by facing directly

issues of reward

system and control.
2.

It could reflect Carritt's own personal

aspirations as Director of the unit.
3. It could reflect M. AppJey's original, but
skillfully hidden agendas.

When interviewed, Appley

stated almost in passing:
One of the sub-interests I had—once we got the
-thing going--was to incorporate those environ¬
ment-related activities on the campus Environ¬
mental Technology, Marine Science, Water ^©7
sources, etc.—and to set up a university-wide
structure .... This structure would have
,3
liaison with the Bureau of Government Research.
Most of those interviewed felt that Appley's aspirations
were finally beginning to emerge through Carritt.

As

one person put it, "The Institute for Man and His Environ

^^Interview with Mortimer Appley, Dean, Graduate
School,

27

January 197't’"
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ment was a real political issue from the start.

The

initial impetus was an attempt by Mort Appley to develop
a power base."

24

As another put it,

"Carritt didn't do

anything that wasn't totally tied with Mort."^^
If the theme underlying Carritt's descriptions
of the form and function of the Institute to department
heads

and deans was a political theme, that same theme

was also important in their response.

Most went immediately

to Bob Gluckstern—who was Associate Provost at this time
under Tippo—to voice their opposition to Carritt and his
ideas.

Most took the opportunity as well to voice their

opposition to Mort Appley.

It was clear that a unit with

control over research proposals and grant funds in an
area as broad and as yet ill-defined as "Man and the
Environment" was an enormous threat to many of the research
activities and aspirations in schools and departments all
over campus^^^ and this was probably the most important

^^Interview with Stanley Moss, Psychology Depart¬
ment, 6 March 1974.
^^Interview with Robert Gluckstern,

22 March 197^•

^^This would include Engineering, Agriculture,
Botany, Zoology, Geology, Geography, Psychology and a
large number of other departments.
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reason for their opposition.
Another clearly had to do with personalities and
leadership style.

Dayton Carritt was clearly insensitive

to the concerns of those with whom he was meeting, and
many found him both arrogant and incompetent.

Most of

those interviewed agreed that he was an ineffective leader
at precisely the time when leadership was most crucial to
the development of the Institute.

A few however, claimed

that Carritt*s ineffectiveness was due to circumstances
beyond his control and laid most of the blame for in¬
adequate leadership onto Mort Appley.
that Appley was impossible.

Everyone agreed

There was strong opposition

to the fact that the Institute reported to Appley as
Graduate Dean,and much of this opposition stemmed from
the fact that other Deans and department heads found him
difficult to work with.

While a few excused Appley's behavior

on the grounds of the difficult role of Graduate Dean, most
27
felt that the person, not the position was the problem.

^"^Graduate Deans do not have the line of responsibility and authority of other Deans in the for^l
organization.
They are dependent on Provosts for their
powe? and a^e able to ope?ate only through
other Deans.
Their power, especially during the sixtie ,
however!
generally increased by the number of research
grants they could bring to the University.
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Bob Gluckstem did nothing at this time except
try to maintain open communications so that differences
over the form and function of the Institute could be
settled.
Carritt Moves For Faculty Senate Approval for the
Institute.

As a result of what he felt were disappointing

meetings throughout the campus, Dave Carritt decided to
move very quickly on the second piece of his mandate
and obtain formal Faculty Senate and Trustee approval for
the Institute.
The approval process itself constitutes, according
to Hefferlin, a crucial environmental factor in the change
process.

In the case of the Institute, it also allows one

to view more clearly the political maneuvering, the inter¬
play of personalities, and the attempts to grapple with
the difficult problems of reward, resources, form and function
for the Institute.

recent administrative reorganization had al¬
ready given Gluckstem control over several areas pre¬
viously handled by Appley, so Gluckstem was reluctant to
move against Appley at this time.
^^At the University of Massachusetts any new program
which wanted to offer courses, degrees or proposed to hire
faculty or staff, required Faculty Senate and Trustee
approval.
The Academic Matters Council, a standing committee
of^the Faculty Senate, was the first step
nrocess.
It reviewed all academic programs and
.
those it approved on to the Senate, which forwarded those it
approved
administration and the Board of Trustees.
^hftime required for the entire process
to several years depending upon the
level of consensus, and the nature of the program.
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Dave Carritt in fact moved too quickly.

He forced

the issue onto the Academic Matters Council agenda in
February and demanded an expedited process on the grounds
the N.S.F. funding depended upon an approved Institute.
He prepared a brief draft proposal for Academic Matters
31
which he did not circulate on the campus.-^
Carritt's draft proposal contained little rationale
but moved for the establishment of an Institute for Man
and His Environment:
II.
that will be a multidisciplinary,
problem-solving component of the University
having the capability to compliment and aug¬
ment existing discipline-oriented departmental
programs in instruction, research, and public
service which are concerned with the environ¬
ment .
III.
the Institute's functions include
(1) the coordination and (2) reporting of
existing environmentally-oriented programs
in the University, and (3) the initiation and
submission to the Academic Senate, the Graduate
Council, and the Board of Trustees plans for
such new programs of instruction and research
as may be deemed necessary.

^^There is no documentary evidence that N.S.F. was
ready to fund the Institute at this time.
It had had the
U.Mass. proposal for more than ten months.
Carritt, how¬
ever sincerely believed that something might develop at
that time.
^^Although Carritt and Appley worked quite closely
together, Appley does not remember having seen a copy of
the draft prior to Academic Matters.
^^Dayton Carritt, "Draft Proposal for
of an Institute for Man and His Environment.
Submittt
to the Academic Matters Council, 5 February 1971'
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The proposal further anticipated an integrated educational
program in environmental studies at both the undergraduate
and graduate level, called for a staffing pattern that
included University faculty, permanent Institute staff,
and more temporary yet qualified workers from outside the
University who would be associated with specific projects.
The Institute was to group research activities into
problem-centers and although it was not explicit, the
presumption was that all environmentally-related research
projects would go through the centers and report to the
Institute.
The draft proposal pleased nobody.

Five days

later Dayton Carritt provided a five page "rationale."

33

It defended the proposed organizational format of the Insti¬
tute and

by pointing to the inability of vertical,

discipline-based Department and School structures to deal
with multidisciplinary or horizontal problems, and pointing
out the differences between the kind of research and
theoretical work required for solving complex environ¬
mental problems and that associated with pushing back the
frontiers of knowledge in a discipline.

It quoted Steinhart

at length and called for additional permanent staff members

^^Dayton Carritt, "Institute Organization,
elaboration on the draft proposal for the
an Institute for Man and His Environment.
Submitted to
the Academic Matters Council, 10 February 1971
*
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and a separate reward structure.
The rationale did not help convince the Academic
Matters Council.

They did not appreciate the fact that a

Director for the Institute had been hired before the
Institute had been formally approved.
being by-passed by the administration.

Niehter did it like
Furthermore,

the Council saw this as the work of one individual rather
than a large group of interested faculty and it had
serious misgivings about the organizational format pro¬
posed.

The strongest opposition was voiced to the

proposed umbrella function for research projects and the
independent faculty.
The Academic Matters Council would not approve the
proposal.

Instead, the Council sent it out to the faculty

and asked for responses, and then set up a review committee
to study the matter further and report back.
Leigh

34

Short, a member of the Council was made

Chairman of the Review Committee and he insisted that
Bernard Berger also be on it.

The subcommittee had many

^\eain in this case, the role of the Academic

Matters Council in the University is an interesting one.
Tt nroves itself to be an open and flexible agent of
rhanee
Other groups would simply have rejected the proposthfcLnril’^always attempted to give the proposeror the new idea-the benefit of the doubt.
It was flexible
enough to create an ad hoc review group,
faculty^

Review commixxee anu
-- - .
Mattprs
Council in an interview Si!o?
claimed
that
the^Ac.^
chSle ?Slca“tn the universi
University
Council cons
ive years.
in the last
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heated meetings with concerned faculty and Deans, and
reviewed the responses from faculty throughout the
campus. 35
The focus of the opposition was becoming clearer.
A.
Faculty did not want an umbrella unit through
which all grants must pass.
They wanted the faculty
to be able to choose to participate or not in the
Institute without any jeopardy to individual grantsmanship.37

35

-'^-'^The members of the subcommittee to review the
proposal were:
Leigh Short, Chairman; Bernard Berger,
Ernest Buck, Sheldon Goldman, Richard Louttit, James
Ludtke, Claude Penchina, Skip Schuckman.
^^Among those who voiced their opposition were:
Ken Picha, the Dean of the School of Engineering; Warren
Litsky, the head of the Department of Environmental
Sciences in the College of Agriculture; Ervin Zube—that
year on sabbatical but the year before chairman of the
education subcommittee and the next Director of the Insti¬
tute.
During these months (January, February, March
1971), the School of Engineering was putting together a
large grant proposal that would involve a multidisciplinary
study of energy usage.
Their involvement of faculty^
from all over the campus and their refusal to work with
or through the Institute for Man and His Environment
shows how strong the opposition to the umbrella function
of the Institute really was.
Engineering’s refusal
in this case also infuriated Dave Carritt and hardened
his position that it was necessary to mandate co¬
operation during the approval process.
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B.
Even in the environmental area faculty
did not want the unit to be able to hire its own
faculty and senior research staff independent
of the departmental hiring process.
Essentially
departments wanted to maintain control over the
reward system.
C.
Faculty did not like Dave Carritt and they
did not like Mortimer Appley and they did not
think the reporting line for the Institute should
be through the Graduate School.
D.
They did not want the Institute to be able
to create an educational program that they did not
approve or that threatened their enrollments.
Despite all of this opposition, however, there
were still a large number of people who were supportive
of the idea of an Institute.

The faculty who had worked

hard the year before still wanted an Institute created.
The subcommittee of the Academic Matters Council began to
revise Carritt's proposal into something more generally
acceptable.
In the midst of their work, the Provost decided
to intervene and this intervention provided the most
dramatic moment in the history of the Institute.

On

Friday, April 9th, Oswald Tippo cancelled a meeting of
the subcommittee,

called Mort Appley to his office,

announced that he would not support the Institute, and
asked Appley to withdraw his proposal from consideration
before the Acadamic Matters and the Faculty Senate.
Mort Appley refused to withdraw it and left.

It happened

that Carl Swanson, then a professor with a possible

217

position in the Botany Departmenti

(Swanson had been

approached a year before as a potential Director and
refused, the Provost happened to be a Botanist), had
dropped by that Friday afternoon to see the Provost.
He was asked his opinions about the Institute.

Swanson

was very supportive of the concept of an Institute for
Man and His Environment and implied that the existence
of such a unit would make the University of Massachusetts
OQ

a much more interesting place for him to consider.-^
The Provost apparently changed his mind again
and did not further block the Institute.
Most of those interviewed felt that it was Carl
Swanson who had turned the Provost around, others,
including the Associate Provost, underplayed the importance
of Swanson, but in any event, the Associate Provost
arrived at the home of the chairman of the subcommittee
the following evening and they spent Saturday evening
revising the draft proposal.

The revised proposal made

participation in the Institute strictly voluntary on the
part of the faculty; made any academic course or program

^The Associate Provost and others remember Swanson as
having been recruited as Associate Director at that time,
Swanson remembers only vague mention of it and stated
that in fact he was quite surprised—and
turbed—to find that he had been
?^he had
unon his arrival the following fall.
He felt that he naa
not been recruited in connection with the Institute, but
as a Professor of Botany.
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subject to further faculty senate approval; and changed
the reporting lines from the Graduate Dean to the Provost.
They added two additional twists.

The Institute would

have an Advisory Board, and it would have only a two-year
mandate.

At that time it would be up for review.
Another subcommittee meeting was held on Monday

and although members of the committee were angered at
the intervention of the Provost, and at the fact that he
almost summarily blocked the institute, they nevertheless
liked the proposal as revised by Short and Gluckstern
and recommended its approval by Academic Matters.
The proposal as forwarded by the Academic Matters
Council to the Faculty Senate was brief and to the point.
It mandated for two years an Institute, with a Director
and an Advisory Board which would:
A. concentrate on the planningi development,
and implementation of interdisciplinary edu¬
cation at both the undergraduate and graduate
levels, and
B.
develop a programmatic approach to inter¬
disciplinary research and public service.-^
The Institute would not have a separate and
distinct staff but would depend on University faculty.

39"special Report of the Academic Matters Cotmittee,”
A. William Plumstead. Chairman, presented to the 17^th
Meeting of the Faculty Senate, April 15. 1971.
(Senate
Document 71”037)*
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Individual faculty members could choose to
participate or not and their ability to pursue independent
research grants was preserved.

Courses and academic pro¬

grams would require further approval, and the implication
was that they would be few and far between.

The reporting

line was to the Provost rather than to the Graduate Dean.
And there would be an opportunity to quash the Institute
after two years if the faculty didn’t like its activities.
For all these reasons the Institute did not seem very
threatening.

It was approved by the Faculty Senate on

April 15, 1971.
Dave Carritt and others felt that if anything this
approved entity was even more vague than that recommended
in April 1970.

While he had wanted a formally constituted

unit as a vehicle to insure faculty participation and en¬
hance funding potential, this approved unit did neither.
It had no control over the reward system—it could not hire,
promote,

or tenure faculty members and thus could not

counteract the fundamental orientation toward research and
education that
ments.

was required by discipline-based depart¬

While almost all of those interviewed felt that the

approval process and reward system were critical factors
to the development of a new academic and organizational
unit in a university,

some felt that in the case of the

Institute for Man and His Environment, these factors
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had been inhibiting.

Others who had originally had more

limited aspirations for the Institute, and who had never
seen it as a large, visible,

independent organization,

but rather as a facilitating vehicle for some multi¬
disciplinary environmentally-related problem-solving
activity, felt that while the reward system was inevitably
negative, the approval process had been a positive
factor.
Summary.

With formal approval, the Institute for

Man and His Environment could begin to engage in those
activities for which it had been created—multidisciplinary
research,

education and action toward the solution of com¬

plex environmental problems.

Thus it would serve as one

vehicle through which the University of Massachusetts
could assume the mission of social problem-solving.
The long struggle over the creation, however,
and the resulting weakness as an organizational entity
would make it extremely difficult for the Institute to
actively involve a large number of faculty and achieve
any measure of fulfillment of the mission of social
problem-solving.
While a number of factors,
leadership,

including resources,

external influence, reward system and approval

process, had been important to the process of creating
the Institute, the most important dynamic was a political
one and lay in the moves for enhanced position power.
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The Graduate Dearii the Deans of Engineering and Agriculture,
and many departments and faculty interested in outside
grants

were all involved in the development of the

Institute not only because the

Zeitgeist was there--

environmental problem-solving was an important, new
activity for a university—but because becoming the leading
force in such a department could enhance personal, de¬
partmental, or school reputations.
The opposing forces and competition, however,
led to the creation of an entity that had very little
independent power and support and that therefore had
difficulty fulfilling its objectives.
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CHAPTER

VI

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Universities are complex institutions which are
continually evolving in fune with a changing society.
was pointed out in Chapter I

It

that it is difficult to know

definitively who or what determines missions for higher
education.

A few individuals and study commissions,

however, have been the most influential over the past
quarter century.
Commission

Clark Kerr, David Riesman, The Truman

on Higher Education, The Newman Task Force,

and the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education have all
reaffirmed the traditional functions of higher education
teaching, research, and public service--but they have called
for new missions as well.

They have said that colleges

and universities should concentrate on providing access,
individualization, and social problem-solving.

Although each

of these themes has also evolved in meaning and emphasis
over the years, by the late sixties access meant the
provision of educational opportunity to those who had
previously been excluded from higher education:

the poor,

minority group members, women, and older students.

The

mission of individualization meant a concern for the needs
of individual students by allowing them to choose their
own educational programs.

Social problem-solving was a
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refinement of the public service mission which placed
special emphasis on the application of university resources
to the solution of complex social problems.
Chapter II provided an overview of the history
of the University of Massachusetts and focused specifically
on the University's position with regard to the missions
of access,

individualization and social problem-solving.

The University committed itself to each of these missions
although there was considerable difference of opinion over
the mission of social problem-solving.

The means through

which the University of Massachusetts proposed to assume
these missions was the creation of specific units or
programs which would take on the missions as specific
objectives.
Chapters III,

IV and V were descriptive case

studies of three programs, the University Without Walls,
the Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration, and
the Institute For Man and His Environment, whose objects
were respectively, access,

individualization, and social

problem-solving.
Chapter I discussed as well the influence of the
organizational characteristics of universities on their
ability to change and assume new missions.

The review of

the literature included a review of those factors
resources,

leadership,

external influence, and conducive
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institutional environment including reward system, critical
mass of support, approval process, and communications
which change theorists have determined to he the most
crucial to the process of change in universities.

The

case studies on the University and the three programs—
UWW,

BDIC, and the Institute for Man and His Environment-

considered these factors within the more general description
of program development.
This chapter will put the data from the review of
the literature on organizational and change theory together
with the data from the case studies at the University of
Massachusetts.

It will assess the characteristics and

change strategies at the University of Massachusetts and
analyze, using specific situations, the viability of the
missions of access,
solving.

individualization and social problem¬

It will also analyze the change process by

focusing on the factors of resources, leadership, external
influence, reward system, critical mass of support,
approval process, and communications in each of the program
case studies.

Additional change factors that emerged from

the study of the development and implementation of the
three programs will also he analyzed in their situational
context.

A comparison of change factors across programs

will then be made in order to draw more general conclusions

about the process of change at the University

of Massachusetts.
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Institutional Assumption of Missions
of Access, Individualization,
and Social Problem-Solving

Characteristics of Vital Institutions and the
University of Massachusetts.

Institutional characteristics

help to determine the possibilities for change in order to
assume new missions.
The University of Massachusetts was through the
period of the sixties and early seventies what Lon
Hefferlin would have termed a "vital" institution—able
to face new social conditions, new types of students
and new developments.

Lon Hefferlin had spelled out

ten characteristics of a vital institution.

Table 4 ,

lists these characteristics and the corresponding
attributes of the University of Massachusetts.
The most important characteristics were new
models, new personnel, major reorganization, and an
avuncular environment.

The University of Massachusetts,

then, displayed most of Lon Hefferlin's characteristics of
a vital institution.

For the University of Massachusetts

as a whole, the most important change factors were re¬
sources, new personnel, advocacy, and an overall environment
conducive to changes. Thus it also corroborates those
factors cited by Lon Hefferlin as important to the change
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TABLE ^
CHARACTERISTICS OF "VITAL" INSTITUTIONS
AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Lon Hefferlin Characteristics

Attributes of the
University of Massachusetts

1.
A market is essential—
meaning both demand and reward
for change.

1.
Committee Reports called
for a series of changes through¬
out the period and resources
were available
for these
changes.^

2.
New Models are needed for
emulation.

2.
The programs—U.W.W.—
B.D.I.C.—and IME—served as
important models for emu¬
lation and did inspire systemswide changes.2
Other programs
were created as well at U.Mass.i
CCEBS, Residential Colleges,
Project 10, Institute for
Governmental Services, etc.

3,
Ideas need circulation—
communication should be en¬
couraged by workshops,
seminars, meetings, etc.

3. Repeated meetings were
held to discuss issues of
missions and objectives for the
University and to bring to¬
gether faculty, students and
administrators from throughout
the campus.
Long Range Plan¬
ning Committees, studentinitiated SWAP conferences,
committees for improvement
of teaching, etc. met often
throughout the period.

4. A number of "marginal"
members are helpful.

4. Marginal members in large
numbers were not found at
the University of Massa¬
chusetts .
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TABLE ^ (Continued)

Lon Hefferlin Characteristics

Attributes of the
University of Massachusetts

5.
For major reorganization,
new members seem necessary.

5.
Spectacular growth during
the period allowed for many
new faculty and administrators
to be brought to the campus.3

6.

The right people must
be retained.

6.
Large numbers of new and
young faculty members allowed
for high rates of retention.

7*
Initiative is de¬
centralized—individuals
throughout the institution
have a sense of power.

7*
At U.Mass., administrators,
faculty,
and students all
felt that they had some power,
and that they could make things
happen.
This was most obvious
in the allocation of re¬
sources
in the Academic
Matters Council and in the
student-run SWAP conferen¬
ces.

8.

Patriarchy is avoided.
Patriarchy is power con¬
centrated in the hands of
one individual, usually
determined by seniority.

8.
Although leadership was
strong at U.Mass. it was
discontinuous throughout
the period.
Power was dis¬
tributed among large numbers
of groups and individuals.^

9.
Enforced collegial
concensus is avoided.

9.
It was possible at U.
Mass, to initiate programs
on a pilot and experimental
basis without total con¬
sensus among the faculty.
This allowed for more
rapid and diverse respon¬
ses .
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TABLE

4 (Continued)

Lon Hefferlin Characteristics

10•
The institution is
avuncular.
A large number
of people help determine
policy—status is assigned
according to expertise.

Attributes of the
University of Massachusetts

10.
At U.Mass. rapid organi¬
zational and governance changes
and new positions allowed for
an avuncular institution.

^See Chapter I for recommendations of major planning
committees with respect to access, individualization and
social problem-solving.
^U.W.W. caused changes in policy and procedures in
admissions, records, and transcripts, financial aid, housing
and fee structures.
It also caused a series of academic
changes in core and major requirements, examinations and
grading, and in credit policies.
Most significantly i
established the principle and practice of awarding credit
for prior learning.
B.D.I.C. caused academic
a large number of departments and spun-off (by 197'+] five
senarate degree programs.
The Institute for Man and His
Environment established models
with state agencies that were emulated throughout
University.
^See Chapter I for growth statistics in enrollment,
faculty and state appropriations.
^See Chapter I for leadership.
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process—extrainstitutional influence, resources, leadership
or advocacy, and conducive institutional environment.
Change Strategies and the University of Massachusetts.
Jack Lindquist had considered the conducive institutional
characteristics and change factors established by Lon
Hefferlin and others and compiled a list of strategies
that would be appropriate for universities interested
in supporting change efforts.

Table*5 compares his

change strategies to those utilized at the University of
Massachusetts.

There is obviously considerable overlap

between the Lindquist strategies and the Lon Hefferlin
characteristics.

While the University of Massachusetts

utilized most of the strategies suggested by Lindquist,
those that were the most directly effective in the assumption
of the missions of access,

individualization and social

problem-solving were new personnel, alternative learning
experiences, an educational development office

(at the

University the office of the Associate Provost for Special
Programs), major self-studies, and joining consortia,
particularly the Union of Experimenting Colleges and
Universities.
The STjecial
nf Massachusetts.

Unit Change Strategy of the Universit^if
Although the University of Massachusetts

displayed most of the characteristics of a "vital" in-
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TABLE 5
CHANGE STRATEGIES AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MSSACHUSETTS

Lindquist Strategies
for Change

University of Massachusetts

1.
Workshops and
retreats

1.
A variety of workshops and con¬
ferences were held at the University
throughout these years.
Many were
sponsored by Long-Range Planning
Committees and most included students.

2.
Faculty Seminars
on teaching and
learning

2.
A group of faculty at the Uni¬
versity established the Committee on
Undergraduate Education which met often
during this period.

3.
New faculty
orientation or in
service training

3.
While U.Mass. did not have exten¬
sive orientation for new faculty, it
did foster communication among them
and across disciplines.

4.
Student Orienta¬
tion to Learning
Options and ProblemSolving

4.
Freshman Orientation programs were
begun during these years, as well as
comprehensive advising systems.
Stu¬
dents were informed of program op¬
tions .

5.
Hire new per¬
sonnel and recruit
new kinds of
students

5.
Faculty and staff grew rapidly and
the explicit choice of the Chancellor
was to go after young faculty members.
A diverse student body was beginning
to be recruited.

6.

6.
The University explicitly chose
to create a number of alternative
program options.

Introduce an
alternative learning
experience.
7.
Restructure
governance

1
1
1

7.
Several governance models were
proposed over the years and practices were considerably altered.
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TABLE 5 (Continued)

Lindquist Strategies
for Change

University of Massachusetts

8.
Build into the
institution an Edu¬
cational Development
Office and/or Research
and Planning Committee.

8. The University established a
new top-level administrative po¬
sition with a respectable budget for
new program development.

9.
Conduct a major
self-study

9. U.Mass conducted two major selfstudies in a three year period.

10. Bring in ex¬
perts

10. Long Range Planning Committees
and other planning groups brought in
consultants and knowledgeable people
from other universities.

11. Visit other
campuses

11. Fiscal autonomy allowed some
travel support for faculty and staff.

12. Utilize social
gatherings

12. The author did not find data on
social gatherings but they were doubt¬
less used.

13. Utilize ad¬
ministrative perogatives

13. U.Mass enjoyed a high level of
administrative autonomy.
Several
new programs were started by ad¬
ministrative fiat.

14. Develop a change
agent team

14. Although U.Mass did not develop
an explicit change agent team until
1973, a variety of ad hoc groups
acted as such during the late sixties
and early seventies.

15. Join a con¬
sortium

15. U.Mass. belonged to several
associations—Association of Land
Grant Universities, Union for^
Experimenting Colleges and Uni¬
versities, and Five College Incor¬
porated, to name only a few.
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stitution as suggested by Lon Hefferlin,
strategies suggested by Lindquist,

and employed change

Although reports and

other documents over the period at the University of
Massachusetts recommended a major reorientation of the
University which would give more attention to a more diverse
undergraduate student body and encourage greater public
service and problem-solving activities*

it is also true

that a) the student body of the University continued to
be largely white, middle class and between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-two; b) the curriculum was largely
prescribed; and c) the level of public service and social
problem-solving activities was low.

The University of

Massachusetts found it extremely difficult to effect change
throughout the organization.
In this respect, the University corroborates the
findings of those organization and change theorists who
describe organizational inabilities to change.

Havelock

had synthesized the literature on organizations and defined
an organization as a group of individuals with a common
task whose strongest impulses are toward routinization of
activity, maintenance of status quo, and preservation of
existing institutional members.

He found that most

structures and roles in an organization act as inhibitors
of change.
The inability to effect system-wide change was
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counterbalanced in the University of Massachusetts through
the creation of specific program units which allowed the
University to be responsive to missions of access,
dividualization and social problem-solving.

in¬

In effect,

the creation of UWW, BDIC and the Institute for Man and
His Environment operated as a strategy to effect change in
the total system,for these programs,

once created, began to

pressure for a number of more system-wide changes.
Matthew Miles, Everett Rogers, Lon Hefferlin and
Jack Lindquist had all recommended the separate unit
strategy for change.

They felt that it would be more

possible to establish such units than effect system-wide
change because such units would not be as threatening to
institutional members.

They felt that such units serve

as models for emulation within the system and help en¬
courage innovativeness and a conducive environment for
change.

Such units, too,

they recognized might bring

pressure for further changes.

The University of

Massachusetts case supports their theory concerning
separate units a.s

change strategies.

Generally, the method used to establish these
units is similar to that described by Jack Lindquist in
the

"Political Linkage Model.”

A generalized sense that

the University of Massachusetts ought to assume the missions
of access,

individualization and social problem-solving
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developed over time into planning committees and groups
each of which recommended the establishment of a special
program.

Plans were debated and proposals prepared and

submitted to the formal authorities for approval.

In all

cases the process could be termed a political one for it
involved a dynamic interaction between individuals and
interest groups and between forms and function.
Special Programs for Access.

Individualization, and

Social Problem-Solving—An Assessment of the Viability of
These Missions at the University of Massachusetts.

The

mission of access was assumed by the University of Massa¬
chusetts chiefly through the creation of the University
Without Walls Program.
It was relatively simple to initiate the University
Without Walls Program for several reasons:
A.

It allowed the University to start with a small

number of students and learn from them what adaptations would
be necessary in the larger system.

Not having to go for

total systems change made the provision of access much more
possible.
B.
of faculty,

As an option it required only a small number
staff and students to support it.

It did not

require agreen«nt and approval of the total faculty and
student body.

Such agreement is generally impossible to

achieve in a large institution.
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C.

While the provision of real access in terms

of education, attitudes, and procedures required of the
institution and its faculty and staff a different conception
of clientele and content, it still did not alter the basic
teaching and research functions of the University.

This

consonance of function made it easy to accept and imple¬
ment the mission of access.
The University Without Walls program was success¬
fully implemented at the University of Massachusetts, and
it began immediately to exert positive pressures toward more
pervasive changes in the University.

The Admissions Office

began slowly to recruit more diverse students, policies
and procedures

were devised to deal with them, and faculty

began to become accustomed to working in a different in¬
structional mode.

In part due to the changes brought about

by the University Without Walls Program, the mission of
access became feasible for the University as a whole.

It would

not be feasible for all students however, because the costs
would be prohibitive.
The University of Massachusetts is similar to other
public, land-grant universities in size, organization, and
basic philosophy.

It would, therefore, be possible to

assume that the mission of providing educational access
would be appropriate for other land-grant institutions
as well.
The creation of a special program such as the
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University Without Walls as a mechanism for providing
access could be a useful strategy for other institutions
as well, although this study did not generate enough
comparative

data to assert this as a fact.

The mission of individualization was assumed by
the University of Massachusetts in part through the creation
of the BDIC program.
Although it was a lengthy process, BDIC was not a
difficult program to implement.

This was true for a number

of reasons.
A.

Even more

strikingly than in the case of the

University Without Walls Program, BDIC and the philosophy
of individualization were not a departure from the basic
functions of the University.
University mission

Teaching was central to the

and, therefore, the fundamentals of the

educational programs suggested by BDIC was something that
would have been difficult not to accept.

Individualization

was a new mission in terms of actual practice because of
the

"academic revolution." but it was not a new role for

faculty members.
B.

BDIC was a curricular

reform but it did not

alter the basic curricular structure of the University.
Because it did not alter the offerings of departments and
was seen as an option only for a relatively small number
of students,

it was much more acceptable.

BDIC allowed

the University to be responsive to some undergraduate
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students' educational needs without overhauling the entire
educational program.
C.

BDIC, like UWW, did not require total acceptance

by all faculty members and students.

If fulfillment of the

mission of individualization had required curricular re¬
vision with the total agreement by all faculty in the
University, it would never have been approved.

BDIC

asked that only those faculty who were willing participate.
This made it acceptable to a much larger number than those
who actually did participate.
BDIC began immediately to exert pressures for
greater attention to student interests throughout the
University.

Departments began to offer more student-

centered majors, new major programs were approved, and
faculty members seemed more willing to work with students
on a one-to-one basis.

In a sense, therefore, it could

be argued that the BDIC program proved the viability of
the "new" mission of individualization for the University
of Massachusetts.
In another sense however, it did not.

While

individualization is possible within the context of an
optimal and small program like BDIC, it could be argued
that it would not be feasible for the totality of the
student body.

The cost would simply be too high for

individual students or the public taxpayer to bear.

In a
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very real sense,

individually designed programs and one-to-

one faculty/student relationships are only possible because
of the mass production aspects of much of the rest of
undergraduate education.

At the University of Massachusetts

only a small number of students in the total undergraduate
enrollment could be handled this way.
The BDIC program was a first of its kind and was
not patterned after a program at another college or
university.

Nevertheless, a number of educational reform

programs were being initiated throughout the country and
student-centered academic programs were to be established
at a large number of institutions within a very few years
after I968-69.

It is possible to assume from these reform

activities that the mission of more individualized under¬
graduate education was a viable one for other universities
as well as the University of Massachusetts.

Other public,

land grant universities which depend on state funds, how¬
ever, would no doubt experience the same difficulty as
the University of Massachusetts

in making individualized

programs available to the entire student body.
The University of Massachusetts paid lip service
to the notion of social problem-solving over the two
decades, but it is not possible to say that it clearly
or unambiguously assumed this mission.
While the number and range of service activities
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increased faster than the growth rate would imply during
the sixties and early seventies, it was also true that
by the end of that period, the University was still
struggling to define "appropriate public service."

The

lack of a clear definition hampered its effectiveness.
The University attempted to respond to the mission
through the creation of an Institute for Man and His
Environment.

The difficulties encountered by the Institute

during its development period highlight the difficulties
of implementation of the public service mission.
A.

The creation of a new unit which would have

potentially its own staff and academic program threatened
existing units in a way that UWW and BDIC had not done.
Strong opposition was voiced--not against the concept,
but against the organizational plans—by most of the schools
and colleges in the University.

The Institute required a

larger scale change effort than had BDIC or UWW.
B.

The Institute for Man and His Environment

brought sharply into focus issues of power and control.
Who decides academic programs?

Who hires faculty and

professional personnel and to whom are they accountable?
Who has the power and the exclusive authority to go after
research grants?

All of these questions were necessarily

raised during the planning for the Institute, and since
there was no agreement and no mechanism for reaching
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agreement, it was very difficult for the Institute to
begin its work.
C. The Institute for Man and His Environment
required developmental as well as program money and by the
late sixties neither the federal nor the state govern¬
ments were eager to grant large sums for the creation of
a vehicle or organization to focus on environmental
problems.

They wanted more immediate and visible impact

for their dollars.

Reallocation of resources within the

University to cover the start up costs of the Institute
was severely opposed by existing units.
D. Social problem-solving in the environmental
area often required different behavior of faculty members
it required attention to detail, task orientation and a
willingness to be one piece of a large effort and take
directions.

Faculty accustomed to abstraction and the

right of pursuing their own interests found public
service projects antithetical to their own scholarly
interests as well as tedious and boring.
E. The Institute planners were unable to agree
on a precise focus for institute activities.

This was due

at least in part to the fact that clear service priorities
had not been established for the University as a whole.
The resources were clearly not adequate for all problems,
but an inability to choose among several possible activi¬
ties led to a diffusion of energies and lessened impact.
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The same difficulties experienced with the creation
of the Institute for Man and His Environment and the
assumption of the mission of social problem-solving
would probably be experienced in other public universities.
Research on the large number of problem-focused research
institutes that were created in colleges and universities
prior and subsequent to that at the University of
Massachusetts shows for the most part a history of
failure.^
It would seem, therefore, that the mission of
public service and the University's responsibility in
applying its knowledge production and educational resources
toward the solution of social problems is the least viable
mission at the present time.

There is still considerable

disagreement—within and without the academy—about the

^The most negative assessment of research institutes is found in Harold Orlans, The Nonprofit Research
institute-I-ts Origin, Operation. Problems, and Prosp.e.c^.
(New York:
McGraw Hill, 1972).
Orlans concluded_that
they had been overevaluated as organizational vehicles
for focusing on complex problems.
Paul Dr^sel,
Craig Johnson, and Philip Marcus, in "The Proliferating
Institutes," Change. Vol. 1, No. 4 (July-August 19d9)i
also gave a negative assessment of research institutes
as organizational structures.
Ikenberry, however, f 1
that they held out considerable promise as new organizational structures which could
^
apply its resources to current social problems.
ISee
Chapter 1.)
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responsibility of the University to society.

Taxpayers,

federal, state and local governments : students and some
faculty, all demand that the University join the "real
world" and help work on its problems.

Other faculty claim

that the University is the only institution in society en¬
gaged in basic research that produces knowledge for its
own sake and for the long run benefit of society and that
to divert to the short run would be a critical mistake.
These positions, however, could be better represented
as poles along a continuum, and there is no question that for
many people public service is assumed to be the responsi¬
bility of the public university.
Even when the concepts of public service and the
mission of social problem-solving are generally accepted
in public universities, however, the mechanics of followthrough are difficult for universities because of the major
changes in organization, attitude and behavior that are
required.

Social problem-solving, therefore, will be a

difficult mission for public universities to assume at
this time.
Conclusions Concerning Viability of Missions.

From

the experience with BDIC, UWW, and IME at the University
of Massachusetts, it would seem that those missions are
most viable which are closest to those functions already
accepted by the faculty and embedded within the organizational
structure-teaching and research.

While public universities
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in the 1970*s have accepted the missions of providing
equal educational access and public service, current
organizational patterns, attitudes and orientations make
these objectives difficult to achieve.

Continuing change

efforts will be required.
From the case study on BDIC it was clear that the
mission

of responsiveness to individual students is a

mission that is easy to accept

and put into practice,

provided it is for a small number of students.

The

University Without Walls case showed that a student
body of widely diverse backgrounds, ages, and interests
requires the faculty and service units of the University
to rethink some of their attitudes and behaviors.

A

different student clientele in response to the mission of
access does not imply a drastic departure, however, from the
traditional university function of teaching.

The mission

of access, therefore, is feasible for universities at
this time.

The case of the Institute for Man and His

Environment showed that public service—especially in the
area of utilizing university resources to solve complex and
difficult social problems—requires a much greater departure
from the normal behaviors and organizational patterns of
the \iniversity.
to achieve.

It is at this time a mission difficult
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The Process of Change at the
University of Massachusetts
Factors in the Process of Change«

Lon Hefferlin

and Jack Lindquist synthesized the research and theory on
the change process in organizations and conducted research
on change in universities.

Lon Hefferlin found that the

most important factors for change in educational in¬
stitutions were:

resources, leadership, outside influences,

support from campus groups, and institution-specific
characteristics including reward systems, approval process,
and communications.

These factors, according to Lon

Hefferlin, were foimd in various combinations depending
upon specific institutional situations.
This study analyzes the Lon Hefferlin factors for
each of three programs at the University of Massachusetts;
The University Without Walls, The Bachelor’s Degree with
Individual Concentration, and the Institute for t.lan and
His Environment.

It analyzes, as well, additional factors

that were important to the creation of each of the programs
taken as case studies.
Each person interviewed in the study was asked in
an initial open-ended question to name those factors
which were important to the planning and implementation
process of the program with which they had Been associated
They were also asked to assess

the importance to the program
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of each Lon Hefferlin change factor.
It is important to note that factors are in a sense
generalized concepts and that their meaning for a specific
situation—e.g.,

the creation of the Institute for Man and

His Environment—can vary considerably over time and from
individual to individual.

It is also important to remember

that each change factor may be seen as either supporting
or hindering (positive or negative) as well as more important
and less important for specific situation..
one respondent

considered

For example,

leadership a critical factor

to the implementation of the Institute for Man and His
Environment, but consider the actual leadership to have
been a hindrance to its development ;

another respon¬

dent, also convinced that leadership had been crucial, felt
that the Institute's leadership had been quite effective.
For each program, the combined responses of those
interviewed provide sufficient data for an analysis of the
change factors in that specific situation.

Although the

method of collecting data made it difficult to prioritize
among factors,

the author did so from the general sense

of the interviews.
Following the analysis of the factors for each
program,
comparison

a comparison across programs is made.

Such a

provides for a more generalized view of the

change process at the University of Massachusetts and
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allows for a validation of the Hefferlin change factors.
The University Without Walls.

Those interviewed

concerning the University Without Walls program showed re¬
markable agreement about those factors which had been
important to the program, and considerable agreement about
whether those factors had been supporting or hindering to
the program.

They also tended to define their terms

similarly which may have been caused by the fact that many
of them were

either students or faculty studying issues

of higher education.

Table 6

summarizes their responses.

The following emphases were placed during the
interviews on those factors listed in Table 6.
I.

Resources.

Twelve of the thirteen respondents considered
resources as a crucial factor to the program.

They all

mentioned that the small grant received from the Union
for Experimenting Colleges and Universities had allowed
them to support the planning period and the pilot program,
and most were convinced that a) the University would
never have come up with that much money and h) that that much
was crucial to the program.

The grant was symtolically

important as well for it signalled a commitment to a
product or end-result of planning efforts and this helped
to keep morale and energy levels high.

It allowed them

a year and a half in which to build a case for university
resources.
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II.

Leadership

All thirteen respondents agreed that leadership was
a critical factor, and all agreed that Tom Clark had occupied
the leadership position.

There was some disagreement, how¬

ever, over the effectiveness of Tom Clark's leadership and
over the appropriate style of leadership for a program that
was attempting a collaborative non-hierarchical model.
Clark saw his role as two-fold*

Tom

serving as the spokesman

for the program to faculty, administration and other out¬
side groups in a role analogous to a program director or
dean, and acting as a facilitator for the collaborative
planning.

Some felt that Clark had been effective as program

spokesman, others that he had not been, because he failed to
attract faculty and caused problems throughout the the campus.
Most agreed that the collaborative planning effort had been
educational for those involved, but that it had been donfusing and cumbersome, and that Tom Clark's administrative de¬
ficiencies and inability to make decisions only made it more
so.

This perception was held by some who had been part of

the planning effort and some

who had not.

Others felt that

Clark had been very effective considering the difficulties
of implementing a program that required as many changes as
did the University Without Walls.
III.

Outside Influence

Eight respondents felt that UWW had been influenced
in many ways from outside the University of Massachusetts.
The chief source was the Union for Experimenting Colleges
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and Universities and the National University Without Walls
Program.

Most felt that this had been a positive influence_

it had set the broad parameters for the program but allowed
UWV/ in Amherst to plan from the needs of the total situa¬
tion;

it provided resources, and it helped keep the

momentum of the program high.

A more general yet critical

outside influence was the general controversy over higher
education—the role of universities in society and the
functioning of colleges and universities.

Most UWW planners

were part of the educational reform movements, and its
perspectives influenced UWW planning.
IV.

Environmental Factors:

Reward System.

There was some disagreement over the

importance of the reward system to UWW.

Six felt that it

was an important hindering factor and five felt that it had
not been very important.

The size of the program was an

important variable here—for a small program as UWW was
at first, the reward system was not necessarily vital but
most would agree that it became more of an issue as the
program expanded.

Many argued as well that the most

difficult thing was locating faculty members with the
ability to work in new instructional modes with non-traditional students, and that the University of Massachusetts
had shown a willingness to reward those who had become
involved.
Annroval Process.

Ten of those interviewed felt

that the approval process had been critical to UWW.
saw essentially two stages to that process:

They

the first

250

stage was getting administrative approval to run a pilot
year* and the second stage was obtaining formal Faculty
Senate approval for the program.

The first stage was seen

as positive in that the administration allowed them to admit
the non-traditional student grou^^ and the second stage for
most was positive in that the Faculty Senate approved a
flexible educational program.

UWW planners had been aware

of the importance of the approval process and had worked
out a comprehensive strategy to get that approval.
Communications. Six persons felt that communications
had been important to UWW while six failed to mention it.
Those who saw communications vehicles as important stressed
the fact that UWW had had to create its own communication
links to prospective students because of the inappropriate¬
ness of traditional admission office liasons.

UWW planners

also stressed that they had had to help build new communi¬
cation routes to faculty, and from students to faculty.
V.

Small Yet Critical Number of Active Supporters

The word most often used during interviews was "com¬
mitment,”

and eleven respondents felt that by far the most

^Little was actually done to advertise ^^e^program,
yet the applicant pool
pfo^ide adetifies to the failures of u
need for the mission
quate educational opportunity and the neea
of access.
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important factor to the process of UWW effort had been a
group of energetic and committed people—many of them
volunteers--who believed in the program and wanted to see
it work.
VI.

Larger Support Base

Ten of those interviewed felt that a support base
that included many faculty members and administrators had
been very important to the UWW.

Faculty support was seen

as crucial to the approval process but also as fundamental
to the program.for the willingness of the faculty to serve
as sponsors and the interactions between sponsors and
students were fundamental to the program.

Administrative

STjipport was seen as crucial in terms of resources.
Other Factors
1.

Influence of School of Education.

Ten of those interviewed felt that the School of
Education had been critical to the development of the UWW
program* eight felt that it had been a positive factor, and
two that it had been a negative one.^

Those who talked of

it in a positive sense felt that the ideas, energy, innova¬
tiveness, and values of the faculty and students in the
School of Education had provided an essential background

3t+

interesting to note that the two people who

from ^tsi^: the rchoorf/rdioSir^^f "oth^—f of
the Academic Matters Council.
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for the planners of UWW.

The commitment to institutional

change and educational experimentation had been fostered
in the School of Education.
2.

Strategy of the Pilot Program.

Many of those interviewed felt UWW had gotten Faculty
Senate approval and University resources in the spring of

1971 as the result of a critical strategic move—the small
pilot project during the 1970-71 year that had been supported
out of planning grant funds.

On a smaller scale this is the

same strategy as that employed by the University of
Massachusetts in the assumption of new missions.

It tests

out an idea in a real situation, allows planners to learn
from it, and begins to put pressure for change on these
units.

UWW was able to learn from the students in the

pilot year what kind of educational program and support
services were needed.

It also gave people a very important

dose of reality—they knew they were not engaged in a
theoretical or abstract process.

3.

Political Factor

Seven of those interviewed felt one of the most
important supporting factors of the University Without Walls
program was the general political climate within the
university and the state.

It would have been difficult,

this group argued, for the University to have disapproved
of a program designed to serve students who had previously
not had access to higher education.

It would have been
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particularly hard for the public University in the Common¬
wealth of Massachusetts to do this.
4. Timing
Seven of those interviewed spoke to the crucial
factor of timing.

The planning process was consistently

informed by the fact that everyone was trying to get a
pilot program implemented by the first fall, and a larger
and formally approved one off the ground by the second.
The planners had a strategy and time-line for achieving
this goal mapped out,and were very sensitive to suggesting
the right idea,

in the right place, and at the right time.

Prioritization of Factors.
interviews,

From the sense of the

it is possible to list the factors important to

the implementation of UWW in the following priority order;
1.

Small yet critical mass of committed supporters

2.

Resources

3.

Pilot Program Strategy

4.

Leadership

5.

Influence of School of Education

6.

Outside Influence

7.

Approval Process

8.

Larger Support Base of Faculty and Administrators

9.

Political Climate in State

10.

Reward System

11.

Timing
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Bachelor's Degree With Individual Concentration*
The Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration was
planned over a two year period,but a surprisingly small number
of people were involved in that planning.

The author was

able to interview only nine people connected with the
program,and some of these interviews were brief.

There was

not generally a high level of consensus concerning the
importance of various change factors.

Table 7 lists

those factors.
I.

Resources

There was substantial disagreement about the im¬
portance of resources to the development of the program.
Four responded that they were critically important, three
that they were important but not critical,

one that they

were not at all important, and one failed to mention them.
The disagreement may have come in part from confusion over
terms—most people took resources to mean money or released
faculty time for coordination,and felt that since the
program had very little of either, resources could not have
been a major factor.

Others defined resources to include

faculty sponsor volunteer time, and saw that time as cri¬
tical to the program.

They agree, however, that since the

faculty commitment was voluntary, resources could not be
seen as a hindering factor.
seen as a supportive factor.

Overall, then, resources were
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II.

Leadership

Seven of those interviewed felt that leadership
had been a critically important factor* and all agreed
that Arthur Kinney's leadership style had been quite
effective.

Most mentioned the fact that he was respected

by both faculty and students as having been especially
important in attracting students and faculty sponsors to
the program.
III.

Outside Influence

All nine of those interviewed were aware that BDIC
was the first of its kind in the country, and said that it
had developed directly in response to perceived needs of
students on the Amherst campus.

The planning group had

done its homework concerning academic reform efforts in

other colleges and universities, and many felt that the
program was clearly responding to something of a national
movement calling for relevance in the curriculum and
individualization,hut the most important influence had
come from the campus.

Arthur Kinney disagreed.

Relevance doesn't mean anything unless it is
in an individual situation ...»

BDIC was

really

an attempt to provide what was

fndivI^^Uy relevant to f
response to a general mood that called
relevance
'•’interview, Arthur Kinney concerning Bachelor’s
Degree with Individual Concentration Program,
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Nevertheless, the BDIC case did not follow the
conclusions of change theorists that the most important
influences on the change process come from outside the
institutions of higher education.^
IV.

Environmental Factors*

Reward System.

There was disagreement about how

important the reward system was to the development of
BDIC.

Five felt that it had not been particularly im¬

portant because*

a) the program was small, b) faculty

members could choose not to be part of it, c) those faculty
who did get involved were people who did not jeopardize their
own career by working in BDIC, and d) faculty tended to
become involved in the program because they were interested
in the students proposed program not because they expected
rewards.

Three of those interviewed did, however, feel that

it was a very important and hindering factor.
respondent put it,

As one

"more faculty would have become involved.

^This issue is not that clear, however.
Change
theorists are referring to more broadly-based change efforts
in institutions of higher education, and I would agree with
them that at that level the most important influences have
been external to institutions, and have been government funding
policies, state legislatures, etc.
This may be an instance
where it is not appropriate to draw connections between
change theory for institutions and change factors for
particular programs.
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but the departments and their ovm mind-sets made faculty
think of research and publishing first."
Approval Process.

(Moss, Interview.)

Seven of those interviewed felt

that the approval process had been an important and positive
factor in the development of BDIC.

They spoke of the

importance of the close relationship between the program
proposers and the Academic Matters Council as having been
very important.

As in the case of UWW there were really two

steps to the process, one involving approval for a pilot
year, and another more formal process involving the
Faculty Senate and Board of Trustees for permanent approval
of the program.
Communications.

Only three people felt that

communications were important to the program, and six either
did not mention them or did not think they were important.
The campus communications vehicles to faculty and students
were obviously considered adequate.
V.

Small Group of Active Supporters

Six of those interviewed felt that the work and
dedication of a very small group of people over the two
year planning period and the pilot program had been very
important and positive factors.

The academic respecta¬

bility of this group was so often mentioned that it has
been listed as a separate factor.

259

VI.

Large Support Base

Those who planned the BDIC program felt that wide¬
spread faculty and student support would be crucial to its
success because so much of the program depended on faculty
willingness to spend time.

They, therefore, started from

a small group and gradually expanded in size to get that
broad support.

This strategy obviously worked, and eight

of those interviewed felt that a large group of faculty
supporters who were respected by other faculty members had
been critical to the success of the program.
Other Factors
1.

Academic Integrity

Eight of those interviewed felt that the single
most important factor to the BDIC program had been the
academic integrity and respectability of those faculty
members who had planned the program,those who served on
the first supervisory committee, and the first group of
approximately fifty faculty sponsors.

Because of this

trust and respect^the Academic Matters Council and Faculty
Senate were much more willing to approve the program and
allow the supervisory committee to encourage experimental
student programs.

According to one person interviewed.

What was unique about BDIC was that it allowed
facult^to feel that they were responsive to
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student needs with a program that also had.
high academic quality—a nice combination.
(Woodbury - Interview).
This factor corroborates Warren Bennis' admonitions
concerning change in a university setting.
. . . guard against the Crazies; build support
among like-minded people and don't allow those
who are opposed to change to appropriate such
basic issues as academic standards.?
2.

Political Climate

Eight of those interviewed felt that the sensi¬
tivities to the political climate of the planners of
BDIC had allowed the program to be approved and implemented.
BDIC planners had been very careful to start small and not
threaten enrollments of any department or school.

They had

also been careful in reviewing student academic programs
not to undermine or run around departmental curricular
offerings or requirements.

This sensitivity perhaps made

BDIC more viable as a program than other more radical or
visible student-centered programs.

3.

Pilot Strategy

The planners of the BDIC program felt that the best
way to get widespread support was to get a small pilot
up and running.

This proved to be an effective strategy

^interview with Robert Woodbury concerning Bachelor's
Degree with Individual Concentration.
7Bennis, The Learning Tvorv Tower, Ibid., p.

i
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for it signalled to students that something was possible
and attracted respected faculty members.

During the pilot

phasef the academic components of the program evolved
to become something more than a mere rearrangement of
courses.

Seven of those interviewed spoke to the effective¬

ness of the pilot strategy.

As one of those interviewed

put it.
Anything going has a bias for reapproval because
it has begun normally to build its own con¬
stituency ... on the other hand,
a good strate¬
gy to get initial approval is to sell it as a
pilot .o
This pilot strategy was referred to often in the
literature on change theory especially by Miles, Lon Hefferlin,
and Everett Rogers.
4.

School of Education

Six of those interviewed paid particular attention to
the positive effect the School of Education was having on the
University at this time through its series of reforms and
dehates on educational issues.

Most were aware that the

concept of student-centered learning and student designed
programs of study had been part of the School of Education
package and drew a direct connection between this and the
BDIC program.

^Interview with Robert Woodbury
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5. Clear Objective—Minimal Departure
Six of those interviewed felt that one of the most
crucial factors had been the fact that the goals and ob¬
jectives of BDIC had been clear, simple, and shared by all
of those involved with it.

They also spoke to the fact that

BDIC in fact involved only a minimal departure from existing
attitudes and behaviors.

This made its adoption very simple.

Social scientists have generally agreed that what is diffi¬
cult about changing organizations is changing the behaviors
and attitudes of organizational members, and therefore that
changes involving only minimal departures are the easiest
to achieve.
Prioritization of Factors.

While it is extremely

difficult to prioritize the factors important to the
development and implementation of BDIC, the following
represents the author's attempt to do so;
1.

Academic Integrity

2.

Large Support Base

3.

Political Climate

4.

Leadership

5.

Pilot Strategy

6.

Small Group of Active Supporters

7.

Clear Objective - Minimal Departure

8.

Approval Process

9.

School of Education
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10.

Resources

11.

Reward System

12.

Communications

13.

Outside Influence

Institute for Man and His Environment.

The responses

on the Institute for Man and His Environment must be
assessed quite carefully.

In the cases of the University

Without Walls and The Bachelor's Degree with Individual
Concentration, there was general agreement that the programs
had been successful,and the factors—whether supporting or
hindering-“Were discussed with that assumption in mind.
In the case of the Institute for Man and His Environment,
there was no such agreement.

Many of those interviewed

felt that the Institute had been successfully implemented,
and many others felt that it had been a failure.

They

tended, therefore, to assess change factors more as
positive and negative causal factors than as supportive
or hindering factors in program development.

Table

8

lists those factors.
I.

Resources

All of those interviewed felt that resources had
been critical, and all felt that resources had been critical
as a motivational factor-an Institute to focus on environ¬
mental problems was planned because many people were
convinced that there were funding possibilities in the

264
1
o
oj 1
CH 6
•H
tj
0)
-p o
•H c
o
CQ
o cd

Z
O
K
M

>

w
c/3
M
W
Q
S
oj
S

00 3
pt,
w
w
m EH
<<
Eh Eh
M
EH
C/3
S
M

g
EH
Z
M

-p +»
C o
cd C
xi
-p
> Ph Ph TO
o O ‘H
P<T0

u

s

-o
03
•p
•H
o

H

o

d

O

o
aJ
tH

rH

^

p>
o g
C cd
Jh
P> w
;3 o
cQ Ph
P
-P
p o
(d -P
-P
p rH
o (d
ft o
6 -H

O

rH

Ph
o
-p
O

rH

rH

CM

rH
rH

CM
rH

O
rH

# wh
as i
crit

E-i
2

c:
o o
rC ‘H
^ +5
c
S-i 0)
o e

o 1 cd
-PSP
O 'H W
Cd
o
•Pi >5 P
tH P
TO rH
0 Cd o
-P O 4-»
•H "H
O -P -P
•H SO
o P Cd
x: o -p
>
p
CQ O
=<fc cd P

cn
rH

OJ
rH

rH
I
Q
W
M

C/3
ct:
O
Eh
O
<t:
pL,

••

>

DO
W
Eh
S
M

DO

CjJ

W
PQ
S

o

ft

P>
p
•H
rH
p
0

h3
-s'
Eh
O
Eh

tH U
0 P
W C>
4P c.3
o ccJ
1-3 fi■1

0
0
O
P
P
O
w
0

DO

•H

0
O
c
0
p
rH
tH
P
M

x:
w
p
0
'p
0
0
1-3

0
TJ
•H
W
H-»
P
O

M
M

M
M
M

W
P
o
•p
o
0

ft
H 6
cd 03
■P -P
P w
0 >s
S c/3
p
O TO
p p
•H <d
> ^
p 0
ft ft

>

M

>
M

m
0
0
o
o
P

ft
1—1
od

>

o
P
ft
ft
<0

0
p
o
•H

P
0
O

•rH
P
P
g
g
O

o

265

environmental area that year.

The Institute was considered

a failure by many because of its failure to attract grants.
II.

Leadership

Nearly all of those interviewed agreed that leader¬
ship had been important.

Over the two year period three

people were cited in leadership roles—Berger, Appley and
Carritt, and most felt that Berger had been effective while
Apply and Carritt had not.

Many had been opposed to

Apply's leadership because they saw his moves as power
plays; others felt that Carritt should have been more
collaborative on campus and a more successful fund raiser.
III.

Outside Influence

There were two major influences on the University
at that time to create something in the environmental
area.

One was the national concern for the environment

which was picked up with a vehemence by student groups;
the other was a trend toward the creation of independent
research institutes, especially among land-grant universities.
It would have been difficult for the University of
Massachusetts to have justified not becoming involved, although it was obviously difficult to spell out the specifics
of that involvement.

Eleven of those interviewed felt that

these two outside influences were critical, and many felt
that they were solely responsible because there had been
little or no organic development of interdisciplinary
activity on the campus.
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IV,

Environmental Factors:

Reward System.

Twelve of those interviewed felt the

reward system was the primary impediment to a strong and
viable institute.

Interdisciplinary activity and task

orientation toward problems was not rewarded by depart¬
ments, and they had control over such things as tenure
or promotion.

Discussions on the reward system had been

lengthy during the planning, and a few felt that the In¬
stitute had failed because of its inability to counter the
existing system with its own independently supported
positions.
Approval Process.

Among the ten respondents who

felt that the approval process had been very important to
the Institute, half felt that it had been positive and half
felt that it had been negative.

The positive group talked

about the enabling effects of a faculty senate mandate
and the fact that the process had encouraged the proposers
to clarify the crucial issues.

The negative group felt that

the Institute had emerged from that process in such a
watered down form as to be nonviable, and therefore felt that
the process had given power and control to all the In¬
stitute's opponents.
Communications.

Communications was not considered

particularly important by those interviewed.

They felt that

enough information had spread about the Institute and its plans
so that anyone who wanted to become involved had that option.
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V.

Small Yet Critical Group of Supporters

Eight of those interviewed felt that the Institute
had been implemented as a result of the volunteer efforts
of a small but consistent group of people—primarily the
Steering Committee members.

Others argued that more crucial

had been one or two individuals in power positions es¬
pecially Mort Appley.

In the case of the Institute, both

had probably been equally

important, and the variousness of

the responses probably depended on whether or not the person
interviewed had been part of the Steering Committee.
VI.

Larger Support Base

On this question there was considerable difference
of opinion on whether there had been a critical mass of
support and how many people determined critical mass.

Most

of those interviewed agreed that there had been few students
who stayed involved throughout the process and that student
support had not been critical.

In terms of faculty, five

felt that a large number of faculty wanted an Institute
and this had been an important though not critical factor
while two felt that it had been critical.

Five others,

however, felt that there had not been a large faculty
support base and that this had been an important negative
factor.

These claimed that while faculty may have supported

the idea of environmental problem-solving in the abstract,
they did not support an Institute that threatened to take
resources away from their own departments or potentially
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limit
ship.

their independent research activity and grantsmanAll agreed, however, that at the University of

Massachusetts, it did not take faculty consensus to create
an Institute—it took only a few faculty.

Enough attention

was given hy respondents to administration support, that I
have listed that as a separate and distinct factor.
Other Factors
1.

Lack of Clearly Defined Priorities at U.MassLack of Focus for Institute

Mentioned by twelve of the thirteen respondents as
a critical factor that inhibited the development of the
Institute was the failure of the University of Massachusetts
to focus on and unambiguously state a position on what
the University should be doing in terms of public service
and social problem-solving.

The lack of consensus in the

University over priorities led to a lack of focus for
the Institute.

The planners wanted to consider all

man/environment problems in their interrelationships;
they wanted all urban and rural problems and just about
everything else that could fall under the lahel-environment.
This inability to focus—or diversity of functions
to state it more positively-had been considered an
essential definitional factor of a "multiversity" by
Clark Kerr.

Jack Lindquist, too, had talked about the

extreme differentiation of universities as an obstacle to
change, but I was surprised at the consistency of opinion
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among respondents.

It is true that there had been many

public service activities and no clear policy statements
at the University.
2.

Political Factor

The second 'View" factor that emerged with a great
deal of consistency during the interviews reaffirmed
Victor Baldridge's and Jack Lindquist's notion of the
importance of power and conflict in determining policies
and activities in a university.

A surprising number of

people felt that the Institute for Man and His Environment
was essentially a tool through which a number of people
sought to improve their positions in the University—
second rate faculty members sought routes to recognition
and reward, entrepreneurs sought grant monies, and graduate
deans sought more personal power vis a vis other administra¬
tors.

It was this jockeying for position that lent the

dynamic to the process.
There were several factors mentioned during the
interviews that fall within the larger notion of a political
or power factor.

Ten of those interviewed mentioned the

importance of the controversy over the formal reporting
line of the Institute.

The Graduate Dean wanted it to

report through him to improve his power position, others
felt that it should report directly to the Provost or
Chancellor because the Graduate Dean had no clout within
the University.

Several people mentioned the importance
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of the interplay of personalities to the outcome.

There

were strong animosities between and among the major
characters—Mort Appley, Ken Picha, Dayton Carritt to
name only a few—that made agreements much more difficult
to reach.

At an institutional level, many people saw a

competitiveness and a vying for institutional reputation
and prestige.

Two hundred other colleges and universities

were creating institutes that year—how could the University
of Massachusetts allow itself to fall behind the others?
3.

Administration Support

There was surprising agreement that support from the
top level administrators at the University of Massachusetts
was a crucial factor in determining the viability of the
Institute for Man and His Environment.

Lon Hefferlin and

Jack Lindquist both had pointed to the fact that it was
helpful to have administration support for reform, but they
had not emphasized it particularly.

The Steinhart study

on Environmental Science Centers had found that the most
successful ones enjoyed administration support.

Those

interviewed took great pains to discuss Oswald Tippo's
and Bob Gluckstem's

(and for two Moyer Hunsberger's and

Robert Woods’) attitudes toward research institutes, but
they all recalled the famous Friday when Tippo withdrew
his support.

Those who saw the Institute as a failure

blamed the administration.

A few mentioned the fact that

the University was experiencing many administrative changes
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as having been important.
4.

Timing

More than half of those interviewed mentioned timing
as a crucial factor in the development of the Institute.
They emphasized the timeliness of the idea of environmental
problem-solving as a positive factor and Dave Carritt's
lack of a sense of timing as a critical negative factor

he

approached Academic Matters too abruptly and lost support,
and made many wrong moves at the wrong time.
took a more general view:

Mort Appley

"institutes as new structures

can be good if brought into the University at the appro¬
priate time in the life-cycle of the University.

Institutes

have been failures when introduced at the wrong time."
Prioritization of Factors,.

There was considerable

difference of opinion among those interviewed on the question
of whether the Institute for Man and His Environment had
been a success or a failure, and therefore considerable
disagreement over whether certain factors had been hindering
or supporting factors in its development.

Despite these

disagreements, it is possible from the sense of the inter¬
views to prioritize the important factors to the planning
and implementation of the Institute for Man and His En¬
vironment, in the following manner:

^Interview with Mort Appley.

272

1.

Resources

2.

Politics

3.

Lack of Institutional Priorities

4.

Leadership

5.

Reward System

6.

Administration Support

7.

External Influence

8.

Approval Process

9.

Timing

10.

Small Yet Critical Number of Active Supporters

11.

Large Support Base

12.

Communications

Comparative Assessment of Change Factors.

A com¬

parison of the factors among the three case studies enables
a validation of the importance of most of Lon Hefferlin s
change factors and provides information on the process of
change at the University of Massachusetts.

Table 9 lists

those factors for each case in priority order so that they may

be compared and analyzed.
From Table 9. a number of observations concerning

change factors at the University of Massachusetts can be made
that related the University of Massachusetts' situation to more

gene 1^1 change theory.
1.

NO factor emerged as having been the single most

critical factor to all three programs at the University of
Massachusetts.

This corroborates Lon Hefferlin's observa¬

tion that the change process in a university involves a
complex interweaving of a larger number of factors.
2.

The factor that emerged as unequivocally
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TABLE 9
CHANGE FACTORS FOR THREE PROGRAMS AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Factors Critical
To University With¬
out Walls Program

Factors Critical
to the Bachelor’s
Degree with Con¬
centration Proeram

Factors Critical
to the Institute
For Man and His
Environment

1. Small yet critical
mass of active
supporters

1. Academic In¬
tegrity

1. Resources

2. Resources

2. Large Supprt
Base

2. Politics

3.

3. Political

3. Lack of In¬

Pilot Program
Strategy

stitutional
Priorities

Climate

4, Leadership

4. Leadership

4. Leadership

5.

Influence of School
of Education

5. Pilot Strategy

5. Reward System

6.

Outside Influence

6. Small Group of
Active Suppor¬
ters

6. Administra¬
tive
support

7« Approval Process

7.

7.

8. Large Support Base
of Faculty and Ad¬
ministrators

8. Approval Process1 8. Approval
Process

9.

9.

10.

Political Climate
in State
Reward System

11. Timing
12. Communications

Clear Objectives
—Minimal De¬
parture

School of
Education

9.

External
Influence

Timing

10. Small yet
critical #
of active
_supporters
11. Large support
11. Reward System
_Base_
12. Communications
12. Communications

10. Resources

13. Outside In¬
fluence

____

27^

impor’ban't in all cases was leadership* yet in two of the
three case studies there had been considerable agreement that
the leadership in that program had been ineffective.
3*

The importance of the political climate within

the University of Massachusetts is seen clearly in two of
the cases.

In the third case—UWW—the pilot program

strategy which was viewed as a critical factor could be
termed a strategy to deal with the campus political situa¬
tion,

so politics like leadership, could be read as a

factor important in all cases.

This essentially affirms

the image of the "multiversity" as portrayed by Clark Kerr
and Victor Baldridge, and corroborates Baldridge’s theory
of power and conflict and Lindquist’s Political Linkage
Model.
4.

Resources emerge as high on the list of critical

factors for two of the programs but quite low for the
third—BDIC.

This low ranking, however, probably re¬

sulted more from the small sise of the program at its
initiation and hence a small actual dollar investment, and
the confusion over terms in that faculty time was not
considered by many as a resource for the program although it
should have been.

Therefore, despite the low BDIC ranking,

the study can be said to corroborate the findings of those
change theorists who claim that resources are the critical
factor.

Mohr, Lindquist, and Lon Hefferlin.
External influence does not emerge as important

5-
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a factor to the University of Massachusetts situation as the
literature on change would have suggested.

This may be true

because the literature was referring chiefly to the influence
on overall direction and policy for higher education by
groups other than higher education institutions j this
study focused on external influences over specific programs.
6.

Communications as an environmental factor does

not emerge as at all important in the University of
Massachusetts situation even though it had been mentioned
as critical by Lon Hefferlin.

. The Lindquist study, too

paid particular attention to the diffusion process.

7.

Timing emerges as having been particularly

important in two cases, yet this was something that had not
been mentioned in the literature on change theory.
Validation of Hefferlin and Lindquist.

It can be

concluded that in most respects* the University of Massachusetts
cases validate the conclusions of Lon Hefferlin and Jack
Lindquist.

Lon Hefferlin*s factors varied in importance

with each case, but leadership, resources, approval process,
and reward systems were central to the development and
implementation of the University Without Walls, the Bachelor s
Degree with Individual Concentration, and the Institute for
Man and His Environment,

While external influence and

communications did not emerge as

particularly significant,

that is probably due to the focus of the study on three
specific programs rather than on the University as a whole.
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Lindquist and Baldridge were also validated in this study
because the importance of the poltical climate of the
University and the dynamic of competing interest groups
were marked causative factors in each case.
While the data is not unequivocal, the study
suggests that change theorists ought to pay closer attention
to the factor and strategy of timing in institutional change.
Hnnclusions on Change Process at the Universitx
of Massachusetts.

In this study, change factors were

researched .and analyzed in relation to three specific
program

situations.

Because all programs were developed

at roughly the same time in one university, however, it is
possible to "generalize" these factors to the process of
change at the University of Massachusetts.

The University

of Massachusetts was a "vital" and change-oriented institution
throughout the period of the fifties and especially the
sixties, and those factors which were important to the dra¬
matic changes included resources, leadership, external in¬
fluence, and a conducive environment in which reward systems,
approval processes.

governance, and communications were

used to encourage change.
The most significant finding concerning the process
+ +hp University of Massachusetts that emerged
of change at the University
^
from the study was the finding that the creation of specia
focus units is an effective change strategy.

This strategy

had been suggested by Lon Hefferlin and Lindquist, and was
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used at the University of Massachusetts in order to assume
three missions—access,
problem-solving.

individualization, and social

The successful creation of the University

Without Walls, the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Con¬
centration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment
as programs provided an institutional and organizational—
rather than rhetorical--method or vehicle for accomplishing
organizational change.

While specific change factors may

vary from institution to institution, the strategy of special
program units should be appropriate for other large, public
universities.
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CHAPTER

YII

SUMMARY, SOME SPECULATIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FURTHER STUDY

This chapter contains a summary of the purposes,
methodology, and findings of this study, and some specula¬
tions that it generated about missions,
change.

organizations, and

It also contains several recommendations for

further study.

Summary
This study focuses on three missions—access,
individualization, and social problem-solving—that have
been recommended as priority agendas for higher education.
It also focuses on the process of planning and development
for three special programs--the University Without Walls,
the Bachelor's Degree with Individual Concentration, and
the Institute for Man and His Environment—which served as
vehicles for the assumption of these missions in one uni¬
versity—the University of Massachusetts.

The aim of the

study is to provide information on the viability of the
missions of access,

individualization and social problem¬

solving within existing public universities, and to con¬
tribute to the study of institutional change.
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In a review of related research and theory, special
emphasis is placed on the articulation of new missions and
objectives for higher education by educational theorists,
including Clark Kerr and David Riesman, and several
specially created study commissions and task forces,

in¬

cluding the Truman Commission on Higher Education, the New¬
man Task Force, and the Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education.

Emphasized, as well, are the characteristics

of universities as organizations and change theories

as

articulated by Ronald Havelock, Lon Hefferlin, Jack Lind¬
quist, Warren Bennis, Victor Baldridge, and others.
Data for the study has been gathered from partici¬
pant observation, from University documents and from
approximately forty interviews.

Case studies provide

descriptions of the University of Massachusetts and of the
planning and implementation of three programs—the Univer¬
sity Without Walls, the Bachelor’s Degree with Individual
Concentration, and the Institute for Man and His Environment.
Each case focuses particularly on those elements which could
be considered important factors in the process of imple¬
mentation and institutional change.
Each case is analyzed in order to assess the
feasibility of the missions of access,

individualization,

and social problem-solving for the University of
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Massachusetts and other public universities and to deter¬
mine and compare the factors important to the change
process in the University.
The study showed that all three missions have been
considered priority agendas for the University of Massa¬
chusetts, and that special units have been developed and
approved by the formal governance bodies in order to
commit the University to the fulfillment of these missions.
The separate program cases, however, reveal
variations in the extent of the commitment.

The Bachelor's

Degree with Individual Concentration program shows that the
mission of individualization was accepted and adopted.
The University Without Walls program shows that although the
provision of educational opportunity for non-traditional
students and the fulfillment of the mission of access would
require comprehensive changes, many at the University of
Massachusetts were willing to make these changes.

The case

of the Institute for Man and His Environment reveals the
difficult organizational, attitudinal,

and behavioral

changes that are required to adopt the mission of social
problem-solving.
The study corroborates the importance of those
change factors which had been cited by Lon Hefferlin-resources,

leadership,

support, and environmental factors
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of reward and approval and showed very clearly the impor¬
tance of the political dynamic suggested by Lindquist and
Baldridge.

The study does not unearth new change factors,

but suggests that timing might be a change factor deserving
of more attention and study.

It shows the advantage of

creating special focus programs as a vehicle through which
the University can accomplish change.

It also makes clear

that the process of change involves a whole network of
factors and dynamics that cannot be easily isolated.

It

shows that it is difficult for universities as organizations
to adopt new missions.

Some Speculations
On Missions.

The author experienced considerable

difficulty in attempting to identify the major missions
and objectives for higher education over the past quarter
century.

It is surprising that despite huge expenditures

of tax dollars at the federal and state levels for higher
education, there is no one individual or group who has been
delegated the power and the authority to determine priori¬
ties, missions,
stead,

and objectives for higher education.

study commissions,

political leaders,

task forces,

In¬

institutions,

lobbyists, and thousands of individuals

vie for attention to state their preferences about higher
education.

At one level this can be considered unfortunate
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for ili lo^ds "to confusion Eind dolsiy.

Collcgos a.nd univer¬

sities—not knowing who to listen to—do nothing.
other hand,

On the

it can be considered positive, because it leads

to greater participation and involvement which might insure
that those missions which do emerge, represent a more
widespread consensus.

It is also possible that any group

mandated to make decisions might itself become rigid and
tend toward the status quo.

The constant debate over the

directions for higher education seems a healthy process.
On Organizations.

This study attempts to consider

at the same time missions for higher education, and the
implementation of those missions within universities.

It

is very difficult to keep the focus on both of these
issues together, because the connections between them
keep

disappearing.

This experience with the study,

to some speculations on organizations.

leads

The data from the

case studies revealed that once a planning and develop¬
ment process was set in motion, the original objectives
for those programs began to be overriden by other, more
organizational considerations.

Individuals seemed to be

more concerned with issues of power, status, and control,
and the programs seemed to be interested more in growth
for its own sake,
objective.

rather than for the realization of any

In a sense, programs began to assume the same
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characteristics as the organization as a whole.

This

experience suggests that no single format or structure will
remain adaptive and that those interested in having
institutions continually respond to the needs of society,
should encourage organizational instability

and conflict

between old and new structures so that the whole gradually
changes in the desired direction.

Put another way, per¬

haps conflict ought to be one of the characteristics of a
"vital” institution.
On Theories of Change.

The aim of this study was

to contribute toward a theory of change that would be
useful for universities as they attempted to be both
responsive to social needs, and positive agents of change
in society.

In the final analysis a theory of change re¬

mains elusive.
Universities have begun changing for centuries,
and the pace of change seems to be accelerating, but in the
opinion of this author, a theory has not been developed to
adequately explain or guide that change.

Lon Hefferlin

was best when he observed that "a whole network of factors
(attitudes,

procedures, mechanisms, pressures), appear to

be involved."

The theoretical models offered by Havelock,

Lindquist, and Baldridge are quite general and would not
at this point really help to understand the change process
in a new situation.

Jack Lindquist's

strategies

represent
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a conglomeration of ideas that may or may not be helpful
in diverse situations.
This study also provides little
data.

"generalizable"

It was very difficult to separate change factors

from the history of each of the programs for the more they
became generalized, the more they became meaningless.
The study does, however,

suggest that a number of things

operating together can be important to getting a change
program started within a university.
A.

A small group of committed individuals is

essential.
B.

The core group must like to work together,

contain a congenial mix of personalities, and

it

must

also be acceptable to the larger group which controls the
approval process.
C.

The idea or program must carry enough moral

weight to inspire people to work on it.
D.

The idea must also be provocative to a large

number of people--it must be in tune with the times.
E.

The core group proposing the program, must

have a sense of timing that is in tune with the campus
and deploy a strategy for implementation.
F.
sufficient.

Resources are important, but are not alone
It can be more effective to start with a small

program and allow it to grow organically,

than to make
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inordinate demands for resources given the present financial
conditions.
G.

Granting the difficulty of changing basic

behaviors and attitudes, it can be effective to underplay
the extent of the change.
It is hoped that this study will furnish case material for
continued theoretical development.

Like the case studies

of Bennis and Baldridge, it attempts to consider important
university issues in the full range of their complexity.
Recommendations for Further Study
In order to deal with what the author considered
important present and future issues in higher education,
this study focuses on broad issues and general theories.
As a consequence, it suggests multiple areas and levels for
further elaboration and clarification.

The following

represent only those which the author considers^to be the
most crucial for higher education as a whole, or the most
compelling in terms of the data from this study
1.

Study Relating Higher Education to Other Social

Institutions.

This study focuses on the missions of access,

individualization, and social problem-solving in connection
with institutions of higher education, but it does not
consider these missions in their broader social context.
A broader focus would be helpful.

This study suggests that
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social problem-solving is a very difficult mission to ac¬
complish in a university.

It should, however, not follow

from this study that recommended missions for universities
should be revised to exclude social problem-solving.

Rather,

it follows that other social institutions should be examined
to determine the possibilities of their taking on this
agenda.

If the university emerges as the most likely in¬

stitution to direct its attention to complex social problems,
then that should remain a mission regardless of the diffi¬
culties.

Similarly, the mission of access should be examined

from a broader perspective.

It seems far too simplistic

for universities to congratulate themselves on their ability
to make the procedural and academic changes required to serve
a different study body who had previously been excluded from
higher education, and yet neglect to consider the impact
of their admissions policies on students and non-students.
Recommending access, but encouraging non-attendance as the
Carnegie Commission has done, does not seem an adequate
solution to the problem.

Further attention should be paid

to the relationship between education, economics, and the
social order.
2,

Study on Timing and Time as Factors of Change.

One of the findings of this study was that a sense of timing
on the part of program sponsors was essential to imple-
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mentation.

This factor needs more careful scrutiny than it

has received in the research on higher education.

Closely

related to this factor is the more general sense of the
times that influenced priorities and missions for higher
education.

Time in this sense also emerged as an important

factor in the study.

To illustrate the difference--an

important impetus for the BDIC program was the student
movement of the late sixties and a major influence for the
Institute for Man and His Environment was the general feeling
that the world has reached an environmental crisis-point.
Both of these would be considered factors of time which were
important.

The supporters of BDIC displayed a sense of

timing in their approach to faculty, to administrators, and
to those groups which were part of the approval process.
This sense of timing was also an important change factor.
The Institute's supporters did not have this sensitivity
to timing, and the Institute did not really get off the
ground, despite the environmental crisis.

Both factors—

time and timing—deserve further study and clarification.
A third time-related question is important, although
it did not receive particular attention in this study.

This

is the question of whether changes are implemented swiftly
enough to respond to the need.

The study showed that the

University of Massachusetts did respond to the demands for
access, individualization, and social problem-solving
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through the creation of special program units.

The study

did not, however, raise the important questions of whether
the vehicles to meet the demands were adequate or whether
they were implemented swiftly enough.

UWW, BDIC, and the

Institute for Man and His Environment were all finally in
operation by the spring of 1972, but were they responding
to the needs of 1972 or of 1962?
3*

Further Study on Special Programs at the

University of Massachusetts.

A number of important follow¬

up studies could be conducted at the University of
Massachusetts.

It would be worthwhile to examine the three

programs—UWW, BDIC, and the Institute for Man and His
Environment to see if their missions and objectives have
changed with time.

This study concludes that special

program units serve as vehicles for change throughout the
institution, so it would be important to examine more
closely the impact of these programs on the university.

All

three programs were developed during a period of substantial
growth and change at the University of Massachusetts.

Since

1972, the Amherst campus of the University has entered a
no-growth period, and it would be interesting to study the
development of special focus programs under these altered
circumstances.

The strategies for change in a game of

zero-sum may be very different.
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4.

Further Research Related to Change Theory.

Many researchers on organizations and change have pointed
out that because of organizational impediments, more change
was likely to result from external rather than internal
pressure.

The specific focus of this study on three cases

did not allow for careful consideration of the external
influence factor, but it could be argued from the data
as a whole, that despite good intentions on the part of
the University of Massachusetts to take on new agendas,
the realization of these agendas was meager by comparison
to the need.

Thus further consideration of the ways

institutions could be influenced to change could be more
important and useful to institutions in the long run.

APPENDIX I
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FACULTY, STUDENTS, AND ADMINISTRATORS
INTERVIEWED FOR THE STUDY

I.

Those interviewed regarding the University

Without Walls Program.

University position
and
Date

Relationship to uww

1. Leigh Short

12/28/73

Chairman of the Aca¬
demic Matters Council
when UWW came up for
approval.

2.

2/1/74

Head of Botany Dept.
Attended faculty
lunches that were part
of UWW planning effort.

3. David Bischoff

3/20/74

Associate Provost—
Member of Academic
Matters Council.

4.

3/23/74

Otto Stein

Robert Gluckstern
(briefly)

Provost

5. Charlotte Rahaim

3/27/74

Assistant Dean of Ad¬
missions, member of
Admissions task force
and UWW policy board

6. Gail Kauffman

3/28/74

Staff member UWW from
beginning of planning
period.
Commimi cat ions
coordinator.

7. Robert Woodbury

3/30/74

Associate Dean, School
of Education during
planning semester.
Associate Provost for
Special Programs to
whom Program reported
during pilot.
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Date

University position
and
Relationship to UWW

8. Tom Clark

3/31/7'f

Director of UWW

9* Mark Cheren

4/3/74

Graduate student,
participant in initial
planning effort, member
of learning skills
task group.

10. Jean Carritt

4/8/74

Volunteer partici¬
pant in UWW planning
effort, member of re¬
sources task group.

11. Dee Appley

4/11/74

Faculty member. Psy¬
chology Department,
one of first faculty
sponsors and member
of policy board.

12. Edward Harris

4/12/74

Graduate student and
staff member, UWW
(would become Director
in 1972).

13. Seymour Shapiro

4/30/74

Faculty member. Botany
Department—one of
first faculty sponsors
and member of policy
board.

II.

Those interviewed regarding BDIC

1. Leigh Short

12/28/73

Member of Academic
Matters Council and
review committee for
BDIC, member of first
BDIC supervisory
committee, Chairman
of Academic Matters
when program came up
for permanent appro¬
val.
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Date

University position
and
Relationship to BDTC

2. Arthur Kinney

2/22/74

Participant in BDIC
planning effort from
the beginning, mem¬
ber of all committees
except Academic Matters
ad hoc budget review
committee, and Chair¬
man of first super¬
visory committee.

3» Janet Sheppard

3/2/7'^

Student in BDIC
program.

4. Stanley Moss

3/6/7'^

One of first BDIC
faculty sponsors, mem¬
ber of supervisory
committee, 1971-1972,
and currently Chair¬
man of the supervisory
committee.

5. David Bischoff

3/20/74

Associate Provost—
member of Academic
Matters Council

6.

3/30/74

Associate Provost for
Special Programs.

7. Tom Clark

4/1/74

Faculty member. School
of Education, member
of BDIC planning
committee.

8.

4/3/74

Graduate Student, School
of Education, partici¬
pant in SWAP conference
and first planning group
to emerge from SWAP.

Robert Woodbury

Mark Cheren
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Date

4/9/74

9. Tony Borton

III.

University position
and
Relationship to BDIC
Faculty member, College
of Agriculture, member
Academic Matters Coun¬
cil and ad hoc commit¬
tee to plan BDIC, mem¬
ber of first super¬
visory committee.

Those interviewed regarding the Institute

for Man and His Environment.
1. Leigh Short

12/28/73

Member of Academic
Matters Council and
committee to review
and revise proposal
for Institute for Man
and His Environment.

2.

Carl Swanson

1/24/74

Associate Director,
Institute for Man and
His Environment, from
September 1971f faculty
member. Botany Dept.

3. Mortimer Appley

12/30/73

Dean of Graduate School
—responsible for ini¬
tial planning effort
for the Institute.

4.

1/31/74

Director, Water Re¬
sources Research Center.
Chairman, Steering
Committee for the
Institute.

2/1/74

Head, Dept, of Botany,
member of the sub¬
committee on education
and the Advisory Board.

Bernard Berger

5. Otto Stein

Date

University position
and Relationship to
the Institute

6. Richard Louttit

2/1/74

Head, Dept, of Psy¬
chology, member of
Academic Matters Re¬
view Committee and Ad¬
visory Board.

7. Kenneth Pic ha

2/4/74

Dean, School of En¬
gineering, member of
Steering Committee for
Institute and Advisory
Board.

8, Dayton Carritt

2/5/74

Director, Institute for
Man and His Environment
Jan. 1971 to January
1972.

9» Erving Zube

3/5/74

Chairman, subcommittee
on education and cur¬
rently Director of
Institute.

10. Stanley Moss

3/6/74

Chairman, subcommittee
on research.

11. Robert McGarrah

3/16/74

Directory, Center for
Business and Economic
Research, SBA, Member
of Steering Committee
and Advisory Board
and Chairman sub¬
committee on outreach.

12. Robert Gluckstem

3/22/74

Provost

13.

4/30/74

Acting Director, In¬
stitute for Man and
His Environment—
January 1972 to
June 1972.

Seymour Shapiro
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QUESTIONS USED AS BASIS FOR INTERVIEWS

1.

What were the original objectives of the (UWW, BDIC,
IMHE) program?

2.

Will you describe the process through which the program
was developed and implemented?

3»

What things or factors would you say were most important
to the development of the program?

4.

What was happening at UMass at that time that made the
program important?

5»

Were you aware that educators elsewhere were saying
that
—access
—individualization
—application of knowledge to social problems
were important agendas for higher education?

6.

Could the program have been developed as a result
of what outsiders were saying?

7.

Who was the person in the leadership position in the
program?

8.

How important was his/her status to the implementation
of the program?

9.

Can you name the five most important people to the
program?

Why were they important?
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10. In addition to the core group, how many people were
supportive of the program in its early stages?

11. Was their support necessary for program approval
and implementation?

12. Which was more important:

faculty support, student

support, or administrator support—or did it matter?

13* How many people were significantly involved with the
program during the planning and initial stages of
the program?

14. How many other resources such as money were availa¬
ble to the program during its initial phases?
15• Just how important were these human and material
resources to the program?

Could it have been imple¬

mented with less?
16. Was the reward system at UMass relevant to the
program in its initial stages?

Did it have a posi¬

tive or negative influence?
17. Was the approval process at UMass a hindering or
supporting factor to the program?

18. How about the established communications vehicles
—faculty to departments to students, etc.

Were

they helpful and important to the program?
19. What other environmental factors might have in¬
fluenced the program in its development and imple¬
mentation?
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20. How would you characterize UMass in relation to other
universities in terms of missions and objectives
and possiblities for effecting change?

21. Why do you think UMass approved and supported the
program?
(Probe:

Do you think the motivation was institutional

image, response to external or internal pressure or
what?)

22. What in addition to those things we have talked about
—external influence, resources, support, leadership
and campus environment—would you say was important
to the program in order for it to be established and
implemented?
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OVERVIEW OF MAJOR STUDY COMMISSIONS WHICH
INFLUENCED POLICY IN HIGHER EDUCATION
AND MAJOR THRUST OF THEIR
RECOMMENDATIONS
Truman Commission
The President's Commission on Higher Education
convened by President Harry S. Truman in 1946 stressed
egalitarianism of access to higher education

and set

the stage for the spectacular expansion of higher edu¬
cation during the fifties and sixties.

It also attempted

to articulate the purpose of collegiate education, and
establish a framework for curricular responses through
the general education movement.
Mayhew,

According to Lewis

"in many respects the Truman Commission may have

been relatively more influential for its time than the
Morrill Act of 1862."^

White House Conference on Youth
The White House Conference on Youth was planned
in 1971 as a forum whereby the youth of America could
address the most pressing issues of the day.

This group

^Lewis Mayhew, The Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education, p. 6.
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suggested that education had emerged as the primary
instrument for the solution of domestic social problems
such as racism, pcverty, the city and the environment.
Mayhew claims, however, that despite its "ringing ideals
(it) has had little effect on the conduct of higher
education."

2

Newman Task Force
The Task Force on Higher Education established
by the Office of Education and headed by Frank Newman was
considerably smaller in size and budget than other study
commissions on higher education.

It also had a more

liberal membership.
The Newman Task Group looked at higher education
as a broad total system and asked questions about its
effectiveness in terms of society's needs.

Its overall

thrust was that much of what is going on in higher education
today is not responsive to the needs of society; that
institutions themselves are not likely to effoct the

^Ibid., p. 9*

needed changes; and that massive federal intervention and
the creation of new educational enterprises are required
in order to get a higher education system more in line
with present national priorities.

The Task Force placed

emphasis on public debate as a force for change in higher
education, and suggested that the federal government take
the initiative through specific funding efforts.

In

1973f one might well question the viability of the notion
of new alternative systems, but there is little doubt that
the Newman Report with its able critique of higher edu¬
cation had a major impact on the educational debate both
inside and outside of institutions.
Assembly on University Goals and Governance
The Assembly on University Goals and Governance
established by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
in 1969 spoke to a large number of educational issues,
and issued a series of recommendations, but its Report
has been poorly disseminated.

While it should have some

impact within higher education circles—because of the
prestigiousness of the group--it is not likely to have
a major impact at broader national levels.
Special Committee on Campus Tensions
The Special Committee on Campus Tensions es¬
tablished in 1969 by the American Council on Education,
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suggested remedies for many of the problems that were
causing widespread disruption on campuses.

They called

for improved governance procedures, greater diversity
among faculty, staff and students, and more flexible
curricula.
President's Commission on Campus Unrest
Established in June 1970 in the wake of Kent State
and Jackson State, the President's Commission on Campus
Unrest suggested ways of dealing with campus disruption
and a variety of reforms for higher education.
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education
The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education was
established in I967 by the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching with support from the Carnegie
Corporation.

It was financed with five and two-thirds

million dollars over a six year period.

Chaired by

Clark Kerr, the Commission's members included presidents,
trustees^and professors associated with colleges and
universities.

Starting with the objective of studying

the financing of higher education, the Commission eventually
took under review almost every aspect of higher educationfunction, structure, governance, expenditure, technology,
effective use of resources, and reform.

The Commission
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issued special reports, and sponsored a series of special
studies appearing in over eighty publications.
The work of the Commission is difficult to
summarize, but the overall directions they suggest for
higher education are, according to Clark Kerr,
Toward social justice—provision of universal
equal access to higher education (but not the
encouragement of universal attendance)
Toward more options. flexibility, diversity—a
revolution of free choice for students of all
ages.
Toward more resources and their more effective
use
Toward reconsideration of purposes—though the
functions of higher education may have multiplied,
the purposes of higher education have not been
deeply analyzed and redefined for nearly a century
Toward improved governance
We give high priority as well to constructive
change3
It is also difficult to evaluate the work of
the Commission.

Norman Bimbaum and others have been

severely critical, maintaining that the Commission did
not deal with matters of substance, and that it accepted
too many educational assumptions as inherently good.
Lewis Mayhew on the other hand is supportive:

^Clark Kerr,
1973). P‘5.

"Viewpoint," Change,.

(November
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In total, the work of the Carnegie Commission on
Higher Education must be judged highly successful
—virtually all of the policy recommendations and
studies are sophisticated and tuned to prevailing
knowledge about higher education ... it is
possible that a substantial number of commission
recommendations will become operative elements of
public policy.^
Books
In addition to Commissions, two books written in
the last decade seem to have had a major impact on the
debate about higher education.

The Academic Revolution

by Christopher Jencks and David Riesman is a comprehensive
study of American higher education which pays particular
attention to the relationship between education and society.
Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University treats

the role

of the university in society and claims that the university s
chief product—knowledge--is the most important factor in
economic and social growth as well as "the most powerful
single element in our culture."^

He sees the role of

the university as that of "service station.

*’Mayhew, Ibid., p»
5Kerr, ThP Uses of the Universi;^, Ibid., p. vii.
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SUPPLEMENTARY REVIEW OF LITERATURE
ON ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

This section contains an overview of the work of
Ronald Havelock, who is the major synthesizer of research
on

knowledge diffusion and utilization, a general review

of research on decision and change process in business,
industry and other organizational settings, and a review
of the work on planned change in systems, particularly
elementary and secondary education.

All of this work

contributed in important ways to the perspectives of those
focusing on change in institutions of higher education.
Ronald Havelock—Research on Knowledge Diffusion
and Utilization.

Ronald Havelock's work in the area

of knowledge diffusion and utilization is concerned with
how ideas .spread among and within social systems.
this study,

For

it is important because it speaks to the

question of how concepts about missions and objectives
diffuse from the level of higher education theorists and
policy influencers into the university, how they diffuse
among university members, and how they are utilized for
program planning.

The focus of Havelock's major work.

Planning for Innovation through Dissemination and
Utilization of Knowledge, was "to assess the current state
of knowledge with respect to processes of dissemination
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and utilization."^

He conducted a literature search of

over four thousand titles and categorized the literature
into three conceptual modelsi

research and development,

social interaction; and problem-solving.

He felt that

each of these models provided insights, but each was
inadequate to explain the totality of the diffusion
process.

He, therefore, created his own conceptual

model—the linkage model—to integrate the other three.
These models were discussed in Chapter I

because they

were significant in the work of Jack Lindquist, and further
elaborated upon in connection with their applicability to
the study of change in colleges and universities.
In summarizing his work, Havelock was able to
identify seven "general factors" in knowledge dissemination
and utilizations
1.

LINKAGE - Linkage means the degree of inter¬
personal or intergroup connection.
"The more
linkages there are and the stronger these
linkages are, the more effective will be the
day to day contact and exchange of information,
hence the greater will be the mutual utiliza¬
tion of knowledge. Most importantly, the greater
the number of overlapping linkages throughout
the macrosystem of knowledge production and
dissemination, the more frequent and the more
effective will be the knowledge utilization
by all."2

^Ronald Havelock, Planning for Innovation Through
Dissemination and Utilization of Knowledge,Ibid., p.
•
^Ibid., pp.

11-21.
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2.

STRUCTURE - "The degree of systematic organization
and coordination of elements strongly affects
the utilzation process. The extent to which
structuring takes place in the sender and receiver
and in the message seem to be important correlates
of successful dissemination and utilization."3

3«

OPENNESS - "Openness is the readiness to give and
receive new information and is fundamental to
effective utilization.
It it a prerequisite to
'linkage* and a necessary complement to 'struct ur e.

4.

CAPACITY - "This summary concept ties together
the highly intercorrelated variables of 'wealth,'
'power,' I status,' 'education,* 'intelligence*
and 'sophistication* which are invariably good
predictors of successful innovation and utiliza¬
tion.
Those who already possess the most in the
way of resources and capabilities are the most
likely to be able to get even more."5

5.

REWARD - "It is a fundamental psychological
fact that rewarded behavior tends to be re¬
peated.

6.

PROXIMITY - Closeness to resources, people and
knowledge mades their use more possible.
Proxi¬
mity is a factor closely related to linkage.

7.

SYNERGY - Havelock uses the English and English
definition of synergy:
"exerting force together
or in combination, or upon the same point."?

^Ibid., pp. 11-23*
^Ibid., pp. 11-24.
^Ibid., pp. 11-25*
^Ibid., pp. 11-26.
"^Ibid., pp. 11-27*
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For knowledge diffusion and utilization the
concept of synergy suggests the need for
"purposeful redundancy" and the need for
leadership.
Although Havelock found several other important
variables in his study| he thinks that these seven factors
seem to account for the bulk of diffusion and utilization
as a phenomenon.
Research and Theory on Decision and Change Processes
in Business and Industry and other Organizational Settings.
>

A great deal of research has been done on the process of
change in the organizational settings of business and
industry.

Benne, Bennis, and Chin review the social,

psychological, and sociological literature pertaining to
innovation and change in organizational settings in The
Q

Planning of Change.
zations^

Warren Bennis in Changing Organi¬

summarized and categorized techniques used in

organizational change efforts and advocated a theory of
"planned change."

Paul Mersey and Ken Blanchard in

Management of Organizational Behavior^^

have attempted

to synthesize a number of theories of change, motivation,
and leadership behavior.

They summarize Maslow's Need's

^Warren Bennis, Kenneth Benne, and Robert Chin,
eds.. The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart &
WinstonT

1969).

barren Bennis, Changing Organizations (New York:
McGraw-Hill, I966).
^^Paul Mersey and Ken Blanchard, Management of Organi2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J** Prenticenational Behavior.
Hall, 1972).
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Hierarchy, Herzbug's Motivation-Hygiene Theory, Argyris's
Immaturity-Materity Continuum, McGregor's Leadership
Theory,- Likert's Theory of Management Systems, Schein's
Motivation Paradigm, and Lewin's Change Cycle, and attempt
these into their own Life Cycle Theory*
Life Cycle Theory describes four phases of growth in an
organization and suggests appropriate behavior for each
growth phase on the part of the leader.

It is meant to

be useful to practitioners of change.
Havelock devoted a chapter of his study to the
organizational context of dissemination and utilization.
He views the organization as a
dynamic problem-solving system which maintains
functionality and stability over time, by de¬
veloping and maintaining an internal structure
and a protective skin to regulate and inhibit
the flow of messages from the environment.
He sees, however, two competing demands
the drive to maintain order and certainty
which tend to create structures, herarchies,
requirements and screening procedures which
act as barriers to knowledge flow; while the
drive to innovate and improve tends to remove
such barriers.
He found that some organizational factors such

^^Havelock, Ibid., pp. 6-1.
12 Ibid.

as training.
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leadership styles, structure, and roles to have been
crucial to the dynamic in organizations, yet Havelock
concluded that most structures and most roles in an organi¬
zation act as inhibitors of change.
Research and Theory on Planned Change in School
Systems.

In I962 Everett Rogers completed an important

study, Diffusion of Innovation, which included a comprehen¬
sive review of the literature—chiefly from anthropology,
rural sociology, medicine and education—and attempted an
inter-disciplinary comparative approach to the study of
diffusion.

Roger's work led not only into Havelock's

diffusion studies but also quite directly into the tradition
of research on innovations in school systems.

Rogers

also attempted to define the characteristics of innovations
that would make them more or less difficult to implement.
These characteristics include.
1.

Relative advantage over existing practice

2.

Compatibility with basic values

3.

Complexity

4.

Divisibility

5.

Communicability

13

^^Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations,
Ibid.
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Richard Carlson in I965 tried to relate Rogers
characteristics to rates of adoption of an innovation.
He showed that "innovations that were considered the best
possibilities for more rapid diffusion •

• • were those

rated high in relative advantage, compatibility and
communicability and low in complexity.

Although he felt

that there was no conclusive data on the relationship be¬
tween diffusion rate and characteristics, the characteristic
that seemed to be most important was compatibility.

Innova¬

tions must be compatible with cultural norms, existing values
and past experiences of individuals and social systems.
Matthew Miles' Innovation in Education (1968)
provides an overview of research in the area of educational
innovation and diffusion of innovations through school
systems.He includes a series of case studies on
specific innovations and provides a summary chapter that
contributes significantly to the theory.

Although its

major thrust is on innovation at lower school levels, it
does consider the process of change in higher education,
and has become a base line for those interested in aca¬
demic reform in colleges and universities.

In summarizing

^^Richard Carlson, Adoption of Educational Innovations (Eugene, Oregon:
Center for the Advanced Study of
Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 19o5)*
^%atthew Miles, ed.

Innovations in Education, Ibid.
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the studies in his volume, Miles states that educational
innovations are almost never started or installed on their
merits.

He feels that the characteristics of the local

system, of the persons or groups involved, and of other
relevant groups are the crucial factors.

He also ad¬

vocated the use of temporary systems and linkages.
Temporary systems are those that operate within an organi¬
zation or institution, hut have not been completely
accepted as a permanent part of the organization.

Special

prograjns are examples of temporary systems within the
organization.

If the innovation is to spread from the

temporary to the larger system. Miles felt that there had
to be linkages—usually people—between those systems.
Goodwin Matson and others built from Miles* work
and attempted a fusion of theory and action in one proL

ject.

The Cooperation Project for Educational Development

(COPED) was a three year project funded by the Office
of Education which brought together scholars from several
universities in an inter-university facility to develop
models for planned change for twenty-five school systems
in metropolitan areas.The papers from the project

^^The project model was an interesting one which
«as later ?o h? used by Lindquist.and others working on
planned change for college and universities.
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Concepts for Social Chanee^'^' and Change in School Systems?-^
although aimed at secondary systems, provided many insights
for higher levels.

Concepts for Social Change started

from a broad theoretical view of the problem of knowledge
dissemination and utilization, drew from a variety of
disciplines, and developed the core ideas about planned
change in education.

Change in School Systems focused

attention on the special properties and processes of the
schools in the project and on strategies for change
designed to test and develop the core ideas.
The major barrier to change at secondary and
elementary school levels was considered by most authors—
in Miles' work and COPED—to be bureaucratic organizational
pattern.

In elementary and secondary schools, missions are

somewhat clear, power is clearly located, and while conflict
is apparent, it is responsive to interventions.

Given this,

the major change strategies suggested at these levels in-

^^Goodwin Watson, Concepts for Social Change
(published for Cooperative Project for Educational De¬
velopment by National Training Laboratories, 1967).
^^Goodwin Watson, Change in School Systems
(published for Cooperative Project for Educational De¬
velopment by National Training Laboratories, 1967).
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\

volve personnel administration to provide effective
leadership from the top and the use of outside consul¬
tants—as diagnosticians, and/or trainers of internal
change teams.
In colleges and xmiversities, however, where
missions are unclear, power is diffuse, and the organi¬
zational structure archaic, the change strategies that seem
to be effective at secondary elementary levels may prove
insufficient.

n
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This section contains an overview of work on the
change process that was not considered in Chapter I.

It

reviews general attitudes toward change and the change
process including those of the Newman Task Force and the
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

As was seen

in Chapter I, these two groups were the most influential
in determining the missions of access, individualization,
and social problem-solving.

They were concerned as well

with how higher education might respond to these missions*
and although their observations did not have a research
base or contribute a great deal to the theory on change,
the Newman and Carnegie groups have influenced the general
attitudes and feelings about the process of change and the
possibilities for change in colleges and universities.
This section also contains a review of additional
work on the process of change in colleges and universities
that was published subsequent to Lon Hefferlin's synthesis
of the change literature and was not considered by Jack
Lindquist.
General Attitudes Toward Change.

In American

society, change has traditionally been considered
synonymous to progress and therefore good.

Educational

institutions, especially universities, however, were
considered to have the major function of preserving the
best of the culture.

Therefore a great traditionalism
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and ritualistic conservatism has been built up around
them that makes changes seem almost impossible to achieve.
In contrast to European universities, however, American
universities have always been more pragmatic and utilitari.an..

The history of American higher education is the history

of the slow evolution of form and function in response to
the dictates of American society.
In the quarter century since World War II there
have been two major trends.

From 19^5 through the mid¬

sixties, higher education was almost universally considered
a good in American society, therefore, the emphasis was
not on changing its forms or functions but on providing more
of it to more people.

By the late sixties and early seven¬

ties, however, more people were criticizing higher edu¬
cation for its failures to respond adequately to society's
or its own students' needs and were urging it to take on
U

new missions.

Many were despairing that it could ever

regain its place

as a vital institution in American

society.
For those who remain positive about our educational
institutions,

"evolutionary" change has greater appeal,

for those more negative, nothing short of radical change
will do.
John Gardner summed up well the general attitude
toward change:
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We do not need more change as such. We need
more 'intentional change'—specifically, the
kinds of change in our institutions that will
enable them to adapt to the radically altered
circumstances in which they are now forced to
function.^
The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

The

Carnegie Commission was generally in favor of change, but
not radical change.

In its final report. Priorities for

Action, the Commission lists "the enhancement of construc¬
tive change" as one of its seven "priorities for action."
The Commission cited three reasons why change has
been slow:

a) higher education by nature has been oriented

toward preservation of history and perpetuation of tra¬
ditions, b) faculty members have control over governance
and as a professional group move very slowly and attempt
where possible to achieve consensus before changing and
c) continuity of academic mores including 'a sense of
stability in structure" has in the past been deemed
important for individual scholarly activity.

The Commission

felt, however, that "the period 1970 to 2000 may prove
to be the second most active period of change in the

^John Gardner , "Universities as Designers of the
(Fall 196?), PP* 315-319.
Future, Educational Record
ft
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history of American higher education.”^
for this prediction about change include

The reasons
new types of

students, new interests among students, new knowledge,
new job market, new social problems, and new technology.
Also "the most universally intense pressure for change may
well turn out to be the shortage of students, as compared
with places available for them, particularly in the
1980*s."^
The Commission has favored reform in three direc¬
tions :
toward more options for students in their
attendance patterns; toward more diversity
of programs both as among and within individual
institutions, thus expanding the range of choice^^
for students; and toward enrichment of programs.
They have recommended ways to encourage change at
the

system-wide and institutional levels mentioning

specifically:
A.

The Fund for Improvement of Post Secondary
Education to be created at the national
level.

^Priorities for Action, Ibid., p. 44.
^Ibid., p. 46.
4
^Ibid.

B.

The creation of such funds at the state level.

C.

At the institutional level, setting aside one
to three per cent of the budget to be directed
toward new endeavors plus the creation of an
office for improvement of undergraduate edu¬
cation.

D.

Assuring that new ideas be allowed trial on
experimental basis before review by faculty
members.

E.

Greater involvement of students in decision¬
making.

F.

The selection of activist presidents who will
give
forward-looking leadership.
The Commission feels that higher education should

take internal initiative as the basic pattern for change
rather than simply respond to outside pressures, but it
does not feel particularly confident about this likelihood.
When all is said and done, however, more
change is likely to take place on the peri¬
phery of higher education—in non-traditional
programs and in further education—than in
colleges or universities themselves.5
While"the Commissions’ analysis of the change
process is fairly unsophisticated, and their recommendations
concerning change programs and strategies are fairly
general, it is one of the few attempts to view higher
education from a total system view and it does at least

’ibid., p(

.
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encourage (or allow for) thinking about change process
at the general policy level.
Newman Task Force.

The Newman Task Force whose

first report was issued two years prior to the Carnegie
Commission's Priorities, can nonetheless be taken as a
rebuttal to the fundamentally positivistic and ameliorist
stance of the Carnegie commissioni

The Newman Task Force

points out that:
The beginning of the decade of the 1970's seems
a time of unprecedented crisis for higher edu¬
cation ....
Something has gone wrong ....
There is growing recognition that higher educa¬
tion needs reform.
The major impediment to change is the set of
assumptions on which educational policy is
based .... Thus it is argued that the task
is:
a.
To expand our present system to provide each
young American with a chance at entrance ....
b.
To maintain diversity by insuring that we
continue to have both public and private
institutions ....
c.
To meet the demand for relevance in educa¬
tion by developing new curricul\ims ....
d.
To continue to improve the level of
professionalism, etc.
To each of these recommendations (strikingly similar to
those articulated two years later by the Carnegie
Commission!), the Newman Commission provides a rebuttal.
For Newman, simply expanding our system will not meet the
educational needs of the new students that will be enter¬
ing; diversity cannot be maintained simply through the
maintenance of public and private institutions, because
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higher educational institutions of all current types are
inexorably moving towards homogeneity.

What is required

are radically new institutions both public and private.
Also, relevant new curricula can only be developed by those
outside the present system, not by those inside.
The Newman group feels that
Today, the most pressing issues are not internal,
within higher education, but involve broad social
decisions regarding its role in contemporary
America, decisions in which the public must have
a voice.^
The Task Force found a compelling need for major structural
changes and felt that there was a fleeting opportunity for
effecting them provided that

a) higher education was

made an issue of serious and comprehensive public debate,
and b) the federal government used its financial clout
to encourage the major changes by creating new and
competitive institutions.
The Commission recommended a variety of changes
ranging from the creation of new enterprises to reviving
institutional missions, but other than federal funding
a reliance on making a problem a public issue* The Task
Force did not suggest other strategies for effecting
changes.

^Report on Higher Education, p. 62.

and
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Harold Hodghinson has some serious questions about
the Newman change strategies.

In a review of the Newman

Task Force report in Change« he predicts that the
Newman Task Force,
. . . will have great difficulty in creating
change and diversity at the campus level . . .
few debates have taken place within institutions
. • . yet it is at the institutional level that
educational debate is most needed .... How
does one engage the thousands on thousands of
college and university faculty .„. . in the
decisions of educational policy?'
The Newman Task Force displayed a pessimistic view
about the possibilities for change within institutions of
higher education.

Ironically, hosts of college and uni¬

versity faculty and administrators were profoundly affected
by its report# and a series of changes and reforms were
initiated within institutions as a direct response.
Additional Research and Theory on Change iji
Colleges and Universities.
B. Richard Evans.
In 1970, Richard Evans published a book entitled
stance to Innovation in Higher Educatj^,

in

which he reported on a study which pursued the
problem

of

faculty

resistance to innovation

^Harold Hodgkinson, "Reflections on the Newman
Commission" Change. (May 1972), p. ir'.
®Richard

^"®;,clicof''’joLey-Ba2sri97uT^

Higher Education (San Francisco:

uu

j
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through a research case study.

The study examines an

academic community's response to a particular innovationI.T.V.

His few conclusions basically corroborated those

of Lon Hefferlin but were far more limited in scope
C. Dwight Ladd
Another work published in 1970 that deals with
institutional change is Dwight Ladd's Change in Educational
Policy*^

Ladd looks at self studies made by a diverse

sample of colleges and universities, tries to assess the
changes that have resulted from the self-studies, and
attempts to generalize some theories of change from these
cases.

Ladd concluded,

The situations reviewed here suggest that these
studies have rarely succeeded in bringing about any
fundamental change in educational policies on the^
campuses involved except where a significant portion
of the faculty had accepted the desirability of some
change before the study began and where pressures
for change from outside the faculties were much in
evidence
Ladd ascribed the resistance to change primarily
to governance patterns which afford collegiality.
, . • real change in educational policy will require significant reallocation of resources, and
at present, resource allocation is controlled for

^Dwight R. Ladd, Change in Education Po.^^yi SelfCarnegie
q+hHioq in Selected Colleges and Universities, The
Commission on Higher Education (New Yori^ Mc^Graw- Hill,
1970).
^°Ibid., p. 200.
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the most part by those who most benefit from
the status auo.ii
Ladd did not see the institutional studies and
reports as an effective strategy for change.
E. Harold Taylor
Harold Taylor wrote How to Change Collegesi
on Radical Reform

12

in 1971•

Notes

It was "intended as a practical

book or operating manual on how to put educational changes
into effect.While it might prove helpful for a
president of a small college, I did not find its suggestions
adequate to deal with the complexities of large institutions
such as universities.

^^Ibid., p. 211.
^^Harold Taylor, How to Change Colleges: Notes
on Radical Reform (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1971).
^^Ibid., author’s note
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The Academic Matters Council had other questions
about the proposal as well.
wide program

asked for a university-

felt l;hat this proposal was too affiliated

with the College of Arts and Sciences.

In response to this

objection, the ad hoc committee^ revised its proposal to
call for a free-standing program called the Bachelor's
Degree with Individual Concentration.

It would have a

\irector responsible to the Provost's Office.

The revised

proposal encouraged the participation of other Schools
in addition to the College of Arts and Sciences.
The revised proposal was discussed again at a
February meeting of the Academic Matters Council.

Council

members—principally Everett Emerson—were still not satis¬
fied with the program.

The issue of the cost of such a

program was raised.
In an action quite separate from the BDIC proposal,
the Academic Matters Council had decided that it should
investigate the cost implications to the University of any
new policy or program before it recommended action to the
Faculty Senate.

Accordingly, it established occasional

ad hoc committees for this purpose.

Several members of

the Council objected strongly to the budget review committees
because they felt that the Council should concern itself
with academic and not budgetary issues.

Because of this

difference of opinion the ad hoc budget review mechanism
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H.

Strong yet changing leadership throughout

the decade.
I.

A number of institutional self studiesf

committees on long range planning, and frequent open
discussions on missions and the role of the university
in society.
J.

An overall climate for change.

Students,

faculty, and administrators felt that it was worth
working for change because change was possible.
It would, however, be a mistake to oversimplify.
Although campus leaders were prepared to place emphasis
and^ prioritizethey were not ready to become one'dimensiona^so the University of Massachusetts remained a
complex institution with many missions and objectives.
Also, the shifts in orientation from graduate to under¬
graduate education; and from pure research to applied
research, public service, and social problem-solving/^
were shifts more obvious in the rhetoric than in the
organizational structure,

the allocation of resources^

or the activity levels.
Special Unite

as Vehicles for Change.

The vehicle

for change most often advocated and used at the University
of Massachusetts was the creation of new programs or
centers.

Special programs were advocated and created

as a means to be responsive to a new student clientele.
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